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Inequalities in European Labour Markets between Insiders and Outsiders -
Employment Protection Legislation and its Relation to Unemployment. 
Cross-Country Empirical Evidence 
1. Introduction 
In the past, employment protection legislation (EPL), particularly concerning the 
use of temporary employment, has been relaxed in many European countries. 
This development was triggered by the high unemployment rates observable in 
Europe compared with the United States and Japan, two countries with less rigid 
labour market institutions (Blanchard/Wolfers 2000; Nickell et al. 2005). 
Differences in employment protection rules have been identified as one of the 
main causes to explain differences in labour markets (OECD 1994). Rigid EPL 
may decrease hiring incentives as a result of high labour turnover costs, and it 
may restrict the ability of firms to adapt to technological progress and 
globalization, thereby hindering the reduction of unemployment (Addison/Teixeira 
2001; OECD 2004; Skedinger 2010; Walwei 2002). 
The design of employment protection rules is also part of the guidelines 
for employment policies of the member states of the European Union adopted by 
the council of the European Union in October 2010. Member states are obliged to 
increase labour market participation and reduce structural unemployment by 
introducing, together with other labour market reforms, ‘a combination of flexible 
and reliable contractual arrangements’ (2010/707/EU: 308/50).1 
EPL is the entire set of regulations that restrict the abilities of a firm to hire 
and fire workers. These regulations are primarily based on specific laws covering 
not only the dismissal of regular employees and the use of temporary work, but 
also collective bargaining or court rulings (OECD 2004). They 
 ‘exist when an individual employer cannot, even by agreement with his or her 
own employees, use particular working arrangements or forms of employment contract, 
                                                             
 
1
 Member states are encouraged to implement flexicurity principles by enhancing the degree of 
flexibility and security on their labour markets. For this purpose, they are obliged to introduce policy 
packages adressing not only EPL, but also active labour market policies, effective lifelong learning, 
policies to promote labour mobility as well as social security systems that provide a certain level of 
income security for their citizens (2010/707/EU). 
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without risking legal sanctions or the invalidity of the relevant provisions in the contract’ 
(Grubbs/Wells 1993: 9).  
The strictness of EPL is usually determined by the costs arising from a dismissal 
(Bertola et al. 1999; Botero et al. 2004; Grubbs/Wells 1993; Lazear 1990; OECD 
1994, 1999; Venn 2009). 
The advantages and disadvantages arising from the level of EPL are hotly 
debated within the literature. Strict EPL is mainly criticized for high dismissal 
costs that increase labour costs and reduce hiring incentives. Another frequently 
criticized aspect is the diminished degree of flexibility that prevents an adequate 
adaption towards technological progress (Enste/Hardegge 2006; OECD 2004; 
Walwei 1996) On the other hand, strict EPL provides employees with a certain 
degree of job security and reduces the number of fluctuations within a company 
(OECD 2004). Furthermore, strict EPL facilitates incentives for employees to 
invest in firm-specific human capital, as they are more likely able to amortize 
investment costs (OECD 2004). Assuming that workers behave reciprocally, EPL 
also increases cooperation between employees and employers and improves the 
identification of the staff with the company goals, thereby increasing motivation 
and the acceptance of technological progress (Walwei 1996). 
As the empirical literature shows, the effects of EPL on unemployment are 
actually ambiguous. Skedinger (2010) provides a comprehensive overview of 
more than 100 current studies dealing with EPL and its effects on the labour 
market. In some of the reported studies, an increase in EPL is related to an 
increase in unemployment. In contrast, several studies confirm the opposite, 
while in many others, there is no effect at all.  
Most studies and their research goals are characterized by an economic 
perspective. Economic explanations describe unemployment as a consequence 
of market failure and imbalances between labour supply and demand. 
Sociological analyses, in contrast, concentrate generally more on the relation 
between unemployment and individual characteristics (Bonß/Ludwig-Mayerhofer 
2000). In this context, the relation between EPL and social inequality is of great 
interest.  
Social inequality occurs when differences between people, e.g. by age, 
sex or skills, become the basis of hierarchical graduations and determine the 
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access to goods. In this regard, the reduction of social inequality is also strongly 
linked with the improvement of employment chances (Ullrich 2005). The access 
to employment is connected with different manifestations of social inequality: 
employment provides workers with income, which, in turn, is related to financial 
security and offers opportunities for an independent living. Unemployed persons, 
in contrast, suffer very often from poverty and social exclusion. Unemployment is 
often linked with a loss of social status. Moreover, the loss of professional 
contacts can even lead to social isolation (Brinkmann/Schober 2002; 
Eisele/Fischinger 2005; Kirchler 1993).  
Besides the correction of market failures, the reduction of social inequality 
is one central aim of welfare state regulations (Ullrich 2005). EPL regulates the 
labour relations between workers and their employers. The implementation of 
dismissal rules has decreased the existing imbalances between capital and 
labour. This has led to less social tensions, for instance, by reducing the number 
of strikes and by protecting workers against the exploitation by their employers 
(Bonß/Ludwig-Mayerhofer 2000; Ullrich 2005). However, labour market regulation 
can also produce own systems of social stratification. They can systematically 
bias the risk of being unemployed towards specific groups of workers (Esping-
Anderson 1990; Esping-Anderson/Regini 2000). By determining the hiring and 
firing decisions of employers, EPL is, therefore, expected to support systems of 
social closure and labour market segmentation. 
Social closure postulates that specific groups are actively hedging their 
status by utilizing their position of power. In this context, the welfare state takes a 
prominent role by supporting processes of social closure through legal provisions 
(Rössel 2003). By protecting the jobs of the employed from competition and 
establishing employment barriers for others, rigid EPL limits the employment 
chances of outsiders and restricts labour market access (Gangl 2003). The 
linkage of employment protection and job tenure, in particular in terms of 
severance payments and notice periods, facilitates these mechanisms. 
Proponents expect that a relaxation of EPL creates new employment 
opportunities and, therewith, leads to a reduction of unemployment (Giesecke 
2006). On the other side, the relaxation of EPL, in particular by facilitating the use 
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of temporary employment, is expected to strengthen labour market segmentation, 
i.e. the division of the labour market into a primary and a secondary segment. 
The primary segment is characterized by high wages, opportunities for 
advancement and, in particular, by high levels of job stability, while the secondary 
segment is marked by low wages, bad working conditions, low upward-mobility, 
instability of labour relations and a high level of job fluctuation (Piore 1978, 
quoted after Giesecke 2006).  
Most of the past EPL reforms followed a two-tier strategy only applying to 
new contracts and facilitating the creation or expansion of dual labour markets 
with a core and a periphery workforce (Barbieri 2009). Although fixed-term 
employment cannot be clearly allocated to one of the two segments, it might be 
assumed that the majority belongs to the secondary segment, where workers are 
flexibly deployed and dismissed according to the respective demand for goods 
(Giesecke 2006). The reduction of social inequality that may result from an 
improvement of employment chances by relaxing EPL, thus, might be weakened 
due to a proceeding labour market segmentation characterized by unequal 
working conditions for different groups of workers. 
 The work of Skedinger (2010) also provides some evidence of individuals 
with a higher probability for newly entering or re-entering the labour market. 
Although results are not totally consistent, most studies confirm that an increase 
in EPL is related to a rise in unemployment for young people and women. Other 
groups, who also face disadvantages in the labour market, have been largely 
ignored. The empirical literature investigating potential imbalances in 
unemployment related to the level or changes in EPL is, thus, rather sparse. 
Therefore, the present thesis attempts to shed additional light on the 
question: How are social inequalities among different labour force groups related 
to the level of or changes in EPL? In this regard, unemployment risks or the 
access to employment respectively, is in the focus of interest. The thesis 
concentrates in particular on inequalities between different skill groups and older 
people with various employment histories. Therewith, important social and 
current developments are addressed: By concentrating on differences according 
to skill levels, the consequences arising from technological progress that have 
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taken place within the last decades are highlighted. Technological amendments 
are described as skill-biased. They have increased the demand for qualified 
labour and changed flexibility demands of companies. Due to this development, 
the employment situation of the low skilled has become worse and social 
inequality between skill groups has increased. This is evidenced by relatively high 
unemployment rates for the low skilled compared to workers with higher 
qualifications. 
The activation of the labour force potential of elderly is also of high social 
and economic relevance as a consequence of demographic developments. 
Therefore, employment barriers preventing the participation of older workers 
should be abolished. Moreover, there are great income differences between older 
workers dependent on their previous employment biographies (Möhring 2013). In 
order to avoid old-age poverty, the improvement of access opportunities to 
employment in the later life is of great importance. 
Another important topic that is addressed within the framework of the 
doctoral thesis is the determinants that are necessary for the implementation of a 
reform. In this regard, consequences of labour market segmentation for the 
support of legislative amendments leading to more flexible employment 
protection are taken up. Thereby, the different roles of labour market insiders and 
outsiders are highlighted. 
The question of how social inequalities among different labour force 
groups are related to the level of or changes in EPL will be answered by 
comparing outcomes for different European countries. Although there is a general 
trend observable towards more flexible legislation, countries vary in some cases 
considerably concerning the level of or changes in EPL. 
 ‘The underlying goal of comparative analysis is to search for similarity 
and variance’ (Mills et al. 2006: 621). Cross-national research aims to compare 
and contrast countries and institutions. It contributes to the understanding of 
differences between countries, e.g. in the level of unemployment rates, by 
considering contextual determinants - in contrast to within country comparisons, 
where ‘only’ variations over time are examined. In the present thesis, EPL and its 
varying forms in different countries are in the focus of the analyses. However, 
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each of the studies takes into account additional contextual factors that are 
expected to influence the relation between EPL and unemployment, i.e. other 
labour market institutions and policies as well specific economic conditions.  
Moreover, by using comparative analysis, the generalizability of 
theoretical assumptions can be tested. However, by concentrating on European 
countries only, cases are not selected randomly. Therefore, the results can only 
be transferred to the chosen sample. Case selection has been mainly driven by 
data availability. Moreover, the thesis tries to contribute to political discussions 
taking place at the European level, e.g. the flexicurity debate (European 
Commission 2013b; de Beer/Schils 2009; Wilthagen 2008). The debate deals 
with the optimal level of EPL in combination with additional security and activation 
policies. In addition, the European Commission formulates employment 
guidelines addressing the flexibility of labour markets of its member states. 
In the following section of the introduction, I will refer to the insider-
outsider theory by Lindbeck and Snower (1987, 1988, 2001, 2002) that provides 
the theoretical background for all papers. It illustrates the underlying mechanisms 
of social closure within labour markets. Next, I describe how EPL has been 
operationalized and which limitations have to be accepted in this context. I also 
provide an overview on the current level of EPL in Europe and its development 
since 1995. The introduction ends with a short description of the content, 
methods used and the data captured within the four studies that constitute the 
main part of the dissertation. The thesis ends with a critical discussion of the 
findings and outlines some policy implications that can be derived from them. 
1.1 Theoretical background: the insider-outsider theory 
The insider-outsider theory of Lindbeck and Snower (1987, 1988, 2001, 2002) 
explains disparities between groups of the labour force arising from different 
levels of EPL. Labour market insiders are incumbent workers who often enjoy 
higher levels of job security and who are protected by dismissal rules for regular 
employment. The disadvantages that outsiders face result from their labour 
market position. Outsiders are persons who enter or re-enter the labour market, 
are unemployed or employed only on a temporary basis. 
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The hiring and firing costs resulting from the level of EPL determine the 
amount of labour turnover costs that arise from the replacement of insiders with 
outsiders. These costs cannot be passed completely to the employees and must 
be paid by the firms. In this context, labour turnover costs encompass, for 
example, severance payments, administrative burdens and transaction costs.  
Besides the costs resulting from EPL, the firm has to pay search and 
bargaining costs for the hiring process. It also participates in costs arising from 
the training and qualification of new recruits. 
Labour turnover costs provide insiders with a certain degree of market 
power since they decrease the incentives for firms to replace insiders. ‘Labor 
turnover costs determine the degree of substitutability […]’ (Lindbeck/Snower 
2001: 168). Wage underbidding processes could improve the bargaining 
positions of the outsiders. Outsiders, therefore, face labour market discrimination 
since they are not rewarded equally for the same effort. However, in practice, 
such wage underbidding competitions are not common. Lindbeck and Snower 
(2001) mention in this context three main explanations: 
1) The minimum-wage explanation: Legislation keeps the wage above its 
market-clearing level. 
2) The efficiency wage explanation: Firms refuse to accept low wages 
because they anticipate a decrease in productivity or an increase in job 
fluctuation. 
3) The insider-outsider theory explanation: Insiders may influence the firm’s 
behaviour by threatening to not cooperate with new recruits. Thereby, 
they create an ‘insider-entrant productivity differential’ (Lindbeck/Snower 
1987: 5).  
Labour turnover costs generally influence the hiring and firing decisions of 
employers. Since employers are able to anticipate these costs in the future, they 
‘discourage firms from hiring when labor demand rises and from firing when labor 
demand falls’ (Lindbeck/Snower 2001: 170). Rigid EPL, therefore, constitutes 
employment barriers for outsiders, while insiders profit from stable employment 
relationships and low unemployment risks. The more rigid EPL is, the stronger 
the disadvantages of outsiders are.  
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A change in the strictness of dismissal rules alters the labour market 
situation of the outsiders. Less rigid rules reduce labour turnover costs and, 
therefore, the bargaining power of insiders. Firms have higher incentives to hire 
outsiders. The introduction of temporary employment also increases the 
employment chances of outsiders, as there are no separation costs at the end of 
the employment relationship. Outsiders might, however, be ‘confined to dead-end 
jobs’ (Lindbeck/Snower 1988: 3).  
The insider-outsider theory explains differences in unemployment 
between persons with stable and persons with irregular employment histories. 
Notice periods and severance payments are often related to job tenure. Labour 
turnover costs for people with short tenure are usually low. These people are 
confronted, in turn, with higher dismissal risks compared to employees with long-
lasting job relationships. 
The theory also aims to explain variations between men and women, 
persons of different age groups and those with different skill levels, since these 
attributes are correlated with specific labour market positions (Lindbeck/Snower 
2002). Women are more likely than men to belong to the outsider group because 
of career breaks and phases of atypical employment as a consequence of 
parenting periods. This is reflected in higher inactivity rates compared to the male 
population (Table 1.1).  
Table 1.1: Employment indicators for specific groups (15-64 years), EU27, 
2012 
  Inactivity rate Unemployment 
rate 
Temporary 
employment rate* 
Total 28,2 % 10,6 % 13,7 % 
Men 22.0 % 10.5 % 13.2 % 
Women 34.4 % 10.6 % 14.2 % 
15-24 years old 57.4 % 22.8 % 42.0 % 
25-49 years old 14.0 % 9.9 % 12.2 % 
50-64 years old 36.7 % 7.4 % 6.6 % 
Low skilled 45.1 % 18.6 % 20.1 % 
Medium skilled 24.7 % 9.6 % 12.6 % 
Highly skilled 12.9 % 6.1 % 11.4 % 
* Notes: The temporary employment rate is the share of total employment. 
Source: eurostat (2013). 
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Young persons are generally more likely than older persons to be outsiders 
because they are new to the labour market after completing formal education. 
They are more often inactive, unemployed or employed on a temporary basis. 
Older people are less often unemployed or temporary employed, but compared 
with the medium-aged population, they are more frequently inactive. Moreover, 
although older workers are generally at a lower risk of becoming unemployed, 
they usually show higher rates of long-term unemployment compared to younger 
individuals (OECD 2006). Low skilled workers face higher unemployment risks 
due to the technological advances, since their knowledge often becomes 
obsolete and the demand for qualified labour increases (Acemoglu 2002). They 
are also more often inactive and temporary employed compared to other skill 
groups. 
The difference between insiders and outsiders also plays a role for the 
design and implementation of employment protection reforms. Insiders, because 
of their numerical dominance, are considered the decisive voters. Their support 
for reforms is important for politicians for not being punished with deselection in 
the next legislature. Labour market insiders are mainly interested in maintaining 
their job security (Ochel et al. 2008; Saint-Paul 1993). Therefore, insiders 
generally resist reforms that relax the level of EPL. Outsiders, in contrast, have 
incentives to diminish employment barriers and to improve their own job 
opportunities. However, since they usually form a minority, their interests fall back 
behind the interests of incumbent workers. 
1.2 Operationalization of employment protection legislation 
By measuring EPL, we are confronted with a complex system of rules. In order to 
make information comparable, indices have been created detailing the strictness 
of EPL for different countries. The most comprehensive EPL index, provided by 
the OECD,2 captures information on 40 countries between the years 1985 and 
2009. 3 The OECD defines EPL as follows:  
                                                             
 
2
 For other quantitative EPL measures see Lazear (1990), Heckman/Pagés (2001), Grubbs/Wells 
(1993), Botero et al. (2004). For qualitative datasets see e.g. the DICE database (2011) or the 
LABREF database provided by the European Commission (2013a). 
3
 Full information is not available for all countries. 
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‘Employment protection refers both to regulations concerning hiring (e.g. rules 
favouring disadvantaged groups, conditions for using temporary or fixed-term contracts, 
training requirements) and firing (e.g. redundancy procedures, mandated prenotification 
periods and severance payments, special requirements for collective dismissals and 
short-time work schemes)’ (OECD 1999: 50).  
This definition is very broad and encompasses aspects that are not 
directly linked to the protection of existing employment but to the facilitation or 
hindrance of employment entry for outsiders. 
 Regulation refers to all types of employment protection rules: legislation, 
court rulings, collectively bargained conditions of employment and customary 
practice (as long as information is available).   
The EPL index provided by the OECD has been revised several times. 
The first index was developed in 1994 (OECD 1994) and was based on previous 
work from Grubbs and Wells in 1993. The current index captures three different 
areas of EPL: dismissal rules for regular employment, regulation on the use of 
temporary employment and dismissal rules for collective dismissals (Figure 1.1). 
Concerning the rules on dismissal for regular employees, direct costs 
arising from severance payments and notice periods as well as indirect costs 
resulting from procedural inconveniences and the difficulty of a dismissal can be 
differentiated. The length of the notice period and the amount of severance pay 
are measured separately for seniorities lasting 9 months, 4 years and 20 years. 
Regarding procedural inconveniences, these are distinguished by whether a) a 
dismissal is only legitimate by indicating a reason; b) a third party, such as a 
works council or local employment exchange must be informed about the 
dismissal; or c) a third party even must give permission in advance. The ‘difficulty 
of dismissal’ is determined by the length of the trial period and the compensation 
payable to a worker who has been unfairly dismissed after 20 years in service 
measured in monthly wages. Furthermore, the indicator measures the possibility 
of re-employment and differentiates between these four different status groups: 
never granted, rare, possible and if the employee always has the option of 
reinstatement. The indicator ‘difficulty of dismissal’ also includes the strictness of 
definitions that determine a fair or unfair dismissal. The following categories are 
distinguished: a) workers capability and redundancy of the job are adequate 
grounds for dismissal; b) social considerations, such as age or job tenure must, if 
17 
 
possible, influence the choice of which workers to dismiss; c) retraining to adapt 
the worker to different work must be attempted prior to dismissal; and d) worker 
capability is never allowed to be a legitimate reasons for dismissal.  
 
Figure 1.1: Employment protection (sub-) indices 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Based on OECD 1999; Skedinger 2010. 
To regulate temporary employment, two sub-indicators can be differentiated that 
deal with the use of fixed-term and temporary work agency (TWA) employment. 
Concerning fixed-term employment, the maximum number of fixed-term contracts 
per company and employee, the maximum cumulated duration of fixed-term 
contracts and reasons that legitimate temporary employment are taken into 
account. Concerning the latter, the following categories are distinguished: a) 
fixed-term contracts are only permitted in ‘objective’ cases, i.e. to perform tasks 
of limited fixed duration; b) specific exemptions apply to situations of employer 
need (for example, launching a new activity) or of employee need (for example, 
workers in search for their first job; c) exemptions exists for both the employer 
Employment 
Protection Legislation 
Dismissal rules for 
regular employment 
Rules for the use of 
temporary employment 
Rules for collective 
dismissals 
Notice periods and 
severance payments 
Difficulty of 
dismissals 
Procedural 
inconveniencies 
Regulation of 
temporary work 
agencies 
Regulation of 
temporary contracts 
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and employee; and d) there are no restrictions on the use of fixed-term contracts. 
For TWA employment, restrictions on the number of renewals and the maximum 
cumulated duration of TWA employment are considered. Types of regulation are 
also differentiated where TWA employment is never legal, where it is legal only 
for certain employment conditions or industries and where no restrictions on 
employment conditions or industries apply.  
The index captures additional information on collective dismissals. Four 
different sub-indicators are included. Firstly, it is controlled for the number of 
dismissed workers when additional rules for collective dismissal must be applied. 
The second sub-indicator measures if there are additional notification 
requirements by employee representatives, work councils or government 
authorities. It includes three categories: no additional requirements, one of these 
actors has to be notified or at least two actors have to be informed. Another sub-
indicator controls whether extra delays are involved. The last sub-indicator takes 
additional costs related to collective dismissals into account. These result, for 
instance, from additional severance payments and/or social compensation plans 
that determine detailing measures for redeployment, retraining or outplacement. 
The last methodological update was made in 2008 (Venn 2009). Three 
additional items have been included: the maximum time allowed for an employee 
to make a claim of unfair dismissal, administrative authorisation and regular 
reporting requirements for temporary work agencies and the requirement for 
temporary work agency workers to receive the same pay and conditions as 
regular workers at the user firm. The inclusion of the latter two requirements 
corresponds to the increasing expansion of temporary work agency employment 
used to circumvent requirements for regular employment (Koene et al. 2004). 
However, because this new indicator is only available for the year 2008, it has not 
been used within the following studies. 
The index assigns categorical scales ranging from 0 to 6, with higher 
scores representing stricter regulation. Indicators are weighted according their 
influence on EPL. The sub-index for regulation on collective dismissal was 
attributed just 40 % of the weight assigned to regular and temporary contracts. 
‘The rationale for this is that the collective dismissal indicator only reflects 
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additional employment protection that was triggered by the collective nature of a 
dismissal. In most countries, these additional requirements are quite modest’ 
(OECD 1999: 115).4 
Some kinds of workers are not covered by legislation. Whole occupational 
groups are excluded: maritime workers, domestic workers, family members 
working in a family business, diplomats, holders of political office, entertainers, 
sportspeople, police and civil servants (Venn 2009: 19).  
Exemptions are also made for particular groups of workers to facilitate 
entry or re-entry into the labour market. These are mainly young workers 
undertaking training. In some countries, disabled and older workers are also 
exempted from regular EPL. According to Venn (2009), these exemptions affect 
on average less than 2 % of the workforce. On the other hand, groups may take 
advantage of special protection rules that make a dismissal even more difficult. In 
Germany, for instance, we find such rules for older and disabled workers and 
mothers (European Commission 2007).  
The application of EPL also depends in many countries on the size of the 
company. Small firms are often exempted from all or some employment 
protection rules. In many countries, for instance, the required amount of 
severance pay or length of notice is much lower or even totally removed. 
Exemption rules vary greatly between countries. In Spain, Italy, Turkey and 
Australia, less than 50 % of all employees are covered by full EPL. In Sweden, 
Slovenia and Korea, exemptions apply for less than 25 % of employees. 
However, as Venn (2009) demonstrates, taking small-firm exemptions into 
account only leads to minor changes of the original EPL-index provided by the 
OECD.  
Another dimension that is not included in the concept of EPL are short-
time working schemes. Especially in times of cyclical downturns, the reduction of 
working hours has been used successfully to avoid dismissal (Arpaia et al. 2010). 
There may be positive correlations between hiring and firing decisions for 
employers with the flexibility to change job conditions.  
                                                             
 
4
 For further information on weighting, see OECD 2004. 
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A comparison particularly of qualitative data sets on employment 
protection reforms (e.g. the DICE database (2011), or the LABREF database of 
the European Commission (2013a)) shows that not all changes are captured by 
the OECD-index. This is the case when changes are very small, when they affect 
only a specific group (e.g. rules for young or old people) or when they affect parts 
of the legislation that are not covered by the sub-indices. 
However, the OECD index has the advantage of comparing legislation 
between countries and of quantifying the degree of changes that have taken 
place. It is most comprehensive in comparison to other quantitative indices and, 
because of its sub-indicators, it is also transparent for the user. In the following 
studies, either the overall index or its sub-indices have been used to 
operationalize the level or change in EPL depending on the specific research 
question. 
1.3 Employment protection legislation in Europe 
Currently, there are large differences concerning the strictness of EPL among 
European countries. Table 1.2 shows an overview on the overall index, and the 
sub-indices for regular employment, temporary employment and collective 
dismissals for the year 2008.  
According to Table 1.2, the United Kingdom, Ireland and Iceland have in 
total the most flexible employment protection rules (ranging between 1.10 and 
1.56). In Portugal, Spain and Luxembourg the rules are most rigid (ranging 
between 2.93 and 3.35). The average EPL-score of all the observed countries is 
2.23. However, as described before, EPL is a subset of hiring and firing rules. 
Countries vary not only in the overall level of EPL, but also in the degree and 
distribution of the sub-indicators. Portugal, for instance, stands out for its very 
restrictive regulation of dismissals for regular employment. In the United Kingdom 
and the Slovak Republic, by contrast, there are nearly no restrictions on the use 
of temporary employment. The Czech Republic, as another example, has 
relatively rigid regulations on dismissals for regular employment, but is 
comparatively flexible concerning the rules on temporary employment and 
collective dismissal.  
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In general, the differences between countries are greatest concerning the 
use of temporary employment. Over the last few decades, there have been 
several reforms in European countries. Most of them have led to a relaxation of 
EPL. 
Table 1.2: Employment protection indices in European countries, 2008 
 
Overall EPL-
index 
Dismissal 
rules on 
regular 
Employment 
Rules for the 
use of 
temporary 
employment 
Rules for 
collective 
dismissals 
Austria 2.15 2.37 1.50 3.25 
Belgium 2.50 1.73 2.63 4.13 
Switzerland 1.60 1.16 1.13 3.88 
Czech Republic 1.99 3.05 0.88 2.13 
Germany 2.39 3.00 1.25 3.75 
Denmark 1.77 1.63 1.38 3.13 
Spain 3.01 2.46 3.50 3.13 
Finland 2.03 2.17 1.75 2.38 
France 2.89 2.47 3.63 2.13 
United Kingdom 1.10 1.12 0.38 2.88 
Greece 2.81 2.33 3.13 3.25 
Hungary 1.85 1.92 1.38 2.88 
Ireland 1.32 1.60 0.63 2.38 
Iceland 1.56 1.73 0.63 3.50 
Italy 2.38 1.77 2.00 4.88 
Luxembourg 3.35 2.75 3.75 3.88 
Netherlands 2.13 2.72 1.19 3.00 
Norway 2.72 2.25 3.13 2.88 
Poland 2.19 2.06 1.75 3.63 
Portugal 2.93 4.17 2.13 1.88 
Slovak Republic 1.82 2.50 0.38 3.75 
Sweden 2.18 2.86 0.88 3.75 
Slovenia 2.57 3.15 1.88 2.88 
Estonia 2.29 2.46 1.75 3.25 
Average 2.23 2.31 1.78 3.19 
Standard 
deviation 
0.56 0.69 1.03 0.71 
Notes: The overall index is a summary of the weighted sub-indicators. The sub-indicators 
capturing dismissal rules for regular employment and rules for the use of temporary 
employment are both weighted by 5/12. The rules for collective dismissal are weighted by 
2/12. 
Source: Adapted from OECD (2010). 
Figures 1.2 and 1.3 demonstrate the changes of dismissal rules for regular 
employment and rules for the use of temporary employment between 1995 
(horizontal axis) and 2008 (vertical axis). Countries below the diagonal have 
relaxed their regulation; in countries above the diagonal regulation has become 
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stricter. Concerning dismissal rules for regular employment (Figure 1.2) only a 
few and mostly minor reforms have taken place.  
 
Figure 1.2: Reforms on dismissal rules for regular employment – 1995 vs. 
2008
 
Source: Adapted from OECD (2010). 
Figure 1.3: Reforms on rules for temporary employment – 1995 vs. 2008 
 
Source: Adapted from OECD (2010). 
In the case of reforms on temporary employment, changes are more pronounced. 
Italy and Germany show the biggest differences between 1995 und 2008. The 
EPL-score for rules on temporary employment has decreased by 3.4 units in Italy 
and by 2.3 units in Germany. In contrast, some countries with originally very 
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flexible regulation, like Hungary and Poland, have seen legislation become 
stricter within the reference period. 
1.4 Organization of the dissertation 
The central objective of the dissertation is to investigate how levels or changes in 
EPL are related to social inequality in labour markets concerning the distribution 
of unemployment and to provide current understanding in this context. The 
insider-outsider theory constitutes the underlying theoretical approach for all the 
studies.  
Table 1.3 provides an overview of each article of the thesis. It gives 
information on the title, the underlying research question, the dependent 
variables that have been estimated, the data sources and samples as well as the 
methods used. 
First research study   
The first study deals with deregulation processes that have taken place within 
European labour markets since 1997 and the labour market outcomes for 
different skill groups. The study investigates to what extent reforms of different 
labour market institutions, such as EPL, influence imbalances on the labour 
market between low, medium and highly skilled individuals concerning the 
distribution of unemployment and employment. The study examines whether the 
relaxation of EPL by loosening dismissal rules for regular employment or by 
facilitating the use of temporary employment leads to a harmonization of 
employment chances. Besides EPL reforms, the study simultaneously controls 
for changes in other labour market institutions, including wage systems, active 
labour market policies and unemployment benefits. The analysis is based on 
aggregated macro-data of 17 European countries between 1997 and 2009. The 
restriction on macro data allows for the examination of information over a longer 
period of time. In order to investigate different employment chances, the relation 
between rates of unemployment and employment in three different skill groups, 
distinguished by gender, are considered. In addition to the labour market 
institutions, the study also controls for economic aspects reflecting the level of 
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technological progress. As method, fixed effects panel regressions have been 
applied. The use of fixed effects allows for controlling unobserved heterogeneity 
at country and time level. 
Second research study 
The second study builds on the results that have been gained from the first 
research study. It examines individual unemployment risks for different skill 
groups and their relation to EPL. In contrast to the first article, it focuses on 
currently implemented legislation instead of changes in EPL. By taking a cross-
sectional perspective, differences between countries arising from the strictness of 
hiring and firing rules are highlighted. Furthermore, it is expected that the relation 
between skill-specific unemployment risks is moderated by the level of 
technological progress. This assumption is based on the literature concerning 
skill-biased technological change. Employers are assumed to have different 
flexibility demands depending on the skill level acquired by the worker. It 
investigates whether unemployment risks vary for the different skill groups 
because of the strictness of EPL. The analysis is based on the Labour Force 
Survey from 2008. Due to the hierarchical structure of the data, logistic multilevel 
regression analyses have been applied. The method accounts for compositional 
effects due to the specific structure of the labour force. It also allows for 
estimating variations at the micro and macro level simultaneously. In addition to 
the general unemployment risks of individuals, the long-term unemployment risks 
of skill groups are also taken into account. 
Third research study 
The third study focuses on a different group of the labour force. It deals with the 
labour market situation of the elderly in relation to their previous employment 
history and job tenure. The article has been written in collaboration with Katja 
Möhring. Both authors contributed equally to the idea and design of the study. 
Katja Möhring carried out the calculation of the empirical results, while I primarily 
developed the theoretical framework. We refer in this study to theoretical 
approaches of life-course sociology. As the empirics show, a large share of the 
elderly is either inactive or unemployed. However, there are large cross-sectional 
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differences between countries. The study investigates whether EPL or early 
retirement policies moderate individual outcomes as a result of previous 
employment biography. In this context, the study differentiates between 
employment, unemployment and early retirement. We have tested our 
assumptions on the basis of the SHARE data set with 12 European countries. We 
concentrate on men between 50 and 64 only. Since the number of cases at the 
macro level is very small, the use of conventional multilevel regression models, 
as in the second study, is not appropriate. It could be only controlled for a few 
country level variables, which leads to omitted variable bias. Therefore, we 
decided to apply multinomial logistic regressions with country fixed-effects 
models, which control for unobserved heterogeneity. Country-level indicators are 
introduced by means of cross-level interaction effects.  
Fourth research study 
The fourth study takes a different perspective concerning the relation between 
EPL and unemployment. Instead of looking at the effects of EPL on 
unemployment risks, the role of social inequality for the implementation of a 
reform is highlighted. Conflicts of interest on the political level are assumed. The 
deregulation of employment protection is, from an economic perspective, 
considered as a labour market tool to decrease high and increasing 
unemployment. However, high and increasing unemployment rates are expected 
to diminish political support for reforms relaxing EPL among decisive voters. The 
decisive voters represented by regular employees have particular interests in 
protecting their own levels of employment security. In this context, reforms 
influencing the employment chances of insiders and outsiders are expected to 
depend on the specific labour market conditions of a country. Within this study, a 
crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis (crisp-set QCA) has been applied on 
the basis of EU-15 countries between 1995 and 2005 to test necessary 
conditions for the implementation (and design) of a reform. 
  
Table 1.3: Overview on research studies 
Source: Own research.
  Study 1 Study 2 Study 3 Study 4 
Title Ungleichheiten auf dem 
Arbeitsmarkt aufgrund von 
Bildungsunterschieden und die 
Rolle der 
Arbeitsmarktderegulierung 
(Inequalities in the labour 
market due to skill differences 
and the role of labour market 
deregulation) 
Skill-specific unemployment 
risks: Employment protection 
legislation and technological 
progress 
Do labour market policies work 
the same way for all? 
Unemployment and early 
retirement of the elderly in 
Europe considering their 
employment history 
Why employment protection 
reforms are not used as policy 
tool to fight back 
unemployment in Europe: The 
role of labour market 
conditions and the relation 
between insiders and outsiders 
on the implementation of 
reforms 
Research 
question(s) 
To what extent have 
deregulation measures 
influenced labour market 
inequalities between skill 
groups? 
To what extent is EPL related 
to the unemployment risks of 
different skill groups and how 
is this relation moderated by 
the level of technological 
progress? 
How is the individual labour 
market situation in late career 
related to previous 
employment history? What 
effects do labour market 
policies (early retirement 
policies and EPL) have on this 
relationship? 
What is the role of labour 
market conditions, in particular 
the degree and development of 
unemployment rates, for the 
implementation of reforms 
relaxing EPL? 
Dependent 
variable(s) 
Relative differences between 
low and highly skilled, low and 
medium skilled, medium and 
highly skilled workers in 
unemployment and 
employment rates 
(Long-term) Unemployment of 
low, medium, and highly skilled 
workers 
Unemployment, early 
retirement, employment 
EPL reforms 
Data source  Eurostat Labour Force Survey Survey of Health, Ageing and 
Retirement in Europe 
OECD 
Sample 17 European countries 
between 1997 and 2009  
Working population between 
15 and 64 years from 21 
European countries 
Male labour force between 50 
and 64 years in 12  European 
countries in 2006/2007 
EU-15 countries between 1995 
and 2005 
 
Methods Fixed effects panel regression 
analysis  
Logistic multilevel regression 
analysis 
Multinomial logistic regressions 
with country fixed effects 
models 
Crisp-set qualitative 
comparative analysis 
Publication 
status 
Published in 2012: Zeitschrift 
für Sozialreform 58 (3) 
Under review: Journal of 
European Social Policy  
Under review: Journal of Social 
Policy 
Under review: European 
Journal of Social Security 
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2. Ungleichheiten auf dem Arbeitsmarkt aufgrund von Bildungs- 
unterschieden und die Rolle der Arbeitsmarktderegulierung5 
2.1 Einleitung  
Die Beschäftigungschancen für geringqualifizierte Erwerbspersonen sind in den 
meisten europäischen Ländern eher gering. Ihre Arbeitslosenquoten sind 
deshalb oft deutlich höher als bei besser gebildeten Personen, während ihre 
Erwerbsquoten meist sehr viel niedriger ausfallen. Diese Differenzen können 
hauptsächlich auf den Strukturwandel in den Industriestaaten zurückgeführt 
werden, der durch eine Veränderung der Konsumentennachfrage ausgelöst 
wurde. Die Wirtschaftsaktivität hat sich vom primären Sektor (Landwirtschaft) 
über den sekundären (Industrie) hin zum tertiären Sektor (Service) verschoben. 
Erlerntes Wissen und Erfahrungen wurden dadurch teilweise überflüssig. Neue 
Fähigkeiten mussten erworben werden, um den aktuellen Anforderungen im 
Servicesektor und in den neu erschlossenen Branchen gerecht zu werden 
(Iversen/Cusack 2000). Gleichzeitig haben sich auch die Produktionsprozesse 
verändert. Der Beschäftigungsrückgang im Industriesektor kann zudem auf eine 
gestiegene Faktorproduktivität zurückgeführt werden: Durch den technolo-
gischen Fortschritt ist weniger menschliche Arbeit notwendig, um einen 
bestimmten Output zu erreichen. Dies trifft vor allem für ‘Routine-Arbeit’ zu, die 
verhältnismäßig leicht zu rationalisieren ist (Goos et al. 2009). Eine weitere 
Maßnahme der Effizienzsteigerung in Hochlohnländer stellt das Outsourcen 
arbeitsintensiver Produktionsprozesse dar (Debande 2006).  
Durch den Strukturwandel konnten aber auch neue Branchen 
erschlossen werden, vor allem im Bereich der Informations- und 
Kommunikationstechnologie (Baker et al. 2005; Bertola 2006; Zimmermann et 
al. 1999). Durch die Transformation zur Informations- und Wissensgesellschaft 
stiegen jedoch die Anforderungen an die Arbeitnehmer. Die neuen Jobs 
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 Erschienen in: Zeitschrift für Sozialreform, 2012, 58 (3). Die Ergebnisse dieser Arbeit wurden u.a. 
auf folgenden Konferenzen und Workshops präsentiert: ESPAnet Conference “Sustainability and 
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erfordern in der Regel ein hohes Maß an Qualifikation (Zimmermann et al. 
1999). 
Während sich Hochqualifizierte eher problemlos an die sich 
verändernden ökonomischen Gegebenheiten anpassen konnten, erscheinen 
die Geringqualifizierten als Verlierer des technologischen Fortschritts. Dies  
zeigt sich in den unterschiedlichen Arbeitslosen- und Erwerbsquoten. Auf 
diesen Überlegungen aufbauend entwickelte sich das Konzept des ‘skill-biased 
technological change’ (Machin/van Reenen 1998; Oesch 2010; Weiss 2008). 
Dieses besagt, dass sich die Produktivität hochqualifizierter Arbeit im Vergleich 
zu einfacher Arbeit vor allem durch die Verbreitung der Informationstechnologie 
stärker positiv entwickelt hat. Bereits bestehende Differenzen zwischen den 
unterschiedlichen Bildungsgruppen wurden dadurch stetig verschärft. 
Für Geringqualifizierte wurden die (Wieder-)Eintrittsmöglichkeiten in den 
Arbeitsmarkt zusätzlich durch rigide Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen erschwert (OECD 
1994). Hohe Tariflöhne und Arbeitslosengelder sowie restriktive Kündigungs-
schutzgesetze förderten die Dualisierung der Arbeitsmärkte, in dem sie die 
Verhandlungsmacht der besser qualifizierten Erwerbstätigen stärkten und sich 
zugleich zu Beschäftigungsbarrieren für Geringqualifizierte entwickelten. Seit 
den 1990er Jahren können jedoch in vielen europäischen Ländern 
verschiedene deregulatorische Maßnahmen beobachtet werden, die darauf 
zielen, die Einstellungsanreize für Arbeitgeber zu erhöhen. Insbesondere im 
Bereich des Kündigungsschutzes zeichnete sich in den letzten beiden 
Jahrzehnten ein deutlicher Flexibilisierungstrend ab. Dies gilt vor allem in 
Bezug auf Regelungen zur Nutzung temporärer Beschäftigung, d.h. befristeter 
Verträge oder Leiharbeit (OECD 2004). Aus diesen Beobachtungen entsteht die 
Frage, inwiefern Deregulierungsprozesse Ungleichheiten am Arbeitsmarkt 
kompensieren können, die aus dem wachsenden technologischen Fortschritt 
resultieren. Bisherige Makroanalysen geben diesbezüglich wenig Aufschluss, 
da diese vorranging den Zusammenhang zwischen der Rigidität von 
Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen und der Arbeitslosenquote im Allgemeinen untersucht 
haben (Baker et al. 2005; Belot/van Ours 2002; Bertola et al. 2001; 
Blanchard/Wolfers 2000; Elmeskov 1998; Nickell 1997; Nickell et al. 2001). 
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Erste Hinweise auf mögliche Zusammenhänge zwischen der 
Arbeitsmarktinstitution und einer ungleichen Verteilung von Arbeitslosigkeits-
risiken liefern Gebel und Giesecke (2011). Die Autoren konzentrieren sich im 
Rahmen ihrer Studie auf Effekte von Kündigungsschutzgesetzen und finden 
heraus, dass eine striktere Regulierung des regulären Kündigungsschutzes die 
Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiken für Geringqualifizierte im Vergleich zu Mittel- und 
Hochqualifizierten erhöht. Allerdings vernachlässigen sie den Einfluss 
bedeutsamer Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen, wie z.B. den Grad der Zentralisierung 
bzw. der Koordinierung von Lohnverhandlungen sowie Arbeitslosenkompen-
sationszahlungen. Außerdem ist die Konzentration auf die Arbeitslosenquote zu 
einseitig. Schwindende Beschäftigungschancen können auch zu einer 
Abwendung vom Arbeitsmarkt führen, was sich in sinkenden Erwerbsquoten 
widerspiegeln würde. Diese Personen stehen dem Arbeitsmarkt dann nicht 
mehr zur Verfügung. 
Im Rahmen dieser Analyse soll deshalb ermittelt werden, inwiefern 
Deregulierungsmaßnahmen Ungleichheiten zwischen den Bildungsgruppen 
beeinflussen. Als Maße für bestehende Arbeitsmarktungleichheiten werden die 
relativen Differenzen der Arbeitslosen- und Erwerbsquoten zwischen Gering- 
und Hochqualifizierten, Geringqualifizierten und Personen mit mittlerem 
Bildungsniveau sowie zwischen Mittel- und Hochqualifizierten herangezogen. 
Die Analyse basiert auf Makrodaten von 17 europäischen Ländern im Zeitraum 
von 1997 bis 2009. Im folgenden Kapitel werden zunächst theoretische 
Annahmen entwickelt, die sich voranging auf die Erkenntnisse der Insider-
Outsider Theorie nach Lindbeck und Snower (1987, 1989) beziehen. Das 
darauf folgende dritte Kapitel enthält Informationen über Daten und Methoden 
der Untersuchung, gefolgt von der Darstellung der Ergebnisse in Kapitel 4. Der 
Beitrag endet mit einer kritischen Diskussion.  
2.2 Theoretische Überlegungen 
Die Insider-Outsider Theorie zielt darauf ab, unfreiwillige Arbeitslosigkeit sowie 
die Existenz ungleicher Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiken zu erklären. Lindbeck und 
Snower (1987, 1989) nehmen an, dass Unterschiede in den Arbeitslosenquoten 
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vorrangig auf Differenzen der individuellen Verhandlungsmacht der 
Erwerbspersonen zurückzuführen sind. Dabei gehen sie davon aus, dass 
Beschäftigte (Insider) über mehr Macht gegenüber dem Arbeitgeber verfügen 
als Arbeitsuchende (Outsider). Erstere sind deshalb eher in der Lage, ihren 
Arbeitsplatz zu schützen und verhindern somit gleichzeitig den Arbeitsmarkt-
eintritt von Outsidern.  
Die Verhandlungsvorteile der Insider ergeben sich aus den 
Fluktuationskosten, die Arbeitgeber bei einem Personalwechsel zu tragen 
haben. Bei einem gegebenen Lohn und gleichem Produktivitätsniveau ist es für 
den Arbeitgeber deshalb immer effizienter, auf den existierenden 
Personalbestand zurückzugreifen. Nur durch einen entsprechenden 
Lohnunterbietungswettbewerb seitens der Outsider kann eine Substitution 
sinnvoll werden. Dies geschieht dann, wenn der akzeptierte Arbeitslohn 
mindestens um den Betrag der Fluktuationskosten geringer ist. Die Höhe der 
Fluktuationskosten wird nach Lindbeck und Snower (1987) durch drei 
verschiedene Einflussfaktoren bestimmt. 
a)  Kosten für Einstellung, Qualifizierung und Entlassung: Mit dem 
Wunsch, einen neuen Mitarbeiter einzustellen, sind sowohl Such- 
als auch Verhandlungskosten verbunden, damit eine möglichst 
genaue Passung zwischen Arbeitgeber und Arbeitnehmer erzielt 
werden kann. Durch die Einarbeitung bzw. Schulung der Mitarbeiter 
fallen weitere Kosten an. Zudem ist auch die Entlassung des 
Arbeitnehmers, dessen Stelle ersetzt werden soll, nicht frei von 
Kosten. Prozedurale Erfordernisse und Abfindungszahlungen 
können die Fluktuationskosten wesentlich erhöhen. 
b) Kooperation: Insider haben die Möglichkeit, ihre Verhandlungsmacht 
durch strategisches Verhalten zu verbessern. Indem sie dem 
Arbeitgeber signalisieren, nicht mit neuen Mitarbeitern zu 
kooperieren, erhöhen sie die antizipierten Fluktuationskosten im 
Zuge eines sinkenden Produktivitätsniveaus. Dadurch schaffen sie 
ein ‘insider-entrant productivity differential’ (Lindbeck/Snower 
1987: 5). Durch Mobbing und gezielte Ausgrenzung steigen zudem 
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die psychologischen Kosten für Outsider. Damit wird der 
Reservationslohn der Arbeitssuchenden erhöht, so dass die 
Bereitschaft zur Lohnunterbietung sinkt. 
c) Leistungsentwicklung: Hohe Fluktuationsraten vermitteln den 
Beschäftigten ein Gefühl der Arbeitsplatzunsicherheit. Die 
Erwartung, dass gegenwärtige Leistungen in der Zukunft entlohnt 
werden, nimmt ab. Arbeitnehmer sind deshalb weniger bereit in 
firmenspezifisches Humankapital zu investieren. Aufgrund der 
langfristig steigenden Produktivität ist es für den Arbeitgeber 
deshalb rational, langfristige Arbeitsbeziehungen anzustreben. 
Während die Insider also von stabilen Beschäftigungsverhältnissen und 
geringen Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiken profitieren, sehen sich die Outsider mit 
restriktiven Beschäftigungsbarrieren konfrontiert, die nicht selten in persistenten 
Arbeitslosigkeitsperioden oder einer Abkehr vom Arbeitsmarkt resultieren. 
Aufgrund der Abschreibung von Humankapital durch Vergessen oder Verlernen 
erworbener Kenntnisse sowie die Entwertung von Fähigkeiten im Zuge des 
technologischen Fortschritts (Becker 1964) wird dieser Prozess weiterhin 
verstärkt. 
Die Zuteilung von Individuen zur Gruppe der Insider oder Outsider 
erfolgt nicht zufällig, sondern wird in der Regel von subjektiven Determinanten 
bestimmt. In ihrer ursprünglichen Form diente die Theorie vor allem dazu, 
bestehende Beschäftigungsnachteile von jungen Menschen und Frauen zu 
erklären (Lindbeck/Snower 1989). Junge Menschen werden automatisch zu 
Outsidern, wenn sie das Bildungssystem verlassen und in das Berufsleben 
eintreten, also arbeitssuchend sind. Für Frauen gilt dies, wenn sie sich nach 
einer Phase der Kindererziehung entscheiden, eine Erwerbstätigkeit 
aufzunehmen. Die Insider-Outsider Theorie lässt sich jedoch grundsätzlich auf 
alle Gruppen übertragen, die ein hohes Erwerbs- bzw. Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiko 
aufweisen. Deshalb kann angenommen werden, dass die Theorie, zumindest in 
begrenztem Maße, Ungleichheiten zwischen verschiedenen Bildungsgruppen 
auf dem Arbeitsmarkt erklären kann. 
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Durch den technologischen Fortschritt wurden viele Geringqualifizierte 
vom Arbeitsmarkt verdrängt. Dies ist vor allem auf die erhöhte Nachfrage im 
wissensbasierten Dienstleistungssektor zurückzuführen. Da Geringqualifizierte 
häufig den veränderten Anforderungen der Arbeitgeber nicht mehr gerecht 
werden und ihre erworbenen Fähigkeiten und Kenntnisse nicht mehr 
gewinnbringend einsetzen können, ist ihr Risiko Outsider zu werden, in den 
letzten Jahrzehnten stark angestiegen. Gleichzeitig hat sich ein erhöhter Bedarf 
an hochqualifiziertem Fachpersonal entwickelt. Unterschiede in der 
Verhandlungsmacht von Arbeitnehmern verschiedener Bildungsniveaus wurden 
somit in Zuge der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung verstärkt.  
Zudem ergibt sich ein erhöhtes Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiko auch daraus, dass 
einfache Tätigkeiten preiselastischer6 sind, d.h. sie reagieren mehr auf 
Schwankungen der Konsumnachfrage (Davis/Reeve 1997). Dies lässt sich vor 
allem dadurch erklären, dass Geringqualifizierte leichter zu substituieren sind. 
Sie können relativ problemlos durch andere Arbeitnehmer ersetzt werden. Die 
erforderlichen Kenntnisse können einfach und kostengünstig übermittelt 
werden. Im Gegensatz dazu sind bei komplexen Tätigkeiten oft lange 
Einarbeitungsphasen sowie spezielle Schulungen nötig. Die Entlassung eines 
hochqualifizierten Mitarbeiters ist deshalb meist mit langfristigen Kosten 
verbunden. Geringqualifizierte sind außerdem einem stärkeren Wettbewerb 
ausgesetzt, so dass die Arbeitgeber aus einem großen Pool relativ leicht 
geeignete Arbeitskräfte auswählen können, die sich zudem in der Regel beim 
Unternehmen selbst anbieten. Leichte Tätigkeiten können zudem auch von 
höher qualifizierten Arbeitnehmern übernommen werden (Oesch 2010). Im 
Vergleich zu komplexen Tätigkeiten reagiert die Nachfrage nach unqualifizierter 
Arbeit daher stärker auf eine Reduktion der Konsumnachfrage. Demnach ist 
das Kündigungsrisiko für Geringqualifizierte grundsätzlich höher. 
                                                             
 
6
 Die Preiselastizität zeigt an, wie die Arbeitsnachfrage auf Änderungen des Preises reagiert. Bei 
einer sinkenden Konsumnachfrage steigen die Preise für Arbeit an; in Relation zum 
Unternehmensgewinn wird Arbeit teurer. Arbeitgeber reduzieren daraufhin ihre Nachfrage nach 
Arbeit. Je höher die Preiselastizität ist, desto stärker reagiert die Arbeitsmarktnachfrage auf den 
geänderten Preis. 
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Anders als bei jungen Menschen und Frauen, die im Anschluss an ihren 
Weg durch das Bildungssystem oder nach einer Erwerbsunterbrechung eine 
Beschäftigung suchen, werden Geringqualifizierte nicht zwangsläufig zu 
Outsidern. Die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass dies geschieht, ist jedoch höher als bei 
Besserqualifizierten. Einschränkend ist zu beachten, dass das Risiko, zu 
Outsidern zu werden, vor allem von der Wirtschaftsstruktur bzw. vom Bedarf an 
unqualifizierten Fachkräften abhängt.  
Einen Einfluss hat weiterhin die Flexibilität implementierter 
Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen. Diese können die Verhandlungsmacht der Insider und 
Outsider verändern, indem sie direkt oder indirekt auf das Verhältnis von Lohn 
und Produktivität einwirken. Interessant ist in diesem Zusammenhang, welchen 
Einfluss der seit den 1990er Jahren stattfinde Deregulierungsprozess ausübt. In 
vielen Ländern wurden Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen flexibilisiert. Vor allem die 
Kündigungsschutzregeln wurden gelockert, wobei insbesondere die Nutzung 
temporärer Beschäftigung (Leiharbeit oder befristete Beschäftigung) erleichtert 
wurde (OECD 2004). Durch den Wegfall bzw. die Minderung von 
bürokratischen Hürden und Abfindungszahlungen sinken die Fluktuationskosten 
und damit die Verhandlungsmacht der Insider. Bei gleichem Lohn erhöhen sich 
also die Anreize für Arbeitgeber, auch Outsider einzustellen. Gleichzeitig sinkt 
jedoch die wahrgenommene Arbeitsplatzsicherheit der Arbeitnehmer, was sich 
gemäß den Annahmen der Insider-Outsider Theorie in niedrigeren 
Kooperationsanreizen und Produktivitätsniveaus widerspiegelt. Da Insider 
bereits längerfristig beim Arbeitgeber beschäftigt sind, ist anzunehmen, dass 
ihre Verhandlungsmacht ausschließlich von Kündigungsschutzgesetzen zur 
regulären Beschäftigung, nicht aber zur temporären Beschäftigung, abhängt. Je 
strikter diese sind, desto größer sind ihre Beschäftigungsvorteile. Die 
Lockerung des regulären Kündigungsschutzes hingegen schmälert ihre 
Verhandlungsmacht. 
Der Einfluss von Regelungen zur Nutzung von temporärer 
Beschäftigung ist jedoch unklar. Der Kündigungsschutz der Insider bleibt 
schließlich unberührt. Mit einer Deregulierung erhöhen sich allerdings die 
Einstellungsanreize für Outsider, da die Separationskosten bei Beendigung des 
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Beschäftigungsverhältnisses wegfallen. Gleichzeitig steigt jedoch ihr 
Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiko aufgrund des schwächeren Beschäftigungsschutzes. 
Beide Effekte können sich demnach gegenseitig aufheben.  
Lohnsetzende Institutionen verstärken die Ungleichheiten bei den 
Beschäftigungschancen, wenn die ausgehandelten Löhne die Produktivitäts-
unterschiede nicht angemessen widerspiegeln (Esping-Anderson 2000; 
Weiss/Garloff 2005). Tariflöhne beispielsweise, die oberhalb des Lohns liegen, 
den ein Arbeitgeber für einen Outsider zu zahlen bereit wäre, führen 
automatisch zu einer Erhöhung des Arbeitslosigkeitsrisikos für Mitglieder dieser 
Gruppe.  
Da Gewerkschaften Interessengruppen sind, versuchen sie zunächst die 
Interessen ihrer Mitglieder zu befriedigen (Accornero 2005). Potentielle 
negative externe Effekte für Nichtmitglieder bleiben deshalb weitestgehend 
unberücksichtigt. Hohe Tariflöhne tragen demnach zur Stabilisierung von 
Beschäftigungsbarrieren für Outsider bei, während eher liberale Institutionen 
mit flexiblen Lohnsystemen Arbeitsmarkteintritte erleichtern. Da 
Hochqualifizierte häufiger außertariflich bezahlt werden (Schnabel 1997) und 
deshalb nicht direkt von Gewerkschaftsaktivitäten betroffen sind, dürften sich 
Veränderungen vor allem auf die Unterschiede zwischen Personen mit 
geringem und mittlerem Bildungsniveau niederschlagen.  
Der Einfluss der Lohnsysteme hängt nicht ausschließlich von der 
Organisationsstärke der Gewerkschaften ab. Neben der Mitgliederzahl ist 
zudem entscheidend, wer in die Verhandlungen involviert ist (Arbeitgeber-, 
Arbeitnehmerorganisation, Regierung) und auf welcher Ebene diese stattfinden 
(auf Firmen-, Sektor- oder nationaler Ebene). Je mehr makroökonomische 
Interessen berücksichtigt werden, d.h. je koordinierter und zentralisierter die 
Lohnverhandlungen verlaufen, desto eher werden auch die Interessen von 
Outsidern integriert - zum Beispiel in Form von Lohnzurückhaltungen zur 
Bekämpfung persistenter Arbeitslosigkeit. 
Die Verhandlungsmacht der Insider wird weiterhin durch bestehende 
Exit-Optionen, wie z.B. die Höhe der Arbeitslosenunterstützung, bestimmt 
(Lindbeck/Snower 1987,1989). Je besser die Einkommensabsicherung im Falle 
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von Arbeitslosigkeit ist, desto höher fallen die Reservationslöhne der Outsider 
aus. Sie sind weniger bereit, Lohnabstriche in Kauf zu nehmen und verbleiben 
deshalb freiwillig in Arbeitslosigkeit (Schneider/Fuchs 2000). Gleichzeitig sinken 
die Einstellungsanreize der Arbeitgeber, da im Zuge der Nichtbeschäftigung 
erworbenes Humankapital abgeschrieben wird, so dass auch die Produktivität 
der Outsider sinkt. Je generöser die Arbeitslosenunterstützung ausgestaltet ist, 
desto größer sind die zu erwarteten Unterschiede in den Arbeitslosenquoten. 
Wenig attraktive Exit-Optionen reduzieren hingegen die Verhandlungsmacht 
der Insider. Die Beschäftigungsvorteile der Outsider werden dann jedoch durch 
eine gestiegene Lohnungleichheit erkauft. 
Aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik kann ebenfalls die Verhandlungsposition der 
Outsider stärken. Arbeitsmarktpolitische Maßnahmen zielen oft darauf ab, etwa 
mit Hilfe von Trainingsmaßnahmen oder der Förderung von niedrigbezahlter 
Beschäftigung durch Lohnkostenzuschüsse Produktivitätssteigerungen zu 
erzielen und  Humankapitalabschreibungen entgegen zu wirken (Calmfors 
1994). Bei gegebenem Lohn steigt somit ihr Leistungsniveau. In der Literatur 
zeigen sich jedoch auch gegenläufige Effekte. Empirisch lassen sich 
sogenannte Locking-in Effekte beobachten. Da es während der Teilnahme an 
Arbeitsmarktprogrammen oft nicht möglich ist, effektiv nach neuen 
Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten zu suchen, verbleiben viele der Teilnehmer nach 
Maßnahmenende in der Arbeitslosigkeit (de Beer/Schils 2009; Schultz/Wiemers 
2004). Zudem sind auch negative Signal-Effekte denkbar. Die Teilnahme an 
einem Arbeitsmarktprogramm wird dann vom Arbeitgeber als Zeichen für das 
individuelle Unvermögen gewertet, mit den eigenen Fähigkeiten und 
Kenntnissen eine adäquate Stelle zu finden. Inwiefern  Ungleichheiten 
innerhalb der Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiken durch aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik verringert 
werden, bleibt deshalb unklar. 
Ob nun die Deregulierung des Arbeitsmarktes Unterschiede zwischen 
Gering- und Hochqualifizierten abbaut, kann aus theoretischer Perspektive 
nicht eindeutig bestimmt werden. Rigide Kündigungsschutzregeln für reguläre 
Beschäftigung, hohe Tariflöhne und generöse Exit-Optionen stärken die 
Verhandlungsmacht der Insider. Zentralisierte und koordinierte Gewerkschaften 
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hingegen, die auch Outsider-Interessen berücksichtigen, können Arbeitsmarkt-
ungleichgewichten entgegenwirken. Eine Beschneidung ihrer Rechte könnte 
demnach zu größeren Differenzen führen. Unklar bleibt der Einfluss von 
Regelungen zur temporären Beschäftigung und der aktiven Arbeitsmarktpolitik 
auf die Arbeitsmarktchancen der unterschiedlichen Bildungsgruppen. 
2.3 Daten und Methode 
Das Sample der vorliegenden Untersuchung umfasst 17 europäische Länder im 
Zeitraum von 1997 bis 2009. Hierbei handelt es sich um  Belgien, Dänemark, 
Deutschland, Finnland, Frankreich, Griechenland, Irland, Italien, die 
Niederlande, Norwegen, Österreich, Portugal, Schweden, Spanien, die 
Tschechische Republik, Ungarn und das Vereinigte Königreich. 
Um die Ungleichheit des Arbeitslosigkeitsrisikos zu erfassen, werden die 
relativen Differenzen in den Arbeitslosenquoten zwischen den verschiedenen 
Bildungsgruppen herangezogen (eurostat 2011a). Die Bildungsgruppen wurden 
entsprechend den ISCED-97 Schemas (UNESCO 2010) kategorisiert. Es wird 
unterschieden zwischen Geringqualifizierten (Personen, die maximal Sekundar-
stufe 1 abgeschlossen haben ohne Berufsausbildung), Personen mit mittlerem 
Bildungsniveau (Sekundarstufe 2 und Post-sekundäre Bildung) sowie Hoch-
qualifizierten (Personen mit abgeschlossener Fachhochschul- oder Universi-
tätsbildung).7 Es wird weiterhin auch zwischen Männern und Frauen 
differenziert, um geschlechtsspezifische Effekte beobachten zu können. Da 
davon auszugehen ist, dass sich die Wirkung deregulierter Institutionen erst mit 
einer gewissen Verzögerung einstellt, werden jeweils die Arbeitslosenquoten für 
das Folgejahr herangezogen.8 Die Mittelqualifizierten werden mit in die Unter-
suchung aufgenommen, um zu sehen, ob sich die theoretischen Überlegungen 
auch auf andere Bildungsebenen übertragen lassen. Anders als bei absoluten 
Differenzen spielt bei der Betrachtung der relativen Unterschiede die Höhe der 
                                                             
 
7
 (1)Arbeitslosenquote für Geringqualifizierte dividiert durch Arbeitslosenquote für Hochqualifizierte, 
(2) Arbeitslosenquote für Geringqualifizierte dividiert durch Arbeitslosenquote für Mittelqualifizierte 
und (3) Arbeitslosenquote für Mittelqualifizierte dividiert durch Arbeitslosenquote für Hochqualifizier-
te. 
8
 Die Arbeitslosenquoten beziehen sich z.B. auf das Jahr 2009, die erklärenden Variablen aber auf 
2008. 
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Arbeitslosigkeit an sich keine Rolle. In Ländern, in denen die 
Arbeitslosenquoten grundsätzlich sehr hoch ausfallen, sind auch die absoluten 
Differenzen zwischen den Gruppen häufig größer. Deshalb sind in diesen 
Ländern stärkere absolute Effekte in Folge einer Veränderung von 
Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen zu erwarten. Relative Unterschiede erscheinen daher 
eher in der Lage, die ungleiche Risikoverteilung in den verschiedenen Ländern 
angemessen widerzuspiegeln. 
Die Arbeitslosenquoten werden nach dem ILO-Konzept ausgewiesen.9 
Die Quote beschreibt den Anteil Erwerbsloser an allen Erwerbspersonen, also 
Erwerbstätigen und Erwerbslosen. Als erwerbslos gilt, wer weniger als eine 
Stunde pro Woche arbeitet, aktiv in den letzten vier Wochen nach Arbeit 
gesucht hat und innerhalb von zwei Wochen eine Stelle antreten könnte. Im 
Gegensatz zur Statistik der Bundesagentur für Arbeit ist es belanglos, ob eine 
Arbeitslosenmeldung bei einem Amt vorliegt. Personen, die aus Resignation die 
Jobsuche aufgegeben haben, werden nicht in der Arbeitslosenstatistik geführt. 
Derartige Verdrängungseffekte, die insbesondere für Geringqualifizierte und 
Frauen zu erwarten sind, können zu einer Verzerrung der tatsächlichen 
Arbeitsmarktungleichgewichte zwischen den Bildungsgruppen führen. Deshalb 
werden in einem zweiten Schritt auch die Unterschiede in den Erwerbsquoten 
herangezogen. Die Erwerbsquote umfasst den Anteil aller Erwerbspersonen 
(Erwerbstätige und Erwerbslose) an der Wohnbevölkerung und ist somit ein 
Indikator für die aktive Arbeitsmarktpartizipation.10 
Im Rahmen der Analyse werden eine Reihe verschiedener 
Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen berücksichtigt. Hierzu gehören Kündigungsschutz-
gesetze, Lohnsetzungsinstitutionen, Arbeitslosenunterstützung sowie aktive 
Arbeitsmarktpolitiken. Für den Kündigungsschutz wird auf den Employment-
Protection-Legislation Index  der OECD (2010) zurückgegriffen. Dieser erlaubt 
die Unterscheidung nach Kündigungsschutzregeln für reguläre Beschäftigung 
sowie Regelungen zur Nutzung von temporärer Beschäftigung. Ersterer enthält 
                                                             
 
9
  Streng genommen, handelt es sich um die Erwerbslosenquote. 
10
 (1) Erwerbsquote für Geringqualifizierte dividiert durch Erwerbsquote für Hochqualifizierte, (2) 
Erwerbsquote für Geringqualifizierte dividiert durch Erwerbsquote für Mittelqualifizierte und (3) 
Erwerbsquote für Mittelqualifizierte dividiert durch Erwerbsquote für Hochqualifizierte. 
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Informationen über Kündigungsfristen und Abfindungszahlungen, prozedurale 
Erfordernisse sowie Richtlinien darüber, wann eine Kündigung als legitim zu 
bewerten ist. Regelungen zur temporären Beschäftigung enthalten 
Informationen über die maximale Anzahl und Dauer von Verträgen innerhalb 
eines Unternehmens, sowie Restriktionen hinsichtlich der Nutzung von 
temporärer Beschäftigung (OECD 2004; Venn 2009). Beide Indikatoren werden 
auf einer Skala von 0 bis 6 ausgewiesen, wobei höhere Werte einer strikteren 
Regulierung entsprechen. 
Lohnsetzungsinstitutionen werden durch drei verschiedene Variablen 
abgedeckt. Die Daten basieren auf dem ICTWSS Datensatz nach Visser 
(2009). Die Gewerkschaftsdichte misst den Anteil an Gewerkschaftsmitgliedern 
an allen Erwerbstätigen und ist ein Maß für die Gewerkschaftsstärke. Der 
Zentralisierungsgrad gibt an, ob Lohnverhandlungen auf Firmen-, Sektor- oder 
nationaler Ebene stattfinden. Der Koordinationsgrad trifft Aussagen darüber, 
inwiefern verschiedene Arbeitsmarktakteure in den Verhandlungsprozess 
involviert sind. Beide Indikatoren werden auf einer 0-5er Skala gemessen. Je 
höher die Werte, desto höher der Zentralisations- bzw. Koordinationsgrad. 
Die Arbeitslosenunterstützung geht in das Modell als durchschnittliche 
Bruttolohnersatzrate ein, die sowohl unterschiedliche Arbeitslosigkeitsdauern, 
Einkommensniveaus als auch den Familienstatus berücksichtigt. Die Daten 
hierzu werden ebenfalls von der OECD bereitgestellt (2011a). Da die 
Informationen nur im Zwei-Jahres-Rhythmus erhoben werden, werden die 
fehlenden Werte jeweils durch den Mittelwert des Vor- und Folgejahrs ersetzt.  
Der Indikator zur aktiven Arbeitsmarktpolitik umfasst öffentliche 
Ausgaben für Training, Arbeitsplatzrotation und Jobsharing, Beschäftigungs-
anreize, unterstützte Beschäftigung zur beruflichen Wiedereingliederung, 
Gründungszuschüsse sowie die Schaffung von neuen Arbeitsplätzen (OECD 
2011b). Der Indikator weist jedoch einige Probleme auf: Ausgaben für aktive 
Arbeitsmarktpolitik verändern sich antizyklisch, da diese gewöhnlich steigen, 
wenn auch die Arbeitslosigkeit wächst (de Beer/Schils 2009). Deshalb werden 
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die Ausgaben pro 100.000 Arbeitslose ausgewiesen, um die aktuelle 
Arbeitsmarktsituation des Landes zu berücksichtigen.11  
Die seit Beginn des Untersuchungszeitraums stattfindende ökonomische 
Entwicklung wird durch drei unterschiedliche Variablen abgebildet. Der 
strukturelle Wandel wird durch die Größe des Service-Sektors operationalisiert 
(eurostat 2011b), gemessen als Anteil der Beschäftigten im Servicesektor an 
allen Beschäftigten. Die anteilige Beschäftigung im Bereich des 
Hochtechnologie-Sektors in Industrie und Service (eurostat 2011c) illustriert 
den bildungsspezifischen technologischen Fortschritt innerhalb des 
Untersuchungszeitraums. Das Ausmaß der Bildungsexpansion, die sowohl 
Indikator für die Nachfrage nach qualifizierter Arbeit, aber auch Maßstab für 
den  herrschenden Wettbewerb auf dem Arbeitsmarkt darstellt, wird durch den 
Anteil niedrigqualifizierter Personen an der Gesamtbevölkerung im 
erwerbsfähigen Alter repräsentiert (eurostat 2011d). Um den Einfluss von 
Konjunkturzyklen zu berücksichtigen, wird weiterhin für das jährliche BIP-
Wachstum kontrolliert.  
Als Methode werden, neben der Darstellung deskriptiver und bivariater 
Ergebnisse, fixed-effects Panelregressionsmodelle mit länderrobusten 
Standardfehlern geschätzt. Hierdurch ist es möglich, zeitliche Abhängigkeiten 
innerhalb der Länder zu berücksichtigen. Zugleich wird für unbeobachtete 
Heterogenität, die sowohl auf Länder als auch auf Zeitebene besteht, 
kontrolliert. Kulturelle Besonderheiten, die beispielsweise die Arbeitsmarkt-
partizipation insbesondere von Frauen beeinflussen, werden somit auch im 
Modell berücksichtigt. 
2.4 Ergebnisse 
Auf Arbeitsmärkten der untersuchten europäischen Länder lassen sich zum Teil 
sehr große Arbeitsmarktungleichheiten aufgrund des Bildungsniveaus 
beobachten. Die deskriptiven Ergebnisse in Abbildung 2.1 veranschaulichen die 
                                                             
 
11
 Im Prinzip müsste auch die „Stille Reserve“ in der Berechnung erfasst werden. Hierzu werden 
jedoch keine Daten von eurostat zur Verfügung gestellt. 
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Unterschiede in den Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiken zwischen den Bildungsgruppen und 
deren Veränderung über die Zeit. Hierbei handelt es sich um die relativen 
Unterschiede der Arbeitslosenquoten von Gering- und Hochqualifizierten, 
Gering- und Mittelqualifizierten sowie von Mittel- und Hochqualifizierten über 
alle Länder hinweg, jeweils für die gesamte Untersuchungspopulation sowie 
getrennt für Männer und Frauen.  
Abbildung 2.1: Ungleiche Verteilung der Arbeitslosenquoten  
Quelle: eurostat 2011a, eigene Berechnungen. 
Die Unterschiede zwischen Gering- und Hochqualifizierten sind 
erwartungsgemäß am höchsten. Die Arbeitslosenquoten der Geringqua-
lifizierten fallen im Durchschnitt etwa 3,4 Mal höher aus als die der 
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Hochqualifizierten. Über den Zeitverlauf lässt sich jedoch kein klarer Trend 
hinsichtlich der Entwicklung der Arbeitslosenquoten von Gering- und 
Hochqualifizierten beobachten. Phasen steigender und sinkender Ungleich-
heiten wechseln sich ab, wobei die Veränderungen insgesamt nicht sehr groß 
ausfallen. 
Mit Ausnahme der letzten zwei Beobachtungsjahre nehmen die 
Unterschiede zwischen Personen mit mittlerem Bildungsniveau und 
Hochqualifizierten im Zeitverlauf hingegen tendenziell ab. Im Durchschnitt 
liegen die Arbeitslosenquoten der Mittelqualifizierten 1,8 Mal höher als bei 
Personen mit (Fach-)Hochschulabschluss. Dies bedeutet, dass die 
Unterschiede in der Verhandlungsmacht beider Gruppen sinken. Andersherum 
verhält es sich beim Vergleich der Geringqualifizierten zu Personen mit 
mittlerem Bildungsniveau. Hier lässt sich ein Aufwärtstrend beobachten, d.h. 
die Ungleichheit zwischen Gering- und Mittelqualifizierten nimmt tendenziell 
eher zu. Das Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiko für Personen mit niedriger Qualifikation ist 
durchschnittlich 1,8 Mal höher im Vergleich zu Personen mit mittlerem 
Bildungsniveau. In 2004 sind die Unterschiede zwischen Gering- und 
Mittelqualifizierten zum ersten Mal größer als die Differenzen  zwischen Mittel- 
und Hochqualifizierten. Wird nach Geschlecht unterschieden, zeigt sich, dass 
die Unterschiede in den Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiken zwischen Gering- und 
Hochqualifizierten sowie zwischen Gering- und Mittelqualifizierten im 
Durchschnitt für Männer etwas stärker ausgeprägt sind. Die Unterschiede 
zwischen Mittel- und Hochqualifizierten sind jedoch bei den Frauen größer. Für 
beide Geschlechter lassen sich insgesamt aber ähnliche Trends wie in der 
Gesamtpopulation beobachten. 
Ungleichgewichte in der Verhandlungsmacht, und damit auch bei den 
Jobchancen, lassen sich nicht ausschließlich anhand der Arbeitslosenquoten 
ablesen. Personen, die sich resigniert vom Arbeitsmarkt zurückziehen und nicht 
mehr aktiv nach Arbeit suchen, gelten definitionsgemäß nicht als arbeitslos. 
Aus diesem Grund ist es sinnvoll, neben den Arbeitslosen- auch die 
Erwerbsquoten zu berücksichtigen. Diese spiegeln die Arbeitsmarktpartizipation 
der Bevölkerung im erwerbsfähigen Alter wider. Wie Abbildung 2.2 zeigt, sind 
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die Unterschiede in den Erwerbsquoten zwischen Gering- und 
Hochqualifizierten, gemessen als Durchschnitt über alle Länder, im Zeitverlauf 
konstant. Die Quote der Geringqualifizierten beträgt etwa 63 % der Quote der 
Hochqualifizierten. Für die anderen Vergleichsgruppen zeigt sich ein ähnliches 
Bild wie bei den Arbeitslosenquoten. Die Unterschiede in den Erwerbsquoten 
zwischen Gering- und Mittelqualifizierten nehmen im Zeitverlauf zu, während 
die Ungleichheit zwischen Mittel- und Hochqualifizierten sinkt. Zudem zeigt 
sich, dass die Unterschiede in den Erwerbsquoten zwischen Mittel- und Hoch-
qualifizierten stets geringer ausfallen als zwischen Gering- und 
Mittelqualifizierten. Bei den Arbeitslosenquoten war dies erst ab 2004 der Fall. 
Dies deutet darauf hin, dass vor allem in der ersten Hälfte der 
Untersuchungsperiode Verdrängungseffekte bei den niedrig Gebildeten 
stattgefunden haben, die bei diesen zu einer Abwendung vom Arbeitsmarkt 
führten.  
Die Differenzierung nach Geschlecht zeigt weiterhin, dass 
bildungsspezifische Unterschiede in den Erwerbsquoten bei Frauen besonders 
stark ausgeprägt sind. Im Durchschnitt, liegt die Erwerbsquote 
geringqualifizierter Frauen über alle Jahre und Länder hinweg bei rund 55 % 
der Erwerbsquote der Hochqualifizierten. Bei Männern liegt der Anteil mit etwa 
71 % deutlich höher. Während die Differenzen in den Erwerbsquoten von 
Gering- zu Hoch- und Mittelqualifizierten über den Zeitverlauf relativ stabil 
blieben (im Gesamtdurchschnitt 67 %), ist eine Abnahme der Ungleichheiten 
zwischen Frauen mit mittlerem und gehobenen Qualifikationsniveau zu 
beobachten (von 79 % in 1997 auf 84 % in 2009).12 Bei den Männern verhält es 
sich anders. Die Unterschiede zwischen Mittel- und Hochqualifizierten sind 
gering und stabil (im Gesamtdurchschnitt 91 %), die Ungleichheiten zwischen 
Gering- und Hoch- sowie Mittelqualifizierten steigen jedoch im Zeitverlauf um 5 
bzw. 6 %  (von 74 % in 1997 auf 69 % 2009 bzw. von 83 auf 77 %). Anders als 
                                                             
 
12 Die Prozentwerte geben den Anteil der Erwerbsquoten der niedriger qualifizierten 
Bildungsgruppe an der besser qualifizierten wieder. Höhere Werte bedeuten demnach eine 
Abnahme der Ungleichheit. 
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bei den Arbeitslosenquoten lassen sich also für die Arbeitsmarktpartizipation 
geschlechtsspezifische Entwicklungen beobachten. 
Abbildung 2.2: Ungleiche Verteilung der Erwerbsquoten 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Quelle: eurostat 2011b, eigene Berechnungen. 
Für die Untersuchungspopulation ist weiterhin insgesamt ein deutlicher 
Deregulierungstrend beobachtbar (Tabelle 2.1). Werden Start- und Endjahr der 
Untersuchungsperiode verglichen, zeigt sich für alle Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen 
im Durchschnitt ein Rückgang staatlicher bzw. gewerkschaftlicher Aktivität. 
Kündigungsschutzgesetze wurden gelockert und der Grad der Koordinierung 
und Zentralisierung von Tarifverhandlungen nahm ebenso ab wie die 
Gewerkschaftsdichte. Auch die Arbeitslosenunterstützung und die Ausgaben für 
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aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik sind gesunken. Die Stärke der Deregulierung variiert 
jedoch je nach Arbeitsmarktinstitution. Die stärksten Veränderungen zeigen 
sich bezüglich der Regelungen zur Nutzung temporärer Beschäftigung und der 
Höhe der Gewerkschaftsdichte. Relativ stabil blieben Kündigungsschutzgesetze 
für reguläre Beschäftigung und der Koordinationsgrad bei Tarifverhandlungen. 
In einzelnen Jahren lassen sich zudem, wenn auch meist geringfügig, Re-
Regulierungsprozesse beobachten. Dies lässt darauf schließen, dass die 
Deregulierung innerhalb Europas nicht stetig verlief und staatliche sowie 
gewerkschaftliche Einflussnahme nicht in allen Ländern gleichermaßen 
reduziert wurde. 
Tabelle 2.1: Deregulierungsprozesse 
  Regu-
lärer 
Beschäf-
tigungs-
schutz 
Tempo-
rärer 
Beschäf-
tigungs-
schutz 
Gewerk-
schafts-
dichte 
Koordi-
na-
tions-
grad* 
Zentra
litäts-
ni-
veau 
Arbeits-
losen-
unter-
stützung 
Aktive 
Arbeits-
markt-
politik 
1996 2,39 2,48 42,6 3,47 3,05 33,64 0,27 
1997 2,38 2,21 41,26 3,47 3,00 33,53 0,28 
1998 2,38 2,14 39,93 3,47 2,94 34,35 0,28 
1999 2,38 2,07 38,82 3,29 2,76 35,16 0,31 
2000 2,39 2,04 37,87 3,24 2,88 31,74 0,31 
2001 2,39 1,99 37,03 3,29 2,76 32,45 0,32 
2002 2,39 1,97 36,48 3,29 3,00 32,22 0,29 
2003 2,36 1,9 36,53 3,29 2,82 31,99 0,25 
2004 2,37 1,87 36,29 3,35 2,82 31,24 0,22 
2005 2,37 1,9 35,78 3,41 2,82 30,49 0,21 
2006 2,37 1,91 35,25 3,41 2,82 30,29 0,23 
2007 2,34 1,93 34,42 3,35 2,71 30,1 0,23 
2008 2,33 1,85 33,63 3,29 2,64 29,63 0,23 
   Ø 2,37 2,02 37,38 3,36 2,85 32,06 0,26 
* Die Werte für Ungarn und die Tschechische Republik fehlen für die Jahre 1996-1999. 
Quellen: Regulärer und Temporärer Beschäftigungsschutz (OECD 2010); 
Gewerkschaftsdichte, Koordinationsgrad und Zentralitätsniveau (Visser 2009); 
Arbeitslosenunterstützung (OECD 2011a); aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik (OECD 2011b). 
Tabelle 2.2 zeigt die Korrelationen zwischen Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen und den 
bestehenden Ungleichgewichten auf dem Arbeitsmarkt verschiedener 
Bildungsgruppen. Richtlinien zur Nutzung temporärer Beschäftigung, der Grad 
der Zentralität und Koordinierung von Lohnverhandlungen, Arbeitslosen-
unterstützungen sowie Ausgaben für aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik stehen in einem 
signifikant negativen Zusammenhang zu den Unterschieden im Arbeitslosig-
keitsrisiko. Dies gilt für alle Gruppen, wenngleich auch die Größe des 
Korrelationskoeffizienten zum Teil etwas differiert. Deregulierung scheint 
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demnach insgesamt geeignet, um Ungleichgewichte in den Arbeitslosigkeits-
risiken abzubauen. 
Tabelle 2.2: Arbeitsmarktungleichheit und Arbeitsmarktregulierung 
  AQ  
Gering-
/Hoch-
qualifi-
zierte 
AQ  
Gering-
/Mittel-
qualifi-
zierte 
AQ  
Mittel-
/Hoch-
qualifi-
zierte 
EQ  
Gering-
/Hoch-
quali- 
Fizierte 
EQ  
Gering-
/Mittel-
qualifi-
zierte 
EQ  
Mittel-
/Hoch-
quali-
fizierte 
Regulärer 
Beschäftigungsschutz 
0.0519 -0.0037 -0.0043 0.0922 0.2214* -0.2164* 
Temporärer 
Beschäftigungsschutz 
-0.5257* -0.5244* -0.3490* 0.2376* 0.4124* -0.4574* 
Gewerkschaftsdichte -0.0506 0.0736 -0.0379 0.1587* -0.0356 0.4207* 
Zentralitätsniveau -0.3130* -0.2468* -0.2091* 0.1226 0.2068* -0.2249* 
Koordinationsgrad -0.3340* -0.2002* -0.2711* 0.0822 0.1163 -0.1305 
Arbeitslosen-
unterstützung 
-0.5152* -0.2240* -0.5862* 0.5289* 0.4217* 0.1481* 
Aktive 
Arbeitsmarktpolitik 
-0.1300* 0.1643* -0.2706* 0.2354* 0.0617 0.3608* 
* signifikant auf 5 % Niveau 
Quelle: Eigene Berechnung. 
Für die Erwerbsquoten zeigt sich ein etwas anderes Bild. Ein positiver 
Korrelationskoeffizient steht nun für eine Reduktion der Ungleichheit, da die 
Variablen hier den Anteil der Erwerbsquoten der niedriger qualifizierten Gruppe 
an der höher gebildeten Gruppe widerspiegeln. Regulärer Kündigungsschutz 
sowie Richtlinien für die Nutzung temporärer Beschäftigung stehen in einem 
positiven Zusammenhang zum Verhältnis der Arbeitsmarktpartizipation von 
Gering- zu Mittelqualifizierten; d.h. je strikter die Regelungen, desto geringer 
sind die beobachtbare Ungleichheit zwischen den Gruppen.13 Die Unterschiede 
zwischen Mittel- und Hochqualifizierten steigen hingegen. Ähnliches lässt sich 
auch für die Zentralität von Lohnverhandlungen beobachten: Die Unterschiede 
in den Erwerbsquoten sinken zwischen den Gering- und Mittelqualifizierten und 
steigen für Personen mit mittlerem und hohem Bildungsniveau. Die Höhe der 
Arbeitslosenunterstützung korreliert positiv mit dem Verhältnis der 
Erwerbsquoten für alle drei Vergleichsgruppen. Für die Gewerkschaftsdichte 
und Ausgaben für aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik lassen sich nur für die 
Vergleichsgruppen Gering- vs. Hochqualifiziert sowie Mittel- vs. Hochqualifiziert 
signifikante und positive Koeffizienten messen. Die Ergebnisse der Korrelation 
                                                             
 
13
 Der Anteil der Erwerbsquoten Geringqualifizierter an den Erwerbsquoten der Mittelqualifizierten 
steigt. Es gibt also weniger Unterschiede. 
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geben keinen Hinweis darauf, dass Geringqualifizierte Verdrängungs-
mechanismen in Folge zu strikter Regulierung unterliegen, die sie vom 
Arbeitsmarkt vertreiben. Im Gegenteil: Strikte Regulierung ist mit einer 
geringeren Arbeitsmarktbeteiligung der Mittel- im Vergleich zu den 
Hochqualifizierten verbunden.  
Die Korrelationstabelle spiegelt jedoch sowohl Unterschiede zwischen 
als auch innerhalb der Länder wider. Zudem bleiben Wechselwirkungen sowie 
makroökonomische Einflüsse unberücksichtigt. Es ist deshalb nur sehr 
begrenzt möglich, Aussagen über Veränderungsprozesse am Arbeitsmarkt zu 
tätigen, die auf Deregulierungsmaßnahmen beruhen. Hierfür eignen sich 
Regressionsanalysen. Die Annahme, dass Deregulierung zu einem Abbau von 
Ungleichheiten innerhalb der Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiken führt, kann im Rahmen 
dieser Analysen aber nur zum Teil bestätigt werden. Insgesamt spielen 
Veränderungen gewerkschaftlicher Einflussnahme eine große Rolle, wobei je 
nach Bildungsgruppenvergleich oder Geschlecht Unterschiede zu beobachten 
sind. 
In einem ersten Schritt werden zunächst die Deregulierungseffekte für 
die gesamte Stichprobe betrachtet (vgl. Tabelle 2.3, Modell 1a). Es zeigt sich, 
dass ein steigender Grad der Zentralisierung von Lohnverhandlungen 
Unterschiede in den Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiken von Gering- und Hochqualifizierten 
verringert. Dieses Ergebnis entspricht der Annahme, dass Tarifverhandlungen, 
die zentral erfolgen, eher makroökonomische Interessen, d.h. also auch 
Interessen der Outsider, berücksichtigen, als Vereinbarungen, die auf 
sektoraler oder Betriebsebene getroffen werden. Je höher allerdings das 
Koordinationsniveau ausfällt, desto größer die Ungleichheit. Anders als 
angenommen führt eine stärkere Koordinierung zwischen den Vertragspartnern 
nicht dazu, die Verhandlungsposition der Geringqualifizierten zu verbessern. 
Veränderungen anderer Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen haben keinen signifikanten 
Einfluss auf die Verteilung der Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiken. Das Wachstum des 
Bruttoinlandsprodukts steht in einem signifikant positiven Zusammenhang zur 
abhängigen Variable. Wirtschaftserfolge resultieren in Wettbewerbsvorteile für 
besser Qualifizierte. 
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Beim Vergleich von Gering- und Mittelqualifizierten (Modell 2a) zeigt sich 
ein signifikanter und negativer Effekt für die Gewerkschaftsdichte. Je mehr 
Arbeitnehmer gewerkschaftlich organisiert sind, desto geringer die Ungleichheit 
zwischen den beiden Gruppen. Die Annahme, dass ein hoher 
gewerkschaftlicher Organisationsgrad zu höheren Tariflöhnen und damit zu 
größeren Einstiegsbarrieren für wenig qualifizierte Erwerbspersonen führt, lässt 
sich ebenfalls nicht bestätigen. Im Gegenteil: Je höher der Organisationsgrad, 
desto geringer scheint die Konkurrenz um Arbeitsplätze zwischen Gering- und 
Mittelqualifizierten zu sein. Steigende Ungleichheit zwischen den beiden 
Gruppen ist jedoch vor allem ein Resultat ökonomischer Entwicklungen. Je 
höher der Anteil an Beschäftigten im Servicesektor bzw. im Hochtechnologie-
Sektor, desto größer die Unterschiede. Bei wachsendem ökonomischen 
Fortschritt sinken also die Arbeitsmarktchancen der Geringqualifizierten im 
Vergleich zu Personen mit mittlerer Bildung. Die Ungleichheit steigt zudem, je 
höher der Anteil Geringqualifizierter an allen Erwerbstätigen ist. Das 
vergleichsweise größere Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiko resultiert dann möglicherweise 
aus der Konkurrenz innerhalb der eigenen Bildungsgruppe.  
Der Kündigungsschutz für reguläre Beschäftigung beeinflusst lediglich 
das Verhältnis der Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiken von Mittel- und Hochqualifizierten 
(Modell 3a). Je strikter die Regelungen werden, desto größer die Unterschiede. 
Der Kündigungsschutz stellt demnach eine Beschäftigungsbarriere für 
Personen mit mittlerem Bildungsniveau dar, nicht aber für Geringqualifizierte. 
Richtlinien zur Nutzung temporärer Beschäftigung haben keinerlei Einfluss. Für 
das Koordinationsniveau lässt sich erneut ein signifikanter und positiver Effekt 
beobachten. Dies spricht dafür, dass ein höheres Koordinationslevel zu einer 
grundsätzlichen Verbesserung der Verhandlungsmacht höher Qualifizierter 
führt. Demnach scheint die unternehmerische Wirtschaftlichkeit bei 
koordinierten Tarifverhandlungen einen größeren Stellenwert einzunehmen als 
die Integration von Outsidern in den Arbeitsmarkt. Ein Anstieg der 
Arbeitslosenunterstützung reduziert die Unterschiede zwischen beiden 
Bildungsgruppen. Anzunehmen ist, dass höhere Kompensationszahlungen das 
Matching zwischen Arbeitgebern und Personen mit mittlerem Bildungsniveau 
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verbessern und so möglicherweise deren Kündigungsrisiko reduzieren. Nicht 
bestätigen lässt sich, dass Hochqualifizierte Beschäftigungsvorteile dadurch 
erwerben, dass die Reservationslöhne Mittelqualifizierter steigen. Des Weiteren 
ist ein negativer Zusammenhang mit der Beschäftigungsquote im 
Servicebereich sowie im Hochtechnologiesektor und dem Wachstum des 
Bruttoinlandprodukts zu beobachten. Wirtschaftlicher Fortschritt reduziert 
demnach die Verhandlungsvorteile der Hochqualifizierten gegenüber den 
Mittelqualifizierten. Hier kann es sich aber auch um einen indirekten Effekt 
handeln: Personen mit mittlerem Qualifikationsniveau steigern ihre 
Verhandlungsposition auf Kosten der Geringqualifizierten, deren Jobchancen in 
Folge ökonomischer Entwicklung sinken. 
Im Folgenden werden nun die Ergebnisse getrennt nach Geschlecht 
näher betrachtet. Hierbei sollen vor allem die Abweichungen (positiv vs. negativ 
sowie signifikant vs. nicht signifikant) zur Gesamtpopulation benannt werden. 
Anders als im Gesamtmodell ist bei den Frauen in Modell 1c nur noch das 
Koordinationsniveau positiv und signifikant. BIP-Wachstum und Grad der 
Zentralität der Lohnverhandlungen spielen keine Rolle zur Erklärung der 
Ungleichheit zwischen Gering- und Hochqualifizierten. Bei den Männern gibt es 
keine Unterschiede zum Gesamtmodell. Dies gilt auch für das Modell 2b. 
Lediglich der Anteil Geringqualifizierter verliert hier seine Signifikanz. Bei den 
Frauen spielt nun das Gewerkschaftsniveau keine Rolle mehr. Dies bedeutet, 
dass Deregulierung keinerlei Einfluss auf die Verteilung der 
Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiken zwischen gering- und mittelqualifizierten Frauen hat. 
Ebenso sind nun auch die Größe des Servicesektors sowie der Anteil 
Geringqualifizierter an der Gesamtbevölkerung im erwerbsfähigen Alter 
unbedeutend. 
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Tabelle 2.3: Regressionsgleichungen Arbeitslosenquoten 
  
AQ Gering-
/Hochqualifizierte 
AQ Gering-
/Mittelqualifizierte 
AQ Mittel-
/Hochqualifizierte 
Gesamt 1a 2a 3a 
  β Std. Fehler β Std. Fehler β Std. Fehler 
Temporärer 
Beschäftigungsschutz -0.138 0.153   0.033 0.079   -0.065 0.072   
Reg. Kündigungsschutz 0.586 0.631   -0.228 0.285   0.478 0.206 ** 
Gewerkschaftsdichte -0.068 0.045   -0.037 0.020 * -0.002 0.019   
Zentralitätsniveau -0.134 0.054 ** 0.021 0.052   -0.054 0.032   
Koordinationsgrad 0.286 0.125 ** -0.041 0.062   0.242 0.073 *** 
Arbeitslosenunterstützung -0.024 0.016   0.001 0.010   -0.019 0.008 ** 
Aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik -0.001 0.057   -0.004 0.030   0.001 0.031   
Beschäftigung im 
Servicesektor -0.028 0.075   0.089 0.031 ** -0.093 0.031 *** 
Anteil Geringqualifizierter 0.024 0.028   0.031 0.016 * -0.010 0.007   
Beschäftigung im 
HighTech-Sektor -0.054 0.124   0.170 0.058 ** -0.146 0.080 * 
BIP Wachstum 0.059 0.025 ** 0.068 0.022 *** -0.036 0.015 ** 
Konstante 6.190 6.948   -5.003 2.859 * 8.727 2.957 *** 
N 208     208     208     
R² 0.144     0.378     0.339     
Männer 1b 2b 3b 
  β Std. Fehler β Std. Fehler β Std. Fehler 
Temporärer 
Beschäftigungsschutz -0.297 0.220   0.066 0.088   -0.113 0.097   
Reg. Kündigungsschutz 0.459 0.757   -0.290 0.292   0.343 0.271   
Gewerkschaftsdichte -0.078 0.055   -0.039 0.022 * 0.001 0.024   
Zentralitätsniveau -0.166 0.082 * 0.005 0.033   -0.048 0.037   
Koordinationsgrad 0.385 0.202 * -0.046 0.042   0.225 0.071 *** 
Arbeitslosenunterstützung -0.030 0.020   0.003 0.011   -0.017 0.008 * 
Aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik 0.005 0.084   -0.006 0.035   0.002 0.039   
Beschäftigung im 
Servicesektor -0.041 0.135   0.089 0.041 ** -0.064 0.049   
Anteil Geringqualifizierter 0.053 0.044   0.028 0.021   0.010 0.007   
Beschäftigung im 
HighTech-Sektor -0.307 0.225   0.207 0.061 *** -0.203 0.100 * 
BIP Wachstum 0.086 0.026 *** 0.108 0.022 *** -0.039 0.014 ** 
Konstante 9.629 12.53
2 
  -5.007 3.758   6.977 4.785   
N 202     208     202     
R² 0.204     0.381     0.261     
Frauen 1c 2c 3c 
  β Std. Fehler β Std. Fehler β Std. Fehler 
Temporärer 
Beschäftigungsschutz -0.042 0.112   -0.118 0.058   -0.021 0.047   
Reg. Kündigungsschutz 0.768 0.531   -0.225 0.301   0.674 0.179 *** 
Gewerkschaftsdichte -0.070 0.048   -0.023 0.018   -0.012 0.018   
Zentralitätsniveau -0.162 0.114   -0.091 0.056   -0.026 0.039   
Koordinationsgrad 0.273 0.123 ** 0.009 0.054   0.247 0.109 ** 
Arbeitslosenunterstützung -0.020 0.015   0.003 0.007   -0.021 0.009 ** 
         Aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik -0.004 0.068  -0.003 0.027  0.000 0.041   
Beschäftigung im 
Servicesektor -0.048 0.053   0.050 0.029   -0.096 0.033 ** 
Anteil Geringqualifizierter -0.001 0.019   0.012 0.015   -0.014 0.009   
Beschäftigung im 
HighTech-Sektor 0.161 0.106   0.141 0.052 ** -0.073 0.066   
BIP Wachstum 0.055 0.033   0.046 0.019 ** -0.025 0.017   
Konstante 5.758 4.338   -1.907 2.577   8.192 2.793 ** 
N 208     208     208     
R² 0.117     0.295     0.269     
* p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, p< 0.01, Quelle: Eigene Berechnung. 
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In Modell 3 zeigt sich ein signifikanter Einfluss des Kündigungsschutzes sowie 
des Servicesektors nur für Frauen, nicht aber für Männer. Für Frauen spielt 
hingegen die Größe des Hochtechnologiesektors sowie das Wachstum des 
Bruttoinlandproduktes keine Rolle zur Erklärung der Ungleichheit zwischen 
Personen mit mittlerem und hohem Bildungsniveau. 
Das Verhältnis der Erwerbsquoten wird, wie Tabelle 2.4 zeigt, vorrangig 
durch Kündigungsschutzreformen verändert. Je strikter die Regelungen zur 
Nutzung temporärer Beschäftigung sowie zum regulären Kündigungsschutz 
sind, desto größer die Ungleichheit zwischen Gering- und Hochqualifizierten 
insgesamt (Modell 1d). Deregulierung führt dementsprechend zu einer größe-
ren Arbeitsmarktbeteiligung der Geringqualifizierten, da Beschäftigungsbar-
rieren abgebaut werden. Veränderungen der gewerkschaftlichen Einflussnah-
me, Arbeitslosenzahlungen oder Ausgaben für aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik haben 
keinen Einfluss, ebenso wie ökonomische Entwicklungen. 
Im Modell 2d, welches die Unterschiede zwischen Personen mit 
niedrigem und mittlerem Qualifikationsniveau erfasst, ist keiner der Koeffizien-
ten signifikant. Eine Verschärfung der Kündigungsschutzregeln erhöht jedoch 
Unterschiede in den Erwerbsquoten zwischen Mittel- und Hochqualifizierten 
(Modell 3d). Dies gilt jedoch nicht für Regelungen zur Nutzung temporärer 
Beschäftigung. Wirtschaftliche Entwicklungen, die Vergrößerung des Service-
sektors sowie des Hochtechnologiesektors wirken sich positiv auf die Arbeits-
marktbeteiligung Mittelqualifizierter aus. Wird nur die Erwerbsquoten der Män-
ner untereinander verglichen, verliert die Variable ‘Temporärer Beschäftigungs-
schutz’ ihre Signifikanz. Das Zentralitätsniveau ist nun jedoch signifikant positiv, 
d.h. je zentralisierter Lohnverhandlungen ablaufen, desto geringer ist die 
Ungleichheit. Dies gilt auch für das Verhältnis von Gering- zu Mittelquali-
fizierten (Modell 2e). Allerdings spielt anstelle des Kündigungsschutzes die 
Größe des Servicesektors eine Rolle. Je größer dieser ist, desto größer sind die 
Unterschiede in den Erwerbsquoten. Im Gegensatz zum Modell 3d verliert in 
Modell 3e die Variable zum regulären Kündigungsschutz ihre Bedeutung. Der 
Einfluss ökonomischer Entwicklungen bleibt jedoch weiterhin signifikant. 
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Tabelle 2.4: Regressionsgleichung Erwerbsquoten 
  
EQ Gering-
/Hochqualifizierte 
EQ Gering-
/Mittelqualifizierte 
EQ Mittel-
/Hochqualifizierte 
Gesamt 1d 2d 3d 
  β Std. Fehler β Std. Fehler β Std. Fehler 
Temp. Beschäftigungsschutz -0.012 0.004 *** -0.010 0.006   -0.006 0.005   
Reg. Kündigungsschutz 
 
 
 
Chutz 
-0.064 0.011 *** -0.016 0.031   -0.050 0.027 * 
Gewerkschaftsdichte 0.002 0.002   -0.001 0.002   0.002 0.002   
Zentralitätsniveau 0.005 0.004   0.008 0.005   -0.001 0.003   
Koordinationsgrad 0.005 0.006   -0.007 0.011   0.011 0.009   
Arbeitslosenunterstützung 0.000 0.001   -0.001 0.001   0.000 0.000   
Aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik 0.000 0.004   0.000 0.004   0.000 0.002   
Beschäftigung im 
Servicesektor 0.003 0.003   -0.005 0.003   0.007 0.003 ** 
Anteil Geringqualifizierter 0.001 0.001   0.001 0.001   0.000 0.001   
Beschäftigung im HighTech-
Sektor 0.001 0.007   -0.009 0.008   0.010 0.005 ** 
BIP Wachstum 0.000 0.001   -0.001 0.001   0.001 0.001   
Konstante 0.482 0.284   1.205 0.354 *** 0.376 0.252   
N 208     208     208     
R² 0.119     0.204     0.426     
Männer 1e 2e 3e 
  β Std. Fehler β Std. Fehler Β Std. Fehler 
Temp. Beschäftigungsschutz -0.007 0.004   -0.005 0.007   -0.004 0.006   
Reg. Kündigungsschutz -0.062 0.027 ** -0.020 0.045   -0.037 0.025   
Gewerkschaftsdichte 0.003 0.002   0.000 0.003   0.002 0.002   
Zentralitätsniveau 0.008 0.004 * 0.009 0.005 * 0.000 0.003   
Koordinationsgrad 0.000 0.008   -0.013 0.015   0.010 0.009   
Arbeitslosenunterstützung 0.000 0.001   0.000 0.001   0.000 0.000   
Aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik 0.000 0.005   0.000 0.004   0.000 0.003   
Beschäftigung im 
Servicesektor -0.001 0.003   -0.008 0.004 * 0.005 0.003 * 
Anteil Geringqualifizierter 0.000 0.001   0.001 0.002   0.000 0.001   
Beschäftigung im HighTech-
Sektor -0.003 0.009   -0.013 0.012   0.009 0.004 ** 
BIP Wachstum 0.000 0.001   -0.001 0.001   0.001 0.001   
Konstante 0.826 0.352 ** 1.54 0.467 *** 0.435 0.246 * 
N 208     208     208     
R² 0.133     0.249     0.295     
Frauen 1f 2f 3f 
  Β Std. Fehler β Std. Fehler Β Std. Fehler 
Temp. Beschäftigungsschutz -0.012 0.005 ** -0.008 0.005   -0.008 0.005 * 
Reg. Kündigungsschutz -0.073 0.015 *** -0.013 0.019   -0.013 0.019 ** 
Gewerkschaftsdichte 0.001 0.002   -0.001 0.002   -0.001 0.002   
Zentralitätsniveau 0.003 0.005   0.008 0.006   0.008 0.006   
Koordinationsgrad 0.009 0.006   -0.001 0.006   -0.001 0.006   
Arbeitslosenunterstützung 0.000 0.001   0.000 0.001   0.000 0.001   
Aktive Arbeitsmarktpolitik 0.000 0.005   0.000 0.004   0.000 0.004   
Beschäftigung im 
Servicesektor 0.006 0.003 * -0.001 0.002   -0.001 0.002 ** 
Anteil Geringqualifizierter 0.002 0.001 ** 0.002 0.001 ** 0.002 0.001   
Beschäftigung im 
HighTechSektor 0.004 0.008   -0.004 0.008   -0.004 0.008   
BIP Wachstum 0.000 0.001   -0.001 0.001   -0.001 0.001   
Konstante 0.161 0.295   0.774 0.29 ** 0.774 0.29   
N 208     208     208     
R² 0.187     0.113     0.481     
Anmerkungen: * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, p< 0.01; Quelle: Eigene Berechnung. 
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Für Frauen sind neben den Kündigungsschutzgesetzen nun auch der 
Servicesektor sowie der Anteil Geringqualifizierter für die Erklärung von 
Unterschieden der Arbeitsmarktpartizipation zwischen Gering- und 
Hochqualifizierten (Modell 1f) bedeutsam. Beide sind positiv und signifikant, 
d.h. ein Anstieg führt zu einer Reduktion von Ungleichheit. Das Verhältnis von 
Gering- und Mittelqualifizierten (Modell 2f) wird lediglich durch den Anteil 
Geringqualifizierter beeinflusst. Auch hier besteht ein positiver und signifikanter 
Effekt. Andere Faktoren spielen keine Rolle. Unterschiede in den 
Erwerbsquoten zwischen Personen mit mittlerem und hohem Bildungsniveau 
(Modell 3f) verändern sich in Folge von Reformen des temporären und 
regulären Beschäftigungsschutzes. Unterschiede in den Erwerbsquoten sinken, 
je flexibler die Regelungen ausfallen. Insgesamt lässt sich damit ableiten, dass 
die Verhandlungsmacht der Hochqualifizierten durch strikte Kündigungsschutz-
gesetze, insbesondere im Bereich der regulären Beschäftigung, gestärkt wird 
und weniger Qualifizierten dadurch Arbeitsmarktnachteile entstehen. In Modell 
3f zeigt sich zudem ein signifikanter negativer Effekt des Servicesektors. Eine 
Zunahme des Servicesektors vergrößert die Differenzen in den Erwerbsquoten 
der beiden Bildungsgruppen. 
2.5 Diskussion 
Ziel der Analyse war es zu untersuchen, inwiefern Deregulierungsmaßnahmen 
bestehende Arbeitsmarktungleichheiten zwischen verschiedenen Bildungs-
gruppen reduzieren können. Als Arbeitsmarktungleichheiten wurden hier 
Unterschiede in den Arbeitslosen-, aber auch in den Erwerbsquoten gefasst. 
Insgesamt wurde so ein Einblick in die jeweiligen Beschäftigungschancen von 
Gering-, Mittel- und Hochqualifizierten ermöglicht. 
Aufbauend auf der Insider-Outsider Theorie wurde angenommen, dass 
Deregulierung die Verhandlungsmacht der Insider beeinflusst und damit auch 
die Arbeitsmarktposition der Outsider verändert. Geringqualifizierte gelten hier 
als Outsider, da sie in Folge des technologischen Fortschritts mit höheren 
Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiken konfrontiert sind. Es wurde angenommen, dass 
Maßnahmen, die die Fluktuationskosten senken, auch zu einer Reduktion der 
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Verhandlungsvorteile der besser qualifizierten Insider führen. Demzufolge war 
zu erwarten, dass eine Flexibilisierung des regulären Beschäftigungsschutzes 
zu einem Abbau von Arbeitsmarktungleichheiten führt. Eine Reduktion der 
Arbeitslosenzahlungen sollte die Verhandlungsmacht der Insider insofern 
einschränken, dass Outsider aufgrund geringerer Reservationslöhne eher zu 
einem Lohnunterbietungswettbewerb bereit seien. Im Umkehrschluss wurde 
angenommen, dass eine hohe Gewerkschaftsdichte mit hohen Tariflöhnen 
einhergeht, und somit Beschäftigungsbarrieren für Outsider darstellt, die das 
festgelegte Lohnminimum  nicht unterschreiten dürfen. Der Zentralitäts- und 
Koordinationsgrad hingegen sollte zu einer Verbesserung der Arbeitsmarkt-
position von Outsidern führen, da anzunehmen war, dass bei Tarif-
verhandlungen, die zentralisierter und koordinierter ablaufen, auch makro-
ökonomische Interessen, wie die Eingliederungsmöglichkeiten in den 
Arbeitsmarkt, stärkere Berücksichtigung finden. Die Rolle aktiver Arbeitsmarkt-
politik und von Regelungen zur temporären Beschäftigung blieben auf Basis der 
theoretischen Überlegungen unklar. 
Die empirischen Ergebnisse haben gezeigt, dass tatsächlich große 
Arbeitsmarktungleichgewichte zwischen den verschiedenen Bildungsgruppen 
bestehen. Zudem zeigt sich eine tendenziell rückläufige Entwicklung der 
Unterschiede zwischen Mittel- und Hochqualifizierten seit Beginn des 
Untersuchungszeitraumes in 1997. Ungleichgewichte zwischen Personen mit 
niedrigem und mittlerem Bildungsniveau steigen jedoch an. Die bivariaten 
Ergebnisse lieferten bereits erste Anhaltspunkte, dass sich die Effekte für die 
Arbeitslosen- und Erwerbsquoten unterscheiden. Die alleinige Betrachtung von 
Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiken reicht also nicht aus, um Arbeitsmarktbenachteiligungen 
in Folge zu strikter Regulierung zu beurteilen. Die ungleiche Verteilung von 
Arbeitslosigkeitsrisiken, aber auch Ungleichgewichte in der Arbeitsmarkt-
partizipation, die in Folge einer resignierten Abwendung vom Arbeitsmarkt 
resultieren, können das Resultat von Regulierungsmaßnahmen sein.  
Die Ergebnisse der Regressionsanalysen sprechen dafür, dass die 
Flexibilisierung regulärer Kündigungsschutzregeln insgesamt zu einem Abbau 
von Arbeitsmarktungleichheiten zwischen Gering- und Hochqualifizierten bzw. 
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Mittel- und Hochqualifizierten führt.  Ebenfalls den Erwartungen entsprechend 
sind die Ergebnisse für das Zentralitätsniveau der Lohnverhandlungen. 
Dezentralere Lohnverhandlungen führen zu einem Anstieg der Ungleichheit 
zwischen Gering- und Mittelqualifizierten. Überraschend sind die Ergebnisse für 
das Koordinationsniveau sowie für die Arbeitslosenunterstützung. Ein höherer 
Koordinationsgrad erhöht die Ungleichheit zwischen Gering- und Hochquali-
fizierten bzw. zwischen Mittel- und Hochqualifizierten. Demnach stärken 
koordinierte Lohnverhandlungen vor allem die Verhandlungsmacht gut 
qualifizierter Insider, anstatt auch Outsider-Interessen zu vertreten. 
Wirtschaftlichkeitsinteressen, die möglicherweise mit dem Erhalt bestehender 
Jobs verknüpft sind, scheinen bei solchen Verhandlungen also im Vordergrund 
zu stehen. Höhere Arbeitslosenzahlungen verringern zudem die Ungleichheit 
zwischen Mittel- und Hochqualifizierten. Es ist zu vermuten, dass Personen mit 
mittlerer Bildung bei hohen Transferzahlungen eher in der Lage sind, eine 
adäquate Beschäftigung zu finden und somit ihr Entlassungsrisiko zu 
reduzieren. Regelungen zur temporären Beschäftigung reduzieren 
Arbeitsmarktungleichheiten zwischen Gering- und Hochqualifizierten, indem sie 
Unterschiede in der Arbeitsmarktpartizipation reduzieren. Für die aktive 
Arbeitsmarktpolitik lassen sich keine signifikanten Effekte nachweisen. 
Die Gewerkschaftsdichte steht in einem negativen Zusammenhang mit 
Arbeitsmarktungleichheiten zwischen Mittel- und Geringqualifizierten. Je höher 
die Zahl der Mitglieder ist, desto geringer die Unterschiede zwischen den 
Gruppen. Anders als erwartet führt ein hoher gewerkschaftlicher Organisations-
grad nicht automatisch zu Einstellungsbarrieren in Folge hoher Tariflöhne. Im 
Gegenteil scheinen starke Gewerkschaften eher in der Lage zu sein, Outsider-
Interessen im Rahmen ihrer Tarifverhandlungen zu berücksichtigen. Wird nach 
Geschlecht differenziert, lassen sich weitere Unterschiede erkennen. Für die 
Frauen spielen insgesamt Kündigungsschutzregelungen eine etwas größere 
Rolle, während bei den Männern eher gewerkschaftliche Eingriffe vorhandene 
Arbeitsmarktun-gleichheiten beeinflussen. 
Die ökonomischen Entwicklungen der letzten Jahre beeinflussen 
ebenfalls die Arbeitsmarktungleichgewichte zwischen den Bildungsgruppen. Mit 
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wachsendem technologischem Fortschritt sinken die relativen Beschäftigungs-
chancen Geringqualifizierter, während die der Mittelqualifizierten steigen. 
Insgesamt ist die Wirkung der Deregulierungsmaßnahmen in den 
untersuchten Ländern als gering einzuschätzen. Einzig die Flexibilisierung der 
Kündigungsschutzgesetze sowie eine Verringerung des Koordinationsgrades 
bei Lohnverhandlungen führten zu einer Verringerung der Ungleichheit. 
Auffallend ist auch, dass die Unterschiede der Arbeitsmarkchancen zwischen 
Mittel- und Geringqualifizierten kaum von Arbeitsmarktregulierungen abhängen. 
Dies könnte auf die Herausbildung eines zweiten Arbeitsmarktes 
zurückzuführen sein, auf den Geringqualifizierte ausweichen, ohne mit besser 
Qualifizierten zu konkurrieren.  
Unterschiede in der Qualität der Beschäftigung konnten im Rahmen der 
Studie allerdings nicht berücksichtigt werden. Zu beachten ist, dass im Rahmen 
der Analyse ebenfalls keine Aussage über die Entwicklung von 
Arbeitslosigkeits- und Erwerbsquoten an sich getroffen werden, sondern 
lediglich über eine potentiell ungleiche Entwicklung von Beschäftigungschancen 
der verschiedenen Bildungsgruppen. Inwiefern Deregulierungsmaßnahmen 
insgesamt zu einer Verbesserung der Arbeitsmarktsituation führen, bleibt 
Gegenstand einer separaten Analyse.  
  
60 
 
2.6 Literaturverzeichnis 
 
Accornero, A. (2005) Different kinds of flexibility: Reconciling different interests, 
in: Trends in social cohesion 15: 133-156 
 
Baker, D./Glyn, A./Howell, D. R./Schmitt, J. (2005) Labour market institution 
and unemployment: A critical assessment of the cross-country evidence, 
in: D.R. Howell (Hg.) Fighting unemployment: The limits of free market 
orthodoxy. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 72-118 
  
Becker, G. S. (1964) Human capital: A theoretical and empirical analysis, with 
special reference to education. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
 
Beer, de P./Schils, T. (2009) The labour market triangle. Cheltenham u.a.: 
Edward Elgar 
 
Belot, M./Boone, J./Ours, van J. (2002) Welfare effects of employment 
protection, in: CentER Discussion paper 2002-48 
 
Bertola, G./Blau, F. D./Kahn, L. M. (2001) Comparative analysis of labor market 
outcomes: Lessons for the United States from international long-run-
evidence, in: Krueger, A. B./Solow, R. (Hrsg.) The roaring nineties: Can 
full employment be sustained? New York: Russel Sage Foundation 
 
Bertola, G. (2006) Europe’s unemployment problems, in: Artis, M. J./Nixson, F. 
(Hrsg.) The Economics of the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press 
 
Blanchard, O./Wolfers, Justin (2000) The role of shocks and institutions in the 
rise of European unemployment: The aggregate evidence, in: The 
Economic Journal 110 
 
Boeri, T./Nicoletti, G./Scarpetta S. (2000) Regulation and labour market 
performance, in: CEPR Discussion Paper 2420 
 
Davis, D. R. /Reeve, T. A. (1997) Human capital, unemployment, and relative 
wages in a global economy, in: NBER Working Paper 
 
Debande, O. (2006) De-industrialisation, in: EIB Papers 11: 64-81 
 
Elmeskov, J./Scarpetta, S. (1998) Key lessons for labor market reforms: 
evidence from OECD countries experience, in: Swedish Economic Policy 
Review 5(2): 205-252 
 
Esping-Anderson, G. (2000) Who is harmed by labour market regulation?, in: 
Regino, M./Esping-Anderson, G. (Hrsg.) Why deregulate labour markets? 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
61 
 
eurostat (2011a) Arbeitslosenquoten nach Geschlecht, Alter und höchstem 
erreichten Bildungsgrad. 
URL:http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfsa_urgae
d&lang=de [12.09.2011] 
 
eurostat (2011b) Beschäftigung nach Geschlecht, Altersgruppe und 
Wirtschaftszweigen. 
URL:http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfsa_egan
a&lang=de [12.09.2011] 
 
eurostat (2011c) Beschäftigungsstatistiken über Hochtechnologiesektoren und 
wissensintensive Dienstleistungen auf nationaler Ebene. 
URL:http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=htec_emp
_sbs&lang=de [12.09.2011] 
 
eurostat (2011d) Personen, die einen unteren Sekundarschulabschluß erreicht 
haben, nach Alter und nach Geschlecht. 
URL:http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=edat_lfse_
05&lang=de [12.09.2011] 
 
Gebel, M./Giesecke, J. (2011) Labor market flexibility and inequality: The 
changing skill-based temporary employment and unemployment risks in 
Europe, in: Social Forces 90(1): 17-40 
 
Goos, M./Fraumeni, B. M./Manning, A./Salomons, A. (2009) Job polarization in 
Europe, in: American Economic Review 99(2): 58-63 
 
Iversen, T./Cusack, T. R. (2000) The causes of welfare state expansion. 
Deindustrialization or globalization?, in: World Politics 52: 313-349 
 
Lindbeck, A./Snower, D. J. (1987) Theories of involuntary unemployment. 
Efficiency wages versus insiders and outsiders, in: European Economic 
Review 31: 407-416  
 
Lindbeck, A./Snower, D. J. (1989) Insider-outsider theory of employment and 
unemployment. Cambridge: MIT Press 
 
Machin, S./Reenen van, J. M. (1998) Technology and changes in skill structure: 
Evidence from seven OECD countries, in: The Quartely Journal of 
Economics 113: 1215-1244 
 
Nickell, S. J. (1997) Unemployment and labor market rigidities: Europe versus 
North America, in: Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(3): 55-74 
 
OECD (1994) The OECD jobs study: Facts, analysis, strategies. Paris: OECD 
 
OECD (2004) Employment outlook. Paris: OECD 
 
62 
 
OECD (2011a) Benefits and wages: OECD indicators: Gross replacement rates 
(GRR) available for uneven years from 1961 to 2007. 
URL:http://www.oecd.org/document/3/0,3746,en_2649_34637_39617987
_1_1_1_1,00.html  [12.09.2011] 
 
OECD (2011b) Public expenditures and participant stocks on LMP. 
URL:http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=LMPEXP 
[12.09.2011] 
 
Oesch, D. (2010) What explains high unemployment among low-skilled 
workers? Evidence from 21 OECD countries, in: European Journal of 
Industrial Relations 16: 39-55 
 
Schnabel, C. (1997) Tariflohnpolitik und Effektivlohnfindung: eine empirische 
und wirtschaftspolitische Analyse für die alten Bundesländer. Frankfurt 
am Main u.a.: Lang: 131-170 
 
Schultz, B./Wiemers, J. (2004) Verschlechterung der Beschäftigungschancen 
durch Teilnahme an Arbeitsbeschaffungs- und Strukturan-
passungsmaßnahmen - Oder gibt es Ausnahmen?, in: Wirtschaft im 
Wandel 6/2003: 184-190 
 
Skedinger, P. (2010) Employment protection legislation: Evolution, effects, 
winners and losers. Cheltenham u.a.: Edward Elgar 
 
Schmid, G. (2001) Arbeitsmarkt und Beschäftigung, in: Schäfers, B./Zapf, W. 
(Hrsg) Handwörterbuch zur Gesellschaft Deutschlands. Opladen: 
Leske+Budrich: 21-36 
 
Schneider, H./Fuchs, O. (2000) Anreizwirkungen der Arbeitslosenunterstützung 
auf die Arbeitssuche, in: Wirtschaft im Wandel 11/2000: 312-317 
 
UNESCO (2010) International standard classification of education - 1997 
version. URL:http://www.uis.unesco.org/ev.php?ID=3813_201&ID2=DO 
_TOPIC [10.08.2010]  
 
Venn, D. (2009) Legislation, collective bargaining and enforcement. Updating 
the OECD employment protection indicators, in: OECD Social, 
Employment and Migration Working Papers 89 
 
Weiss, M./Garloff, A. (2005) Skill biased technological change and endogenous 
benefits: The dynamics of unemployment and wage inequality, in: ZEW 
Discussion Paper 05-79 
 
Weiss, M. (2008) Skill-biased technological change: Is there hope for the 
unskilled?, in: Economic Letters 100: 439-441 
 
Zimmermann, K. F./Hinte, H./Thalmaier, A. (1999) Ursachen und Wege zur 
Bekämpfung von Arbeitslosigkeit, in: IZA Research Report 1 
63 
 
 
3. Skill-specific unemployment risks: Employment protection legislation 
and technological progress14 
3.1 Introduction 
A lack of numerical flexibility in the hiring and firing decisions of employers is 
generally regarded as a main reason for high and persistent unemployment rates 
in many European countries (Addison/Teixeira 2001; OECD 2004; Skedinger 
2010; Walwei 1996, 2002). The relaxation of employment protection legislation 
(EPL) is believed to improve employment chances, particularly for people that are 
disadvantaged in the labour market; for example, the low skilled, who often 
appear to be the losers of technological progress. Due to structural change, jobs 
offered in the primary and secondary sector have decreased. Achieved 
knowledge on these fields has become obsolete. At the same time, new skills are 
needed to fulfill the requirements in the service sector and new established 
branches. These new jobs mainly demand rather higher levels of qualification 
(Iversen/Cusack 2000). In this context, the enhancement of labour market 
flexibility – particularly by facilitating the use of temporary employment – has 
been one of the main targets of the European Union’s current and future 
employment strategies (Council of Europe 2005; European Commission 2012), 
which aims to reduce the degree of social exclusion and improve social cohesion. 
The easing of dismissal rules is expected to simplify access to the labour market 
by retrenching employment barriers. 
Empirically, however, there is no clear evidence of a relationship between 
the relaxation of EPL and a reduction in the unemployment rate in general (for an 
overview, see Addison/Teixeira 2001; Skedinger 2010). Moreover, specific 
effects of EPL on different skill groups have only been of minor interest in the 
past. The OECD (1999) and Oesch (2010) both concentrated on the effects that 
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 This article has been submitted to the Journal of European Social Policy and is currently under 
review. The study (or previous versions) has been presented inter alia at the following conferences 
and workshops: ESPAnet Conference ‘Social policy and global crisis: consequences and 
responses, Budapest, Hungary in 9/2010; ECPR Graduate  Conference, Dublin, Ireland in 09/2010; 
International Labour Process Conference ‘Work Matters’, Leeds, UK in 03/2011; ESRA Conference, 
Lausanne, Switzerland in 07/2011. 
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EPL has on the low skilled unemployment rate, but were unable to show any 
significant relation. Esping-Andersen (2000) identified a significant and positive 
relationship between the long-term unemployment rate of less-educated workers 
and EPL, but again not with the low skilled unemployment rate in general. The 
first insights into skill-specific labour market outcomes for differently educated 
workers were provided by Gebel and Giesecke (2011). The authors concentrated 
on the relative differences between skill groups in temporary employment and 
unemployment. Their results show that deregulating restrictions on temporary 
employment increases the relative share of low skilled workers in temporary 
employment in comparison to better skilled workers; however, there was no effect 
concerning the distribution of unemployment risks. In their study, the easing of 
dismissal rules for regular employment decreased the relative unemployment 
risks for the low skilled. Bennett (2012) could only confirm these results relating 
to differences between individuals with medium and high levels of qualification, 
while also facilitating the possibility that employing workers on a temporary 
contract has no influence on the distribution of unemployment risks at all. 
However, the author shows that an increase in the level of EPL leads to bigger 
differences in the employment rates between the low and highly skilled, whereas 
differences in employment rates between the medium and highly skilled are 
strengthened only by an increase in the regulation of temporary employment.  
The following analysis aims to provide more insights into the interplay 
between EPL and skill-specific unemployment risks. In contrast to previous 
studies, it does not concentrate on changes in EPL, but on the level of EPL that 
is implemented at a specific point in time. Previous studies mostly focused on the 
effects of a reform only by neglecting the base level of EPL. By taking a cross-
sectional perspective, the existing differences between countries concerning the 
currently implemented levels of dismissal rules and their relation to individual 
unemployment risks are highlighted. Therewith, the general effects that are 
related to differences in the level of EPL can be captured. In addition, the article 
also deals with the likelihood that the observed unemployment status is 
permanent. 
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Furthermore, this article contributes to the literature by taking 
technological progress into account. In the course of an explorative analysis, the 
article tries to answer the question whether the relation between EPL and 
unemployment risks for different skill groups might be moderated by the level of 
technical progress that can be observed in a country. Since technological 
advancements are considered to be skill-biased, as will be outlined later, they 
might produce different flexibility requirements on varying skill groups. 
The analysis is based on data from the Labour Force Survey (wave 2008) 
and captures 21 European countries. In order to account for compositional 
effects, hierarchical models are used.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 deals with skill-specific 
unemployment risks; potential positive and negative employment effects of EPL 
are initially described, before the role of technological progress and its possible 
interplay with EPL for different skill groups are discussed. Section 3.3 describes 
the data, variables and methods that have been used. In section 3.4, the 
descriptive, bivariate and multivariate results are presented. The paper ends with 
a discussion of the results. 
3.2 Skill-specific unemployment risks 
3.2.1 Employment protection legislation 
Generally, EPL can be described ‘as restrictions placed on the ability of the 
employer to utilize labor’ (Addison/ Teixeira 2001: 2), or according to the OECD, 
as ‘rules governing the hiring and firing process’ (OECD 2004: 64). Actually, EPL 
is the sum of a rather complex system of rules that vary from country to country. 
From an economic perspective, the strictness of EPL is determined by the 
costs related to the dismissal of an employee. One can distinguish between costs 
directly associated with a lay-off – i.e. quantifiable and already known before the 
employment relation starts, e.g. severance payments – and indirect costs arising 
from procedural inconveniences and difficulties to enforce a dismissal.  
Given that the flexibility of wages is somehow restricted, the literature 
argues that strict EPL has both negative and positive employment effects that 
determine the probability of unemployment (Addison/Teixeira 2001; Skedinger 
66 
 
2010). Negative employment effects might result from high labour costs and 
restrictions on the flexibility of entrepreneurial activity. Dismissal regulations 
increase separation costs, for example by severance payments, and delay the 
optimal moment of a dismissal in a company. As neoclassical employment theory 
states, high labour costs are generally related to a reduction in labour demand so 
as to reach an optimal amount of labour. Furthermore, by limiting the freedom of 
action, appropriate responses to economic changes are constrained. Compared 
to labour markets with low requirements on firing rules, employers in strictly 
regulated markets are restricted in their competitiveness. Rigid EPL might thus 
result in recruitment freezes or shifts in foreign markets. By creating employment 
barriers, strict dismissal rules are specifically expected to increase the probability 
of being long-term unemployed. 
However, hiring and firing decisions depend on the employer’s 
expectation to what extent the additional labour costs will be compensated in the 
future (OECD 2004).  
Redundancies often result from a decrease in demand (Nolte 2001). In 
this regard, labour demand for simple activities is more price elastic. According to 
Davis and Reeve (1997), the more easily input factors are substitutable, the more 
they respond to price fluctuations (here: in terms of decreasing marginal labour 
productivity). In the case of highly skilled workers, the elasticity of labour demand 
is, therefore, rather low. Future replacement of highly skilled workers in times of 
increasing demand is expensive. Moreover, highly skilled employees can even 
become indispensable as important service providers for the production process 
of the company. For the highly skilled, there is generally a greater need for 
functional flexibility. Functional flexibility describes the ability to redeploy workers 
from one task to another. These workers often participate in decision-making, 
work in teams, and their wages are often determined by the organizational 
performance of the company. Therefore, layoffs due to declines in consumer 
demand affect, at least in the short run, mainly low skilled workers. 
However, the literature also gives some reason to suspect that there are 
positive employment effects resulting from strict dismissal rules (see, in 
particular, Belot et al. 2002; Storm 2007). First of all, those being employed profit 
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from a high level of job protection, and consequently the frequency to become 
unemployed should be lowered. Through the establishment of specific dismissal 
laws, long contract negotiations at the beginning of the employment relationship 
can be avoided and thus reduce transaction costs. Moreover, job security 
afforded by EPL increases the extent of human capital investments by workers. 
Increases in productivity could compensate for high labour costs. In order to 
obtain investment incentives, workers have to be provided with an appropriate 
employment guarantee, which protects them against the opportunistic behaviour 
of the employer so that, at the very least, the investment costs can be amortized 
(OECD 2004). Because productivity rates increase in relation with the skill level 
acquired, dismissal risks - for the same seniority – decrease more for highly 
skilled than for low skilled workers (Layte et al. 2002; Nolte 2001). Strict EPL also 
tends to improve the extent of cooperation by increasing job security. According 
to Walwei (1996) it promotes the identification with operational objectives, in-
house mobility and the acceptance of technological progress. A lack of EPL 
might, in contrast, result in more frequent strikes, a reduced willingness to make 
concessions by workers’ representatives and an increased amount of shirking 
(Walwei 1996). 
However, the added value for the company resulting from an increased 
level of cooperation depends on how important cooperation in the production 
process is. The more ambiguous and unstructured the task is and the higher the 
required skill levels are, the more difficult the monitoring of performance is (Jones 
1984). Productivity benefits from strict firing rules, therefore, derive priory for 
highly skilled workers. 
Whether the detrimental or beneficial effects prevail is unclear. 
Unemployment risks are determined by both the frequency of unemployment 
periods and their duration. On the one hand, strict EPL can mutate into an 
employment barrier for those searching for a job by reducing hiring incentives to 
high labour costs; on the other hand, workers that are already employed profit 
from low dismissal risks because they are protected by legislation. Both effects 
might compensate for each other, so that the net effect is zero. Since the actual 
employment effects depend on the employers’ expectations as to what extent 
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labour costs will be compensated and which productivity gains will be met in the 
future (OECD 2004), the negative effects should decrease with the skill levels 
acquired. 
3.2.2 The interplay between EPL, skills and technological change 
Differences in unemployment risks between skill groups can partly be explained 
by technological progress. The question that shall be answered within this study 
is whether technological progress also moderates the relation between EPL and 
unemployment risks. This would be the case if technological progress alters 
flexibility demands. 
In the past, technological progress has led to skill-biased technological 
change, with different effects on the working conditions and labour market 
chances for differently skilled workers. There are two reasons for this 
development. One is the increase in the proportion of skilled workers in the 
labour force (Acemoglu 1999, 2002; Autor et al. 1998; Berman et al. 1997). 
Increases in skilled labour usually lead to decreases in the wage premium for  
investments in education. However, if a certain threshold is reached, it becomes 
more beneficial for employers to create jobs targeted specifically at highly 
qualified workers; this also results in higher returns to education. Thus, the key 
determinant of skilled-biased technological change has been the market size of 
skilled labour. The second reason is that increases in skill supply have been 
accompanied by technological progress, thereby reducing the optimal amount of 
labour by increasing the factor productivity at the same time. Technological 
change has resulted in a qualitative change in the composition of jobs. It has 
been associated with changes in production techniques, but also with 
organizational changes and capital deepening (Autor et al. 1998). The 
developments observable in the labour market confirm the existence of skill-
biased technological change, and the formation of two separate job markets for 
skilled and unskilled workers (Acemoglu 1999). Furthermore, the highly skilled 
are encouraged to match with other highly skilled workers through positive wage 
effects, rather than working as managers in companies employing mostly low 
skilled workers. The positive wage effects result from increases in productivity 
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that can be realised in this context (Acemoglu 2002). The diffusion of computers 
and telecommunication technologies in the 1980s and early 1990s has largely 
contributed to this development. For both the manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sector, the increase in demand for highly skilled individuals has 
been greatest in the most computer-intensive industries. In particular, the simple 
and repetitive tasks of white collar workers have been rationalized by 
computerization rather than complex and specific tasks. Many production 
processes have also been substituted. While many clerical and production jobs 
have been displaced from the labour market, workers with managerial and 
professional jobs have benefited from computerization by utilizing their manpower 
more effectively (Autor et al. 1998; Mortensen/Pissarides 1999).  
Skill-biased technological change has also led to changes in the 
organizational structure of companies. For instance, the use of computer 
technology has increased firms’ ability to monitor work (Acemoglu 1999, 2002; 
Autor et al.1998). Moreover, it was stated that: 
‘high wage firms are more selective in hiring than they were two decades ago, the 
distribution of physical capital to labor ratios across industries has become more unequal, 
workers appear to be better matched to their jobs, the distribution of on-the-job training 
across education groups has become more unequal, and some of the jobs in industries 
and occupations that typically pay close to the median of the wage distribution have been 
replaced by jobs from the more extreme parts of the quality distribution of jobs’ 
(Acemoglu 1999: 1260-1261).  
However, later Autor et al. (2003) claim that the low skilled are only little affected 
by technological progress, since routine labour is often done by medium skilled 
workers. In a more current article, Autor (2010) confirms a decrease in middle-
wage, middle-skill white collar and blue collar jobs within the US and Europe. 
Manning (2004) argues however, that ‘employment of the less-skilled is 
increasingly dependent on physical proximity to the more-skilled and may also be 
vulnerable in the long-run to further technological developments’ (Manning 2004: 
581). 
Acemoglu (2002) found some evidence that labour market institutions and 
skill-biased technological change interact with each other. Employment protection 
rules have turned out to play a prominent role in this context. He argues that: 
‘Job security measures reduce job destruction by increasing actual or implicit 
firing cost, but also reduce the incentive to create new jobs in response to changing 
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technology patterns of demand, as firms hesitate before getting stuck with unwanted 
employees’ (Acemoglu 2002: 243).  
The question that arises in this context is, whether technological progress and the 
related polarization of labour markets has changed flexibility demands for 
different skill groups and how these changes might alter the relation between 
EPL and individual unemployment risks. If technological progress would increase 
the need for functional flexibility for the highly skilled and the need for numerical 
flexibility for less skilled workers, technological progress strengthens the positive 
and negative effects of EPL described above on individual unemployment risks 
related to the skill levels acquired.  
Thus, in countries with a high level of skill-biased technological change 
one may assume that the highly skilled are less harmed by strict EPL in contrast 
to less educated workers. The negative effects of strict EPL might predominate 
the positive effects in the case of the less skilled, and turn into stricter 
employment barriers increasing individual unemployment risks – particularly the 
risk of being long-term unemployed – by reducing hiring chances.  
However, in economies with less technological progress, the relationship 
between EPL and individual unemployment risks should be more similar for the 
different skill groups. Highly, medium and low skilled workers partly compete for 
the same jobs. The need for numerical flexibility in the case of unqualified work is 
less strong. The positive employment effects due to strict EPL are therefore more 
likely to dominate in countries with less technological progress. However, 
whether the adverse or beneficial effects actually predominate remains an 
empirical question. 
3.3 Data, variables and methods 
3.3.1 Data 
Micro-level data is based on the European Labour Force Survey (LFS) from 
2008. The LFS collects information on demographic, social and economic 
characteristics of numerous European countries (German Federal Statistical 
Office 2012). Due to restrictions in the availability of macro-level data, the study 
includes 21 countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, 
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Estonia, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, Slovenia and the UK.15 
Only the working population is included, i.e. employed and unemployed people 
aged between 15 and 64 years old. In total, these constitute 1.6 million 
respondents. 
3.3.2 Individual level variables 
The employment status is at the focus of the analysis. At first, the analysis 
differentiates between being unemployed and being employed; all other groups 
are excluded. The variable is coded 1 if the individual is unemployed and 0 if the 
individual is employed. The second part of the analysis also accounts for long-
term unemployment. In order to test whether unemployment remains more 
permanent in countries with strict EPL or not, the unemployed are distinguished 
according to the length of unemployment. The variable is coded 1 if 
unemployment lasts more than 12 months and 0 otherwise.16 Several socio-
demographic attributes are included as control variables in the models. These are 
gender, age, marital status and nationality. Age is divided into three groups: 
15-24; 25-54; and 55-64 years old. The binary variable ‘nationality’ is coded 1 for 
respondents not having the citizenship of their residence and 0 for the opposite 
situation. Marital status is 1 for individuals being married and 0 otherwise. On the 
individual level, it is also controlled for the reference week respondents refer to. 
In most countries, surveys were equally spread over the whole year, while some 
were concentrated only on specific time periods. Individual unemployment risks, 
however, vary over time. Due to the in 2008 beginning economic crises, they 
increase the more the year has progressed. 
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 Slovakia has been identified as an outlier, with a low skilled unemployment rate of 40 %. The 
Czech Republic, in comparison, which is the second worst performing country in this context, has a 
low skilled unemployment rate of 19 % 
16
 In order to analyse whether unemployment is more likely to be permanent or not according to 
different levels of EPL, this approach has the advantage – in contrast to looking at the long-term 
unemployment rate – that it is not biased by the general risk of being unemployed. For example: in 
country A, the relative risk that unemployment remains permanent is 20 %; in country B, it is 40 %. 
The unemployment rate in country A is 10 %; in country B, it is 5 %. The corresponding long-term 
unemployment rates in both countries are 2 %, although it is much more difficult to overwhelm 
unemployment in country B. 
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Individuals are grouped according to their acquired skill level. Education is 
classified on the basis of the ISCED-97 scheme (UNESCO 2010). Respondents 
who have completed lower secondary education at most are categorized as low 
skilled (ISCED 0-2); those with upper secondary and post-secondary education 
are classified as medium-skilled (ISCED 3-4); and individuals with the first or 
second stage of tertiary education are defined as highly skilled (ISCED 5-6). 
3.3.3 Country level variables 
The level of EPL is measured by an index provided by the OECD for the year 
2008 (OECD 2012). The index includes dismissal rules for regular employment 
and restrictions on the use of temporary employment. It consists, inter alia, of 
information on procedural processes, compensation payments, notice periods 
and the difficulty to enforce a dismissal. It also captures information on the 
requirements and restrictions of using temporary employment, i.e. fixed-term or 
temporary work agency employment (for detailed information, see Venn 2009). 
Data refers to the year 2008. The strictness of EPL is valued on a scale from 0 to 
6, with larger numbers meaning stricter regulation. Since the regulation of the 
different dimensions might be influenced by each other, the use of the overall 
index seems to be more reasonable than looking at one specific dimension only. 
Due to methodological restrictions resulting from the low degree of freedom at the 
country level, it should be avoided to include the sub-indices separately. 
Figure 3.1 provides an overview on the EPL indicator. With a value of 
0.75, the UK had the most flexible EPL in 2008. Ireland (1.1), Denmark (1.5) and 
Hungary (1.7) also have relatively liberal dismissal rules. In contrast, Spain (3.0), 
France (3.1), Portugal (3.2) and Luxembourg (3.3) show comparatively strict 
employment protection regulations. The average value of the EPL index over all 
countries is 2.2. 
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Figure 3.1: Employment Protection Legislation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: OECD (2012). 
In order to represent the level of skill-biased technological progress that has 
taken place within countries, and which is reflected in the labour market, the 
share of employment in (medium-) high-tech manufacturing are taken into 
account, as well as employment in knowledge-intensive services. Information is 
taken from the European Innovation Scoreboard and refers to the year 2008 
(PRO INNO EUROPE 2009).  
Figure 3.2 gives an overview on the distribution of these indicators. By 
looking at the technological progress expressed in shares of employment relative 
to the total employment rate, Portugal (13.1 %), Greece (13.4 %) and Poland 
(14.9 %) bring up the rear with less than 15 % employment in (medium-) high-
tech manufacturing and knowledge-intensive services in sum. Germany has a 
total share of 26.3 % at the top of the league, closely followed by Luxembourg 
(25.0 %) and Sweden (24.7 %). The average lies at 20.6 %. Between the 
different sectors, there are large differences depending on the economic structure 
of the country. With a share of 1.2 %, the lowest proportion of employment in 
(medium-) high-tech manufacturing can be observed in Luxembourg; conversely, 
it has by far the highest employment rate in knowledge-intensive services 
(24.0 %). The Netherlands also has a very low share in (medium-) high-tech 
manufacturing (3.2 %), but a big knowledge-intensive sector (18.0 %). Greece 
shows very little technological progress according to the distribution of 
employment for manufacturing (2.4 %) and services (11.1 %), and takes the 
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second-to-last place for both. The Czech Republic (10.9 %), Hungary (8.8 %) and 
Slovenia (9.1 %) all show a relatively strong progress in the manufacturing 
sector. The average share of employment in (medium-) high-tech manufacturing 
over all countries is 5.9 %; the share is 14.7 % in knowledge-intensive services. 
At the country level it is also controlled for the growth in the gross 
domestic product. In order to measure the general economic activity and power 
of the country, the average growth rates of the last three years are used.17 
 
Figure 3.2: Technological progress within national labour markets  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: PRO INNO EUROPE (2009). 
3.3.4 Methods 
The analysis starts with some descriptive and bivariate findings, providing 
insights into the relationship between individual unemployment risks and country 
level determinants. 
Since the data structure is hierarchical – individuals are nested in 
countries – multi-level modelling has been applied. Multi-level regressions allow 
simultaneous estimations of variations at various levels (Raudenbush/Bryk 2002). 
Moreover, they account for compositional effects due to the specific structure of 
the labour force, such as differences in the age structure or the degree of female 
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employment. The dichotomous nature of the two dependent variables suggests 
using logistic regression techniques. The analysis concentrates on random 
intercept models with varying macro-level determinants, which are expressed in 
the following logit link function: 
 
(Level 1)   ηij = log(φij /1 - φij) = β0j + β1j X1j 
 
where ŋ
ij
 is the log of the odds of success; and φ
ij
 is the probability that the 
observed event (i.e. being long-term unemployed) occurs. The term on the right 
of the equation includes the structural model. β
0j 
represents the context 
dependent regression intercept; β
1j
 is the regression slope; and X1j is the micro-
level predictor. Within the analysis represented in the following section, the micro-
level predictor contains the control variables for age, gender, marital status, 
nationality and the reference week of the interview. 
The structural equation of the macro-level models corresponds to the 
equation of a linear multi-level model. Within the analysis, the intercept β
0j
 is 
assumed to vary by context:  
  
(Level 2)   β0j = γ00 + γ01 W1 + γ02 W2 + γ03 W1 W2 + γ04 W3 + u0j 
 
The regression intercept β
0j
 encompasses every country j at a context 
independent intercept γ
00, plus slope γ01 and a macro-level predictor W1 for the 
level of EPL; slope γ02 and W2 represent one of the technological progress 
indicators; and slope γ03 represents the interaction between both macro-level 
predictors W1 und W2 in the model. According to the theoretical considerations, it 
is expected that γ03 is negative for the highly skilled workforce and positive for the 
low skilled. W3 represents the control variable at the country level by measuring 
the average GDP growth between the years 2006 and 2008. Moreover, the 
equation contains the residual term u
oj
. Since there are only a limited number of 
countries, the model has only sparse degrees of freedom. Therefore, it is not 
possible to control for numerous country variables simultaneously (Maas/Hox 
2004). 
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In order to avoid three-way interaction effects, models are estimated separately 
for the different skill groups. Multi-level models have been calculated with the 
software program HLM 6.06. The data is weighted at the individual level by the 
design weight provided with the LFS in order to account for potential selection 
biases.  
3.4 Results 
Figure 3.3 displays individual unemployment rates for the low, medium and highly 
skilled in each country based on the data from the LFS. There is much more 
variation between countries in the unemployment rates of the low skilled than in 
the other two groups. The low skilled unemployment rates range from 5.1 % in 
the Netherlands to 19.4 % in the Czech Republic. The unemployment rates for 
medium skilled individuals vary from 2.0 % in Norway to 11.1 % in Spain; 
meanwhile, the highly skilled rates range from 1.2 % in Norway to 7.0 % in 
Portugal. For the latter two groups, unemployment is particularly high in Southern 
European countries. Furthermore, Greece is the only country where 
unemployment risks for the medium skilled are higher compared to the low 
skilled.  
 
Figure 3.3: Skill-specific unemployment rates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of the LFS (2008). 
Figure 3.4 represents the proportion of the unemployed for whom unemployment 
lasts longer than 12 months. As such, the deviations between skill groups are 
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now lower compared to the distribution of unemployment risks. While again the 
low skilled face the highest risk on average, in some countries it is more likely 
that unemployment lasts more than 12 months for the highly skilled than for less 
skilled non-workers. This is true for Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Germany. In 
Norway and the Netherlands, the proportion of long-term unemployed is highest 
for the medium skilled, but only with little differences to the other two groups. 
The comparison of Figures 3.3 and 3.4 illustrates that the likelihood to be 
long-term unemployed is only partly related to the general unemployment risk. 
Spain, for instance, has relatively high unemployment rates, but unemployment 
seldom lasts longer than a year. In the Netherlands or Luxembourg, in contrast, 
unemployment rates are rather low, but job losses result relatively often in long-
term unemployment. 
 
Figure 3.4: Long-term unemployment risks (in percentages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations on the basis of the LFS (2008); only respondents are included 
who were unemployed at the reference week. 
 
The bivariate results presented in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrate the 
relationship between the skill-specific unemployment rates and the proportion of 
long-term unemployment with the level of EPL and the technological progress 
observable in the labour markets, respectively. A significant relationship between 
EPL and unemployment exists only for the highly skilled labour force. The 
direction of the correlation is positive. Stricter dismissal rules are related to higher 
unemployment rates for the highly skilled. The share of employment in (medium-) 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
SE NO DK FI ES AT UK EE NL LU PL IE FR IT GR PT DE HU SI BE CZ 
Lowskilled Middle skilled Highly skilled 
78 
 
high-tech manufacturing and knowledge-intensive services only correlates 
significantly with the highly skilled unemployment rate. Here, the relationship is 
negative, meaning that the higher the share of employment in both sectors, the 
lower the unemployment risks for highly qualified workers. By distinguishing both 
sectors, the coefficients are still negative, but lose significance. This indicates 
that the described correlation applies only in countries where technological 
advancements have been established in both sectors to a large degree. 
However, the share of employment in (medium-) and high-tech manufacturing is 
positively correlated to the low skilled unemployment rate. Thus, technological 
progress in manufacturing seems to lower the employment chances of the less 
educated workforce. There is no significant relationship between employment in 
knowledge-intensive services and unemployment. Table 3.1 shows that EPL is 
not correlated to the level of technological progress. 
 
Table 3.1: Unemployment rates and macro-level determinants 
 
Low skilled: 
unemploy-
ment rate 
Medium 
skilled: 
unemploy-
ment rate 
Highly skilled: 
unemploy-
ment rate 
EPL 
EPL -0.1261 0.3596 0.4646* 
 
Employment in (medium-) 
high-tech manufacturing 
and knowledge-intensive 
services 
0.1246 -0.3106 -0.5085* -0.3059 
Employment in (medium-) 
high-tech manufacturing 
0.5802* -0.1163 -0.2364 -0.3516 
Employment in knowledge-
intensive services 
-0.291 -0.2389 -0.3578 -0.0634 
Sources: LFS (2008); PRO INNO EUROPE (2009); own Calculations.  
* significant at the 10 % level. 
 
The proportion of long-term unemployed among all unemployed respondents 
within a country is not related to the level of EPL (Table 3.2). The level of 
technological progress that is represented in the distribution of employment only 
correlates significantly with the share of employment in knowledge-intensive 
services and long-term unemployment risks for the low and medium skilled 
workforce. For both groups, the relation is negative. Technological progress 
established in the service sector, therefore, seems to diminish long-term 
unemployment risks for these two groups. 
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Table 3.2: Long-term unemployment risks and macro-level determinants 
  
Low skilled: 
long-term 
unemploy-
ment risk 
Medium 
skilled: long-
term 
unemploy-
ment risk 
Highly skilled: 
long-term 
unemploy-
ment risk 
EPL 
EPL 0.0897 0.1644 0.2755 
 
Employment in (medium-) 
high tech manufacturing 
and knowledge-intensive 
services 
-0.1536 -0.2132 -0.0093 -0.3059 
Employment in (medium-) 
high tech manufacturing  
0.3386 0.3198 0.1662 -0.3516 
Employment in knowledge-
intensive services 
-0.4053* -0.4538* -0.1303 -0.0634 
Sources: LFS (2008); PRO INNO EUROPE (2009); own calculations.  
* significant at the 10 % level. 
The bivariate estimations do not allow either for differences in the composition of 
the labour force, nor for relations between macro-level determinants. The multi-
level models presented in this section show that the bivariate results are biased 
by both restrictions. Table 3.3 presents the results of the multi-level logistic 
regression analysis for the three skill groups separately (under the control of the 
individual level variables and GDP growth). Because relations are not linear, 
coefficients within and between models of different skill groups are not directly 
comparable. Firstly, the effect of EPL on the likelihood to be unemployed has 
been estimated exclusively for each skill group. Secondly, the indicators 
measuring the level of technological progress established at the labour markets 
have been added, as well as its interaction with EPL. 
As Table 3.3 shows, EPL is positively and significantly related to risk of 
unemployment for all three skill groups. Converted into percentage points, 
changes are very similar. An increase in EPL by one unit above the average is 
related to an increase in the probability to be unemployed by 1.46 percentage 
points for the low skilled, 1.62 for the medium skilled and 1.19 for the highly 
skilled. In relative terms, however, unemployment risks increase much stronger 
the higher the individual skill level is. An increase in EPL of one unit is, for 
example, related to an increase in the probability of unemployment by around 
12 %, for the highly skilled the unemployment risk raises, in contrast, by 31 %.18 
                                                             
 
18
 Unemployment probabilities can be calculated by 1/[1+exp(-ŋij)]. The probabilities are estimated 
under the control of GDP growth and refer to an average increase by 3 % within the last three 
years. 
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However, in the case of the low skilled, EPL loses significance when the macro-
determinants for employment in (medium-) high-tech manufacturing and 
employment in knowledge-intensive services are included separately. For the 
medium and highly skilled, the coefficients remain positive and significant in all 
models. As expected, there are negative interactions between the level of 
technological progress and the unemployment risks of the highly qualified 
workforce. The positive effect of EPL is somewhat lower when the total share of 
employment in both the (medium-) and high-tech manufacturing and the 
knowledge-intensive service sector is higher. 
By distinguishing the two sectors, the effect is only significant for 
employment in knowledge-intensive services. For the medium skilled, the 
interaction effect is only significant if employment in both sectors is taken into 
account as a whole. The effect goes into the same direction as for the highly 
skilled. In the case of the low skilled, no significant interaction effect between EPL 
and the macro-level determinants measuring the level of technological progress 
can be detected.  
  
Table 3.3: Multi-level logistic regression analysis – Skill-specific unemployment risks 
  Low skilled Medium-skilled Highly skilled 
Intercept 
-2.192 
(0.126) 
*** -2.426 
(0.244) 
*** 
-2.816 
(0.148) 
*** -3.115 
(0.194) 
*** -3.343 
(0.141) 
*** -3.556 
(0.199) 
*** 
EPL 
0.128 
(0.050) 
** 
0.270 
(0.119) 
** 0.225 
(0.048) 
*** 
0.401 
(0.095) 
*** 
0.285 
(0.058) 
*** 
0.436 
(0.080) 
*** 
Employment in (medium-) high-tech manufacturing + 
knowledge-intensive services 
 
 
0.030 
(0.019) 
  
   
0.032 
(0.018) 
* 
   
0.008 
(0.014) 
  
EPL * Employment in […] manufacturing and […]service 
 
 
-0.052 
(0.041) 
  
   
-0.071 
(0.033) 
** 
   
-0.085 
(0.027) 
*** 
Variance Component 0.114 *** 0.113 *** 0.123 *** 0.117 *** 0.097 *** 0.086 *** 
Chi-Square 2908.075  3054.477 
  2897.304  4130.644 
  1085.525  846.707 
  
Intercept 
-2.192 
(0.126) 
*** -2.237 
(0.152) 
*** -2.816 
(0.148) 
*** -2.850 
(0.172) 
*** -3.343 
(0.141) 
*** -3.332 
(0.153) 
*** 
EPL 
0.128 
(0.050) 
** 0.140 
(0.081) 
  0.225 
(0.048) 
*** 0.248 
(0.075) 
*** 0.285 
(0.058) 
*** 0.299 
(0.059) 
*** 
Employment in (medium-) high-tech manufacturing 
 
 
0.035 
(0.022) 
  
   
0.032 
(0.019) 
  
   
0.004 
(0.017) 
  
EPL * Employment in (medium-) high-tech manufacturing 
 
 
-0.001 
(0.044) 
  
   
-0.056 
(0.070) 
  
   
-0.073 
(0.093) 
  
Variance Component 0.114 *** 0.111 *** 0.123 *** 0.122 *** 0.097 *** 0.108 *** 
Chi-Square 2908.075  3224.215 
  2897.304  3138.547 
  1085.525  
1100.23
5 
  
Intercept 
-2.192 
(0.126) 
*** -2.066 
(0.292) 
*** 
-2.816 
(0.148) 
*** -2.748 
(0.247) 
*** -3.343 
(0.141) 
*** -3.307 
(0.234) 
*** 
EPL 
0.128 
(0.050) 
** 0.116 
(0.155) 
  0.225 
(0.048) 
*** 0.243 
(0.120) 
* 0.285 
(0.058) 
*** 0.359 
(0.125) 
** 
Employment in knowledge-intensive services  
 
 
-0.045 
(0.038) 
  
   
-0.036 
(0.029) 
  
   
-0.054 
(0.027) 
* 
EPL * Employment in knowledge-intensive services 
 
 
-0.020 
(0.043) 
  
   
-0.029 
(0.033) 
  
   
-0.069 
(0.034) 
* 
Variance Component 0.114 *** 0.121 *** 0.123 *** 0.129 *** 0.097 *** 0.079 *** 
Chi-Square 2908.075  3146.156 
  2897.304  2639.358 
  1085.525  744.522   
N 389,468   389,468   727,360   727,360   332,398   332,398   
N 21   21   21   21   21   21   
Source: Own calculations. Models control for individual level variables and GDP growth. Macro variables in the table are mean centred. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *** significant at the 1 % level; ** significant at the 5 % level; * significant at the 10 % level. 
  
 
In order to illustrate the results of the logistic multi-level regression analysis, the 
corresponding probabilities have been estimated as exemplary for the highly 
skilled by taking the total share of employment in (medium-) high-tech 
manufacturing and knowledge-intensive services into account. The graph 
presents the individual unemployment probabilities due to differences in EPL and 
for varying proportions of technological progress. Probabilities are estimated for 
three different levels of EPL (average = 2.06; average plus 1 unit; average minus 
1 unit) and three different employment shares in (medium-) high-tech 
manufacturing and knowledge-intensive services (average = 20.6 %; average 
plus 10 percentage points; average minus 10 percentage points).  
Figure 3.5 demonstrates the moderating effect technological progress has 
on the impact of EPL. In countries with a very low share of employment in 
(medium-) high-tech manufacturing and knowledge-intensive services, EPL is 
strongly positively related to the unemployment risks of the highly skilled. The 
differences in unemployment probabilities become smaller when the share of 
employment in both sectors is higher. In countries with a large technological 
advancements – i.e. when the share of employment in (medium-) high-tech 
manufacturing and knowledge-intensive services is very pronounced – the effect 
of EPL changes its direction; EPL is then negatively related to the unemployment 
risks of the highly skilled, i.e. the highly skilled face lower unemployment risks 
when EPL is stricter.  
However, individual unemployment risks comprise both the frequency of 
job losses and the duration of unemployment. Both aspects raise the probability 
to be unemployed at the reference week. 
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Figure 3.5: Unemployment probabilities for the highly skilled due to 
changes in EPL and different employment shares in (medium-) high-tech 
manufacturing and knowledge intensive service (in percentages) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own calculations. Data represent probabilities for men, aged between 25 and 54 
years old, not married, having the nationality of the country of residence which had an 
average growth in GDP of 3 % between 2006 and 2008. 
Therefore, in a second step, the article concentrates on the likelihood of being 
long-term unemployed for those having already lost their jobs. The results in 
Table 3.4 show that the main effect of EPL on the likelihood of being long-term 
unemployed is not significant. This means that it does not depend on the 
strictness of the implemented dismissal rules, regardless of whether 
unemployment is mostly short- or long-term. However, there are a few 
exceptions. For the highly skilled, the main effect of EPL is significant and 
positive when employment in (medium-) high-tech manufacturing is included. If 
employment in knowledge-intensive services is taken into account, the interaction 
effect between EPL and the share of employment becomes significant, while the 
main effect is negative and insignificant. In contrast to the previous analysis, the 
interaction effect is now positive. The higher the share of employment in 
knowledge-intensive services, the more likely it is that strict EPL increases the 
probability for the highly skilled to be long-term unemployed; whereas, as Table 
3.4 shows, the general likelihood to be unemployed at all, in relation to strict EPL, 
shrinks with an increase in the share of employment in the service sector. The 
same can be observed for individuals who are medium skilled. However, the 
models generally show that the relationship between EPL and long-term 
unemployment is not robust.  
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Table 3.4: Multi-level analysis – Skill-specific long-term unemployment risks 
  Low skilled Medium-skilled Highly skilled 
Intercept 
-0.269 
(0.204) 
 
-0.713 
(0.341) * 
-0.724 
(0.252) ** 
-1.271 
(0.373) *** 
-0.859 
(0.306) ** 
-1.614 
(0.430) *** 
EPL 
-0.046 
(0.184) 
 
 0.142 
(0.328)   
 0.029 
(0.226) 
 
 0.318 
(0.377)   
 0.137 
(0.239) 
 
 0.541 
(0.397)   
Employment in (medium-) high-tech manufacturing and 
knowledge-intensive services 
  
0.103 
(0.032) ***   
 
 0.109 
(0.046) **   
 
 0.138 
(0.047) ** 
EPL * Employment in […] manufacturing and […] service 
  
0.118 
(0.114)     
 
-0.043 
(0.137)     
 
-0.079 
(0.142)   
Variance Component 0.461 *** 0.348 *** 0.474 *** 0.356  *** 0.529 *** 0.339 *** 
Chi-Square 2685.564 
 
3128.379   3063.319 
 
3234.637   950.440 
 
1113.984   
Intercept 
-0.269 
(0.204)   
-0.471 
(0.224) * 
-0.724 
(0.252) ** 
-0.955 
(0.165) *** 
-0.859 
(0.306) ** 
-1.130 
(0.157) *** 
EPL 
-0.046 
(0.184) 
 
0.005 
(0.119)   
 0.029 
(0.226) 
 
0.118 
(0.111)   
 0.137 
(0.239) 
 
0.232 
(0.123) * 
Employment in (medium-) high-tech manufacturing 
  
0.150 
(0.030) ***   
 
0.170 
(0.031) ***   
 
0.192 
(0.039) *** 
EPL * Employment in (medium-) high-tech manufacturing 
  
0.006 
(0.181)     
 
0.042 
(0.075)     
 
-0.105 
(0.147)   
Variance Component 0.461 *** 0.256 *** 0.474 *** 0.232  *** 0.529 *** 0.207 *** 
Chi-Square 2685.564   1800.711   3063.319   1862.762   950.440   610.635   
Intercept 
-0.269 
(0.204)   
0.601 
(0.550)   
-0.724 
(0.252) ** 
 0.333 
(0.565)   
-0.859 
(0.306) ** 
 0.087 
(0.566)   
EPL 
-0.046 
(0.184) 
 
-0.612 
(0.393)   
 0.029 
(0.226) 
 
-0.628 
(0.375)   
 0.137 
(0.239) 
 
-0.485 
(0.373)   
Employment in knowledge-intensive services 
  
-0.114 
(0.062) *   
 
-0.153 
(0.066) **   
 
-0.122 
(0.063) * 
EPL * Employment in knowledge-intensive services 
  
0.182 
(0.106)     
 
0.208 
(0.159) *   
 
 0.210 
(0.113) * 
Variance Component 0.461 *** 0.438 *** 0.474 *** 0.414 *** 0.529 *** 0.482 *** 
Chi-Square 2685.564   2087.684   3063.319   2376,956   950.440   701.739   
N 37,038 
 
37,038   41,129 
 
41,129   12,296 
 
12,296   
N 21   21   21   21   21   21   
Source: Own calculations. Models control for individual level variables and GDP growth. Macro variables in the table are mean centred. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *** significant at the 1 % level; ** significant at the 5 % level, * significant at the 10 % level.
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3.5 Discussion 
The multi-level analyses have shown that the relationship between EPL and 
unemployment is positive for all skill groups. The negative impact due to high 
labour costs and restricted flexibility thus seem to dominate the positive benefits 
that are connected with higher levels of job security. However, this relationship 
becomes smaller – at least for the medium and highly skilled – with higher levels 
of technological progress, as reflected in the employment rates in (medium-) 
high-tech manufacturing and knowledge-intensive services. In countries with very 
large technological advancements, the relation can even be negative. The study, 
therefore, demonstrates that strict EPL is not associated with higher 
unemployment risks per se. It also illustrates that flexibility demands for medium 
and highly skilled workers vary due to the level of technological progress. The 
results underline the expectations that the need for functional flexibility increases 
with the implementation of technological improvements for the medium and highly 
skilled, and that employers are more interested in long-lasting and stable job 
relationships, so that the positive consequences of strict EPL can finally prevail. 
For the low skilled, in contrast, the relationship between EPL and 
unemployment is not moderated by the level of technological progress. For this 
group, stricter dismissal rules are always related to higher unemployment risks. 
The need for numerical flexibility does not change with the implementation of 
technological advancements. The demand for simple tasks and workers that are 
easily substitutable seem to be independent from economic developments in 
contrast to the demand for better skilled workers.  
The fact that the relationship between EPL and unemployment works in 
the opposite direction for the low and the better skilled individuals in countries 
with very high levels of technological progress indicates that job markets are 
probably not independent from each other. In fact, low and better skilled workers 
might be substituted by each other. This is also related to higher levels of 
inequality concerning individual unemployment risks to the detriment of the low 
skilled.  
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The results also show that there are differences due to the sectors in 
which technological progress is reflected. One has to distinguish between the 
general technological progress that is represented by high employment rates in 
both (medium-) high-tech manufacturing and knowledge-intensive sectors, and 
the consideration of the two sectors separately. Seen in isolation, the interaction 
between EPL and technological progress is only meaningful for the share of 
employment in knowledge-intensive services, and then only for the highly skilled. 
One reason for this might be that the proportions of employment in the specific 
sectors (particularly in manufacturing) are too small to significantly affect 
outcomes of the whole labour market. 
One striking result of the study is the missing robust relationship between 
EPL and the likelihood to be long-term unemployed. In contrast to the theoretical 
literature and past empirical findings, strict EPL does not necessarily turn into an 
employment barrier for those being out of work. It can also lead to more frequent 
unemployment periods. If very strict dismissal rules are implemented in a country, 
employers might prefer to try to use legitimated exit options, e.g. employees 
might be terminated more often after a trial period ends, or fixed-term contracts 
are prolonged less often. A high share of employment in knowledge-intensive 
services alone can strengthen the long-term unemployment risks for the medium 
and highly skilled. However, in this context it is important to note that prior studies 
concentrating on EPL reforms have examined short-term effects only resulting 
from one year to another. 
Since this analysis is cross-sectional, no reliable predictions can be made 
concerning future effects resulting from changes in EPL. The results indicate, 
however, that more flexible dismissal rules generally improve the employment 
chances of workers. They also show that the relationship between EPL and 
unemployment is not one-dimensional. If the technological progress continues, 
we should expect further relaxation of dismissal rules leading to strong negative 
labour market results – at least for the medium and highly skilled. By looking at 
the distribution of employment in (medium-) high-tech manufacturing and 
knowledge-intensive services, an increase in unemployment risks by relaxing 
EPL could be anticipated particularly for Sweden, Luxembourg and Germany, 
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while in countries like Portugal, Greece and Estonia, which only show rather low 
technological progress, the deregulation of EPL will probably result in lower 
unemployment risks for the medium and highly skilled. 
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4. Do labour market policies work the same for all? Unemployment and 
early retirement of the older workforce in Europe considering their 
employment history19 
4.1 Introduction 
The labour market participation of older workers is of particular relevance for 
counteracting the challenges of demographic change (Lynch 2006). Problems in 
this context stem from an increasing shortage of skilled labour and the rising 
costs of state pensions. The integration of the ‘generation 50+’ into the labour 
market is of key importance to EU policy and, for instance, has been part of the 
European Employment Strategy from 2005 to 2008 (European Commission 
2007). Many European countries have adopted national strategies to reduce the 
institutional incentives for early retirement, for example, by means of actuarial 
benefit reductions for early retirees as in Germany or with activation policies as in 
the UK (Macnicol 2008). However, we still find a high cross-national variation in 
the labour market participation of people older than 50 years within the European 
Union. The activity rates vary from 42 % in Malta to 81 % in Sweden (eurostat 
2012). Furthermore, the political efforts to improve the activity of the 50+ age 
group in the labour market are accompanied by concerns that the abolishment of 
early retirement possibilities may also lead to higher unemployment rates 
(Brussig/Knuth 2011; Ebert et al. 2006; Promberger/Wübbeke 2006). 
One crucial point which is often neglected in the discussion of these 
general trends is the diversity within the group of older workers. In this study, 
therefore, we apply a life course perspective to the employment situation of the 
older workforce in Europe and take into account differences in individuals’ 
previous work history. Using data on employment histories of men in 13 
European countries from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe 
(SHARE), we analyse the individual determinants of the late career employment 
                                                             
 
19
 This article has been submitted to the Journal of Social Policy and is currently under review. The 
study has been presented inter alia at the following conferences and workshops: Doctoral research 
colloquium for economics at the City University of New York, Graduate Center, USA in 09/2012; 
lidA/IAB Workshop ‘Älter werden in der Arbeit’, Nuremberg in 10/2012; IAB PhD Workshop 
‘Perspectives on (Un-)Employment, Nuremberg in 11/2012. 
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situation and their interaction with policy factors.20 Concerning late career 
employment status, we distinguish between being employed, unemployed or 
having retired before the statutory retirement age (early retirement). Contrary to 
previous research in this field which assumes rather uniform effects of policy 
regulations on the group of older workers, we show that the policy effects differ 
considerably according to individuals’ accumulated status in working life. In line 
with the insider-outsider approach in labour market research, we assume that 
policy factors do not have the same effect for the entire older workforce 
(Lindbeck/Snower 1988). Instead, their effect will depend on the accumulated 
rights and experiences over the working life (Clemens/Himmelreicher 2008). This 
applies especially to the risk of late career unemployment, which is triggered by 
previous labour market experience, as well as to the risk of early retirement, 
which depends on the accumulation of pension rights. 
The theoretical framework underlying our analysis combines mechanisms 
at the micro and macro level. The research questions are: (1) How are 
individuals’ late career labour market situations related to previous employment 
history, specifically, the number of years a person has spent in regular 
employment and job tenure? (2) What effects do labour market policies have on 
this relationship? Do policy effects vary according to individual characteristics? 
To our knowledge, this is the first study which applies a life course perspective to 
the employment situation of older individuals for a large sample of European 
countries. Regarding the institutional framework, we focus on two labour market 
instruments, namely early retirement schemes and employment protection 
legislation, which are both expected to have a substantive impact on the labour 
market outcomes for older persons (Deelen et al. 2006; Ebbinghaus 2006; 
European Commission 2006; Guillermard/Rein 1993; Hofäcker/Unt 2013). 
The following section outlines the theoretical background and describes 
individual, as well as macro-level determinants, of the employment situation of 
older people and how these factors interact. Section 3 gives an overview of the 
                                                             
 
20
 Among those birth cohorts covered by the SHARE sample, we find a large proportion of women 
who have never, or have only very shortly been employed, and thus, are not members of the 
potential work force. Therefore, the female older workforce is highly selective and we need to 
restrict our analysis to the male labour force. 
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data, operationalization and methods. The results of the multilevel analysis are 
described in section 4. The last section includes a discussion of the findings.  
4.2 Previous research and theory 
4.2.1 Individual employment history 
Among older individuals, we find a high level of heterogeneity in terms of labour 
market outcomes which, in the light of previous results, can be described as 
polarization. Dannefer (1987) as well Chrystal and Shea (1990) showed, for 
instance, that many older workers have high-status jobs, while, at the same time, 
many are overrepresented in low-wage jobs. According to a study by O’Rand 
(1996), income inequality is also highest among older people. Giesecke and 
Groß (2003) analysed the likelihood of temporary employment and found that 
older people, on the one hand, are more often employed in permanent jobs 
compared to other age groups, possibly as a result of specific human capital 
requirements and seniority rules. On the other hand, older and younger people 
have the highest risk of finding only a temporary job when re-entering the labour 
market. Furthermore, the elderly have a lower risk of becoming unemployed, but 
also show higher rates of long-term unemployment compared to younger 
individuals (OECD 2006). Other previous studies support these results and 
demonstrate that unemployed older workers experience severe difficulties in re-
entering the labour market and that unemployment is then often permanent 
(Dietz/Walwei 2011; Whittaker 2007).  
This polarisation at the end of working life should be viewed in the broader 
context of previous employment history for two reasons. Firstly, individual labour 
market experience and tenure within a company are closely related to the risk of 
late career inactivity (Schulze Buschoff 2011). Persons with inconsistent working 
histories, i.e. with frequently changing employers and with long periods of 
unemployment, can be described as labour market outsiders who also face rough 
conditions later in their career. Secondly, the qualifying conditions of early 
retirement schemes also depend on previous employment history. In earnings-
related pension schemes, a certain number of years in regular employment are 
necessary to meet entry rules and to achieve a sufficient pension income 
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(Hofäcker 2010; OECD 2006). Thus, the interrelation of employment history and 
late career is determined at both the individual and institutional level, as we will 
outline in the following. 
In the mostly earnings-related pension systems in Europe, consistent 
labour market integration over the career leads to high pension entitlements. 
Moreover, the number of years spent in regular employment during working life is 
expected to correlate with good job positions, high earnings and high levels of 
employment security. Thus, persons with consistent careers in regular 
employment and long job tenures at an employer are considered labour market 
insiders (Lindbeck/Snower 1988). In addition, persons with long job tenures are 
more likely to benefit from seniority wages, and thus, may expect higher 
pensions. On the contrary, those with unstable job histories and mainly atypical 
employment during their career will suffer from increased unemployment risk and 
lower re-employment chances later in their career (Dustmann/Meghir 2001; Zwick 
2008). These divergences cumulate over the life course and lead to increased 
inequalities over time between those better and less privileged (O’Rand 1996). 
Employment history has an institutional significance since it is the means 
of access to social security and social assistance schemes. For example, the 
eligibility criteria of early retirement schemes mostly take into account the 
duration of labour market participation over the course of an individual’s career. 
Consequently, those with unstable careers in marginal employment also have 
had fewer possibilities to accumulate public pension entitlements. Furthermore, 
an individual’s labour market and job history serves as a personal knowledge 
bank of firm- and job-specific processes and techniques, which also determine 
individual employment chances. Generally, we can differentiate two aspects of 
individuals’ working histories in this context. Firstly, the accumulation of general 
labour market experience and social rights throughout the career, which is 
reflected in the overall years in employment. Secondly, firm-specific knowledge 
and work experience, for which job tenure with one employer is a proxy.  
However, the actual effects of those individual preconditions depend on 
contextual factors related to the specific national institutional framework and 
policies (Ebbinghaus 2006; Engelhardt 2012; Guillermard/Rein 1993). Especially 
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work incentives and disincentives caused by labour market and retirement 
policies are expected to have a high impact (Walwei/Dietz 2011). Policies 
targeted at the labour market situation of older individuals exist in two broader 
categories. Early retirement options and their related benefits constitute 
institutional ‘pull-factors’ which ‘pull’ the individual into retirement (Foden/Jepsen 
2002). On the other hand, the reduction of employment barriers for older workers, 
for instance through the relaxation of employment protection legislation, may 
serve to keep them on the labour market (Lafoucrier 2002; Platman 2012). In the 
following, we will outline these effects related to policies and institutions. 
4.2.2 Retirement-related policies 
Several studies confirm a strong positive correlation between generous early 
retirement provisions and the labour market participation of older men 
(Foden/Jepsen 2002; OECD 2006). Mostly, the relationship between early 
retirement schemes and withdrawal from the labour market has been highlighted 
from a labour-supply perspective and, thus, conceptualized as a voluntary 
decision of the worker (Dorn/Sousa-Poza 2005). From this perspective, early 
retirement decisions are determined by the assessment of future incomes 
stemming from either job wages or social benefits, respectively. Individuals 
compare their current actual and potential future wages with the expected 
amount of retirement benefits. The attractiveness of retirement in comparison to 
continued employment increases in line with the level of pension benefits. 
Likewise, retirement becomes more unattractive if potential future earnings are 
assessed to be higher than pension benefits. Consequently, if individual 
retirement decisions are conceptualized as voluntary, they highly depend on the 
generosity of pension payments and early retirement benefits (Hofäcker 2010; 
OECD 2006).  
However, the current employment situation of the elderly also depends to 
a large degree on the labour demand side. From this perspective, employers play 
a key role in retirement decisions (Laczko et al. 1988). Hutchens (1999) 
demonstrated that high pension payments may also be a trigger of retirement 
because they decrease the separation expenses which have to be paid by 
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employers to separate from their older employees. The level of pension benefits, 
thus, influences the incentives for employers to displace their older workforce. 
These incentives are based on various factors, for instance, on general 
negative perceptions about the productivity of older workers, but also on seniority 
payments which lead to higher wage costs for older employees. Furthermore, 
older workers might be confronted with a depreciation of human capital and 
obsolescence of their skills as a result of technological change or other structural 
changes in the labour market (Dorn/Sousa-Poza 2005; OECD 2006). To sum up, 
either the perceived or the actual productivity of older workers, relative to the 
wages paid, leads to a decrease in the labour demand for the older workforce 
(Hutchens 1999). Retirement is then understood as a situation in which the 
access to acceptable wages and attractive job opportunities are restricted 
(Dietz/Walwei 2011; OECD 2006; Radl/di Fiesole 2006; Taylor/Walker 1998). In 
this case, ‘[r]etirement legitimatizes withdrawal from the work force in the face of 
difficulties in finding suitable work’ (Bould 1980: 124). 
The reservation wages of older workers are not only determined by the 
generosity and accessibility of public early retirement benefits, but also by other 
benefits like unemployment, long-term sickness and disability benefits, as well 
private pension arrangements. However, previous studies have shown that public 
pension benefits are one of the main predictors of early retirement, even when 
other social transfer payments are taken into account (Fischer/Sousa-Poza 
2006). Generous statutory early retirement benefits allow firms to reduce their 
own costs related to the layoff of older employees in terms of company pensions 
and compensation payments and, therefore, might increase the incentives to 
push older workers out of their jobs (Foden/Jepsen 2002). 
However, adverse working conditions and dismissals do not necessarily 
only lead to early retirement, but may also result in unemployment. The 
employment situation after job loss, therefore, depends on the interplay of early 
retirement provisions with other policy factors, such as the strictness of 
employment protection legislation (Ebbinghaus 2006; Hofäcker/Unt 2013).  
These possibly contrary incentives resulting from (early) retirement 
possibilities might also be an indication that policies and regulations do not affect 
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all older individuals in the same way, and further individual-level characteristics 
have to be taken into account in order to comprehend the actual effects and 
micro-macro interrelations. This holds especially in the case of early retirement, 
where the institutionalised access requirements mostly refer to an individual’s 
previous employment history.  
4.2.3 Employment-related policies 
Employment chances of older workers are also influenced by the level of 
employment protection legislation (EPL) implemented in a country. Besides 
negative perceptions about the adaptability or productivity of older workers and 
the increasing labour costs due to seniority payments, strict employment 
protection rules have been identified as an important determinant of the 
employment situation of older workers (OECD 2006; European Commission 
2006). The strictness of EPL is determined by the costs related to the dismissal 
of an employee. Typically, it is distinguished by costs directly associated with a 
layoff which are quantifiable and already known before the employment 
relationship starts, e.g. severance payments, and indirect costs arising from 
procedural inconveniences and difficulties enforcing a dismissal (OECD 2004).  
Although employees of all ages are affected by the strictness of dismissal 
rules, they have turned out to be particularly relevant for the elderly since in many 
countries the level of legal protection depends on tenure (Deelen/Bourmpoula 
2009). However, the effects of EPL are twofold (Addison/Teixeira 2001; 
Engelhardt 2012; Skedinger 2010). On the one hand, rigid EPL restricts the 
possibilities of firms to force older workers out of the labour market. High 
severance payments make it more expensive to dismiss a worker. Rules 
determining the legitimacy of a dismissal make separations even more difficult. 
They specify, for instance, whether changes in the productivity of workers can 
justify a layoff, or whether alternative measures have to be taken to enable the 
continuance of the employment relationship, such as a change in job 
characteristics. Thus, the stricter the level of EPL is, the higher the job security 
and the lower the likelihood of forced unemployment or early retirement are. On 
the other hand, EPL also constitutes barriers to re-entering the labour market 
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after job loss. Separation costs are part of the labour costs that employers take 
into account when hiring new employees. The higher these costs are, the lower 
the incentives are to employ workers (OECD 2004, 2006). Furthermore, strict 
EPL constitutes an incentive for employers to use early retirement schemes as 
an alternative method of displacing older employees with high wages. Strict EPL, 
therefore, strengthens the general risk of long-term unemployment for older 
workers. However, while it is broadly accepted that strict dismissal rules are 
positively related to long-term unemployment, there is no clear empirical 
evidence concerning a general relationship between EPL and unemployment 
(Addison/Teixeira 2001; Skedinger 2010). 
Again, the inconsistent previous findings regarding the presumed effects 
of EPL on the employment situation of older individuals can be related to the fact 
that the actual impact of EPL varies according to individual characteristics. While, 
for example, strict dismissal rules protect those older employees with long job 
tenure from layoff, it may constitute, firstly, a barrier to regular employment for 
those in marginal employment or even unemployment, and secondly, an 
incentive for employers to use early retirement schemes instead of direct 
dismissal. 
4.3 Hypotheses 
As described, we expect that the generosity of early retirement schemes and the 
strictness of EPL do not have one uniform effect on the employment situation of 
older workers. Rather their effects will vary according to individual determinants 
related to employment history and labour market experience.  
The duration of regular employment over the career indicates an 
individual’s labour market experience. Those with stable employment biographies 
have gained employment advantages throughout their working life, especially 
due to investments in human capital that are related to higher wages and higher 
levels of job security, in particular when employment careers are characterized by 
long job tenure (Dannefer 1987, 2003). Therefore, persons with longer periods in 
regular employment should have a lower risk of unemployment in their late 
career. The same applies to job tenure: firm-specific knowledge and experiences 
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prevent from lay-off. Thus, persons with long-term attachment to one employer 
are expected to have a generally lower risk of being unemployed. 
Hypothesis 1a: The more consistent and stable the individual’s working 
history, the lower the unemployment risk late in their career.  
The relationship of previous career and early retirement risk is more ambiguous 
since consistent careers in regular employment and stable employment 
relationships are also associated with the accumulation of pension rights. Thus, 
its effect on the probability of early retirement is twofold. On the one hand, 
individuals with long labour market experience in regular employment are less 
likely to leave the labour market early because they have acquired high human 
capital and good job positions. On the other hand, long duration in regular 
employment also constitutes pension rights and, thus, is related to a high 
expected pension income which provides an incentive to withdraw from the 
labour market. Furthermore, long periods of regular employment may also be a 
qualifying condition for early retirement schemes. Considering these contradictory 
presumptions, it is an empirical question of which effect is most predominant. 
H1b: The individual-level relationship between the consistency and 
stability of the individual’s working history and the risk of early retirement is 
unclear. 
We assume that the individual-level effect of years in regular employment on 
early retirement risk will be dependent upon the generosity of early retirement 
benefits. Generally, the likelihood of a transition into early retirement should 
increase along with the generosity of pension benefits. However, primarily 
persons with stable careers in regular employment can opt for early retirement as 
an alternative to employment or unemployment, because they are likely to meet 
the eligibility criteria and their expected pension benefits are high. 
Hypothesis 2: The more generous the early retirement incentives, the 
higher the probability of early retirement for individuals with consistent and stable 
working histories. 
EPL, especially the strictness of dismissal rules, intensifies the effect of 
job tenure on the risk of unemployment. The longer someone is employed in the 
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same job, the higher their job protection. In contrast, for those already having lost 
a job, rigid employment protection rules might turn into employment barriers 
impeding the possibility to procure employment in the future. Therefore, workers 
who have spent a long time with one employer benefit from rigid EPL and have a 
lower unemployment risk. Previous career instabilities, periods of unemployment 
and atypical employment increase the risk of remaining in a disadvantaged 
position late in one’s career, particularly when EPL is rigid. The stricter dismissal 
rules are, the lower the incentives for employers to hire new workers are. 
Consequently, in countries with strict dismissal rules, persons with long-term job 
tenure have an even greater advantage since their risk of being unemployed is 
lower, whereas the situation of those with previously unstable careers is worse.  
Hypothesis 3: The stricter the EPL, the lower the late career 
unemployment risk for individuals with consistent and stable working histories. 
In addition, we also assume that the relation between EPL and early retirement 
differs depending on individual working history. The more rigid employment 
protection laws are, the higher the separation costs are, i.e. the more difficult it is 
for the employer to displace a worker with high job tenure. In this situation, early 
retirement constitutes an alternative to dismissal and might be an option which is 
mutually agreeable for both the employer and the employee. The former can 
circumvent the strict dismissal regulations, and the latter might resign and decide 
to leave the labour market if they see no future employment chances due to 
employment barriers produced by rigid dismissal rules. 
Hypothesis 4: If the EPL is strict and the early retirement incentives are 
generous, the probability of early retirement is high for individuals with consistent 
and stable working histories. 
4.4 Data and methods 
We use SHARE-data with Wave 3 providing retrospective information on the life 
histories of older individuals in 12 countries (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden and 
 101 
 
Switzerland).21 The biographical data includes information on the individual 
employment situation from leaving school until retirement entry (Börsch-Supan et 
al. 2011; Schröder 2011). Information on the current situation of respondents 
comes from SHARE Wave 2 (surveyed in 2006/07) and Wave 1 for those who did 
not participate in Wave 2 (surveyed in 2004/05).22 We restrict our analysis to the 
male older workforce, excluding long-term sick and disabled persons. This results 
in an analysis group of 4,447 men aged between 50 and the statutory retirement 
age of a country (typically 65 years). 
The dependent variable of the analysis is the employment status at the 
time of the interview, divided into three categories: (1) employed (full-time, part-
time, and self-employment); (2) retired; (3) unemployed. ‘Employed’ serves as a 
reference category in all multivariate models. In order to cover the different labour 
market situations of older workers, we use two indicators which describe 
individuals’ employment histories based on the retrospective biography 
information included in SHARELIFE. The first indicator is measured as the sum of 
years in regular full-time employment. The second indicator ‘job tenure’ 
represents the duration of the last job. For employed persons, this applies to the 
current job, while for those in early retirement or unemployment, it applies to the 
last job before they left the labour market. The following individual characteristics 
are included as control variables: age; educational level according to the 
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED: level 0-2 indicates a 
low educational level, 3-4 a medium educational level, and 5-6 a high educational 
level); a binary variable indicating cohabitation with a partner or not; the 
subjective health status as a binary variable indicating poor health; and, in order 
to account for significant differences in retirement provisions, a binary variable 
                                                             
 
21
 This analysis uses data from SHARELIFE release 1, as of November 24th, 2010 and SHARE 
Wave 1 and 2, release 2.5.0, as of May 24th, 2011. The SHARE data collection has been primarily 
funded by the European Commission through the 5th framework programme (project QLK6-CT-
2001- 00360 in the thematic programme Quality of Life), through the 6th framework programme 
(projects SHARE-I3, RII-CT- 2006-062193, COMPARE, CIT5-CT-2005-028857, and SHARELIFE, 
CIT4-CT-2006-028812) and through the 7th framework programme (SHARE-PREP, 211909 and 
SHARE-LEAP, 227822). Additional funding from the U.S. National Institute on Aging (U01 
AG09740-13S2, P01 AG005842, P01 AG08291, P30 AG12815, Y1-AG-4553-01 and OGHA 04-
064, IAG BSR06-11, R21 AG025169) as well as from various national sources is gratefully 
acknowledged (see www.share-project.org for a full list of funding institutions). 
22
 This applies to 365 of the 4,447 respondents in our final analysis sample. 
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indicating whether someone has been mostly self-employed during their working 
life. 
As contextual factors, we include the strictness of EPL and the generosity 
of early retirement benefits. The strictness of the national EPL is operationalized 
with an index provided by the OECD (OECDa 2011; data refers to the year 
2007). We use only the component of the index which provides information about 
dismissal rules for regular employment and gives information, for example, on 
procedural processes, compensation payments, notice periods and the difficulty 
of enforcing a dismissal (for detailed information see Venn 2009). The strictness 
of EPL is measured on a scale from 0 to 6, with larger numbers indicating stricter 
regulation. In our sample, this EPL measure varies between 1.19 in Switzerland 
and 3.00 in the Czech Republic. 
We operationalize early retirement generosity with an OECD indicator 
providing information about the monetary incentives for older workers preferring 
employment over retirement. The indicator shows the change in gross pension 
wealth for each year of leaving the labour force before reaching the statutory 
retirement age for a man aged 60 to 65 with average earnings. A positive value of 
this measure indicates that the monetary incentives of early retirement are 
stronger than the additional value of staying in the labour force, and vice versa. A 
low monetary incentive for early retirement stems from high actuarial reduction in 
benefits and/or restrictions of possibilities to apply for public pension benefits 
before the statutory retirement age (OECD 2011b). The range of this indicator in 
our sample is from -24.0 in the Netherlands to 20.5 in Belgium. 
To test the micro-macro hypotheses on the employment situation of older 
workers, we apply multilevel methods. However, due to the rather small number 
of macro-level units in the SHARELIFE data, the conventional random effects 
regression models are not appropriate. Maas and Hox (2005) and Meuleman and 
Billiet (2009) pointed out the problems of the application of multilevel analysis 
with a small sample of countries. Due to the low number of cases on the second 
level, only a very small number of macro variables can be controlled for. In this 
case, the application of robust fixed effects models, which control for country-
level heterogeneity, is recommended in the econometric literature (Allison 2009; 
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Wooldridge 2010). Thus, we apply country fixed effects models and integrate the 
country-level indicators by means of cross-level interaction effects. In conceptual 
terms, the cross-level interaction effects represent the interrelated effects of 
individual characteristics and policy factors. 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Descriptive results 
Figure 4.1 gives an overview of the distribution of employment statuses among 
the older workforce in country comparison. First of all, the proportion of 
unemployed older men is rather low in all countries, with the exception of Poland 
and Germany. The main variation in the labour market status of the elderly is 
between early retirement and employment. In four countries, the proportion of 
employment among the older workforce is high, nearly reaching, or even 
exceeding, 80 %. These are the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and 
Switzerland. However, we find rather low employment rates in Austria, Poland 
and Italy, where only around 50 % are actively participating in the labour market.  
 
Figure 4.1: Employment status of men age 50-64 in country comparison 
(weighted percentage shares) 
 
Source: Own calculations from SHARE waves 1 and 2 (Release 2.5.0). 
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4.5.2 Multivariate results 
We estimate several country fixed effects regression models including the 
individual-level variables in Model 1 (Table 4.1) and additionally the cross-level 
interactions effects for: EPL in Model 2, early retirement generosity in Model 3, 
and the interaction of both in Model 4 (Table 4.2).23 First of all, we find slightly 
different patterns in the structure of the individual-level determinants of early 
retirement and unemployment. Generally, without considering any cross-level 
interaction effects, impact factors related to the individual employment history 
have a stronger impact on late career unemployment risk than on early retirement 
risk (Model 1). The number of years spent in regular employment over the career 
has no significant effect on the risk of early retirement; however, tenure is 
negatively related to early retirement. The longer a person is employed in the 
same job, the higher the probability is that he will stay in this job also later in his 
career. On the other hand, the involvement in regular employment over the whole 
career neither induces nor prevents early retirement. The effects of the number of 
years in regular employment and job tenure on late career unemployment risk are 
both negative. The more time a person was in regular employment during his 
working life, and the longer he has been attached to the same employer, the 
lower is the probability of late career unemployment. Consequently, our 
individual-level Hypotheses 1a and 1b regarding the relationship of employment 
history and late career employment are mainly supported. As assumed, we find 
no clear effect regarding the relation of employment history and the probability of 
early retirement. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
23
 As a robustness check, country-separated regressions and two-stage plots were estimated. 
These tests confirmed the results of the country fixed effects regression models.  
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Table 4.1: Multinomial logit model for the employment situation of men age 
50-64, relative risk ratios: Individual factors 
 (Model 1) 
 Category: retired Category: 
unemployed Reference category: employed 
Age 1.646*** 1.174*** 
 (0.028) (0.023) 
Years in regular employment (age 25-50) 1.004 0.952*** 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
Duration of last job 0.985*** 0.955*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
Mainly self employed 0.247*** 0.208*** 
 (0.061) (0.060) 
Educational level (Reference-category: Low)   
   Medium educational level 0.675*** 0.605** 
 (0.076) (0.099) 
   High educational level 0.405*** 0.248*** 
 (0.053) (0.052) 
Self-reported health: Poor 5.231*** 5.196*** 
 (1.210) (1.331) 
Living with spouse/partner 0.820 0.422*** 
 (0.116) (0.067) 
 + Country Fixed Effects 
N 4447 
Pseudo-R² 0.317 
Standard errors for the logit-values in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 
Source: Own calculations from SHARE waves 1 and 2 (Release 2.5.0) and SHARELIFE 
(Release 1). 
 
For the other individual-level characteristics, we find the following results. The 
relative risk of early retirement or unemployment significantly increases with age 
and significantly decreases with the educational degree. The risks of being 
unemployed or entering early retirement are strongly reduced for persons who 
have been mainly self-employed over their career and strongly increased for 
persons who indicate a poor health status.  
In the next step, we introduce policy factors in our models for the analysis 
of the micro-macro interrelation of employment career and policy factors. The 
results demonstrate that the impact of years in regular employment on the 
relative risk of early retirement is significantly moderated by both policy 
indicators.24 As assumed in Hypothesis 2, we find a significant positive cross-
level interaction effect of the generosity of early retirement and years in regular 
employment (Model 3), meaning that persons with a long duration of regular 
                                                             
 
24
 There is no significant interaction between job tenure and the macro-level indicators. Interactions 
with policy indicators are, thus, not primarily induced by the duration of the last job, but rather by 
developments during the whole working career. 
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employment have a higher probability of early retirement, but only in countries 
where the associated benefits are generous.  
 
Table 4.2: Multinomial logit models for the employment situation of men 
age 50-64, relative risk ratios: Cross-level interaction effects 
 (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) 
Reference category: employed    
Category: retired    
Years in regular employment (age 25-50) 1.140*** 1.019 1.023 
 (0.038) (0.012) (0.012) 
Duration of last job 0.999 0.986*** 0.987
**
 
 (0.016) (0.004) (0.004) 
Cross-level interaction effects    
Regular employment*EPL 0.943***   
 (0.013)   
Last job duration*EPL 0.994   
 (0.007)   
Regular employment* Early retirement generosity  1.003***  
  (0.001)  
Last job duration* Early retirement generosity  1.000  
  (0.000)  
Regular empl.*Early retirement generosity*EPL   1.001
***
 
   (0.000) 
Last job duration*Early retirement generosity*EPL   1.000 
   (0.000) 
Category: unemployed    
Years in regular employment (age 25-50) 0.990 0.953*** 0.953
***
 
 (0.042) (0.012) (0.012) 
Duration of last job 0.940* 0.956*** 0.956
***
 
 (0.024) (0.006) (0.006) 
Cross-level interaction effects    
Regular employment*EPL 0.983   
 (0.018)   
Last job duration*EPL 1.007   
 (0.011)   
Regular employment* Early retirement generosity  1.000  
  (0.001)  
Last job duration* Early retirement generosity  1.000  
  (0.000)  
Regular empl.*Early retirement generosity*EPL   1.000 
   (0.000) 
Last job duration*Early retirement generosity*EPL   1.000 
   (0.000) 
 + Country Fixed Effects 
N 4447 4447 4447 
Pseudo-R² 0.317 0.320 0.322 
Models 2-4 include all individual-level variables as in Model 1.  
Standard errors for the logit-values in parentheses; * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; 
Source: Own calculations from SHARE waves 1 and 2 (Release 2.5.0) and SHARELIFE 
(Release 1). 
For unemployment, we do not find significant cross-level interaction effects, 
neither for EPL nor for the early retirement generosity, and therefore, no 
indication which supports Hypothesis 3. Consequently, in the case of 
unemployment, individual factors work rather independently from the national 
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labour market and retirement regulations. As we showed in the previous section, 
the share of persons becoming unemployed at the end of their career is very low. 
Those few who are affected exhibit certain individual-level risk factors, such as 
low educational level, marginal employment and short job tenure. The policy 
factors regarded in this study neither compensate for, nor intensify, the effect of 
these disadvantageous characteristics. 
For early retirement risk, we find a significant cross-level interaction effect 
of EPL and years in regular employment. Stricter EPL leads to a lower risk of 
early retirement for those who have spent more time in regular employment 
during their career (i.e., the labour market insiders), in comparison to those with 
inconsistent careers (i.e., the outsiders) (Model 2). However, Model 4 reveals that 
the effect of EPL is dependent on the generosity of early retirement incentives. If 
rigid dismissal rules are combined with a generous pension system (Model 4), the 
coefficient becomes positive, i.e. then persons with consistent careers have a 
higher risk of early retirement. Thus, Hypothesis 4 is confirmed. The results 
indicate that early retirement schemes are more likely to be accepted by labour 
market insiders when public early retirement benefits are high. It can be assumed 
that employers use generous early retirement schemes in order to avoid seniority 
wages for their older workforce. On the other hand, in countries where early 
retirement is rather unattractive due to low benefits, persons with inconsistent 
careers have a higher chance of early retirement. 
To illustrate this three-way cross-level interaction effect, we display the 
predicted probabilities of early retirement by means of marginal effects computed 
for ‘average individuals’ which differ in the number of years in regular 
employment over the career holding constant all other factors on the mean value 
of the sample. Figure 4.2 is based on Model 4 and shows the combined effect of 
employment protection rules and early retirement incentives on the probability of 
early retirement. For all groups of workers, the probability of early retirement is 
highest when EPL is rigid and early retirement benefits are high. It is lowest when 
the dismissal rules are rigid and the early retirement incentive is low. Thus, EPL 
and the early exit incentive have divergent effects on early retirement risk, yet, 
the generosity of early retirement benefits are more influential than the EPL 
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rigidity. While generous pension benefits generally result in a higher probability of 
early retirement, the effect of EPL is more complex. Rigid dismissal rules also 
encompass a higher probability of early retirement, however, only if early exit 
incentives are high. If these incentives are low, strict dismissal rules have the 
reverse effect and de facto diminish the individual probability of early retirement.  
 
Figure 4.2: Marginal effects for the probability of early retirement for 
different numbers of years in regular employment and different country-
levels of EPL and the early retirement incentive 
 
‘Early ret. in. ‘means early retirement incentive, values 10 (high), -20 (low). Values for 
EPL: 3 (high), 1 (low). Source: Own calculations from SHARE waves 1 and 2 (Release 
2.5.0) and SHARELIFE (Release 1); based on Model 4 (see Table 4.2). 
The central result is that the effect of the policy factors differs and even moves in 
the opposite direction depending on the individual’s previous working history, i.e. 
for labour market insiders with a high number of years in regular employment, 
and outsiders with a low number of years in regular employment. When EPL is 
strict and early retirement benefits are low, the early retirement probability of a 
person with many years in regular employment is only around 14 %, whereas 
those with more inconsistent careers have a higher probability of early retirement. 
Accordingly, rigid dismissal rules create disincentives for employers to displace 
workers, who due to the high labour market integration over their career, are 
strongly protected by EPL. However, this is only the case if the alternative route 
of displacement by means of early retirement is denied. 
In contrast, if the EPL is strict and early retirement benefits are generous, 
the probability of early retirement for individuals who spend many years in regular 
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employment is around 45 %, by far exceeding the probability of those with 
inconsistent employment histories. Early retirement generosity has the strongest 
impact on the employment situation of labour market insiders, i.e. people having 
spent the most years in regular employment. The higher the monetary incentives 
to withdraw from the labour market before the statutory retirement age, the more 
likely those with a long duration of regular employment will do so. Consequently, 
early retirement benefits serve as an exit option for individuals who have been 
well integrated in the labour market during their career, but are only sparsely 
available for those in marginal labour market positions. Moreover, the gap 
between labour market insiders and outsiders is largest when EPL is strict and 
early exit options are generous, while there is almost no difference between 
these groups when both EPL and early retirement benefits are low. Thus, 
inequalities in labour market outcomes in later life are driven by the interaction of 
labour market policies and their specific interplay with individuals’ accumulated 
status over the working career. 
4.6 Conclusion 
Our analysis of the labour market chances of the older workforce has shown that, 
firstly, individuals face different risks of inactivity and unemployment later in their 
career depending on their previous employment history. We found clear patterns 
regarding the individual-level determinants of unemployment and early 
retirement. Late career unemployment results from an accumulation of 
disadvantages over the previous career, including a low educational level and a 
fragmented career in marginal employment without long-term attachment to one 
employer. Since the developments of the last years have shown that the share of 
discontinuous career paths has increased considerably (Schulze Buschoff 2011), 
one may expect that unemployment risks of older people will rise in the future. 
Those who retire early, on the other hand, are persons who have had 
rather consistent careers in regular employment and use early retirement 
possibilities if they are available in their country. Thus, mainly individuals who are 
well integrated in the labour market and could accumulate sufficient pension 
rights throughout their careers make use of generous retirement benefits. In 
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contrast, persons with fragmented employment histories face a higher risk of late 
career unemployment and are less like to use early retirement as an alternative. 
Presumably, one reason for this is their lower capacity to accumulate pension 
rights over their career, which then results in burdens to meet the possibly 
demanding eligibility rules of early retirement schemes.  
Secondly, regarding early retirement we found that also the effect of EPL 
varies among older workers depending on their previous employment history. 
According to our results, strict EPL particularly decreases the probability of early 
retirement for individuals with consistent careers in regular employment, but only 
when the expected pension benefits are small. In this context, rigid EPL appears 
to have the effect that older employees actively participate longer in the labour 
market, presumably because employers want to avoid costly layoff procedures. 
Therefore, strict dismissal rules appear to give some security against possibly 
involuntary early retirement. The high costs of dismissal might have the side 
effect that employers implement alternative strategies to preserve the 
employability of their older staff members. However, these firm-level effects have 
to be tested in further research with data that also includes employer information. 
Furthermore, older labour market insiders seem to accept early retirement 
schemes offered by employers in order to avoid seniority wages when public 
pension benefits are also high. As the outcomes of the study have shown, the 
consideration of only one single policy factor can be too one-sided and might 
lead to biased expectations. 
In general, generous early retirement options are not a last resort for 
individuals with low employability, but rather serve as an appropriate option for 
well-integrated insiders of the labour market. Two reasons can be named for this 
result. Firstly, only labour market insiders with previously stable employment 
histories have access to early retirement. Secondly, employers have higher 
incentives to lay off these employees because of their high seniority wages.  
Therefore, the strategy of using early retirement to avoid unemployment of 
older workers has to be questioned. Against the background of an ageing 
workforce and increasing demand for skilled labour, the results of our analysis 
provide support for active measures to keep qualified older employees in the 
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labour market and for not restricting these measures to the supply side. 
Furthermore, strategies to avoid late career unemployment should start earlier in 
the career, for example, by means of incentives for life-long learning (Jepsen et 
al. 2002). 
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5. Why employment protection reforms are not used as a policy tool to fight 
back unemployment in Europe: The role of labour market conditions and 
the relation between insiders and outsiders on the implementation of 
reforms25 
5.1 Introduction 
For decades, in numerous European countries, employment protection legislation 
(EPL) has been relaxed. The biggest changes can be observed concerning the 
use of temporary employment and fixed-term contracts. 
Reform processes26 have been initiated, inter alia, by the Jobs Study of 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) that was 
published in 1994. The Jobs Study was published due to the high number of 
unemployed within the EU-member states (35 million or 8.5 % of the labour force) 
and the strong prevalence of long-term unemployment. An insufficient 
adaptability of the labour markets towards a preceding technological 
development and globalization of economies has been identified as the main 
reason for high and persistent unemployment by the OECD. Rigid employment 
protection rules and, along with this, missing capabilities of a flexible work 
organization have been criticized, in this context, as an essential obstacle for the 
reduction of structural unemployment by decreasing hiring incentives (see OECD 
1994).  
The relation between employment protection and unemployment has 
been examined in numerous studies (e.g. Addison/Teixeira 2001; Baker et al. 
2005; Belot et al. 2002; European Commission 2006; OECD 2004; Skedinger 
2010). However, in the empirical literature, no clear effect concerning the relation 
between the deregulation of EPL and a decrease in unemployment could be 
confirmed. Only some of the studies identified a positive relation between EPL 
and unemployment; in most of the cases, the effects were not significant. 
                                                             
 
25
 This article has been submitted to the European Journal of Social Security and is currently under 
review. The study has been presented inter alia at the following conferences and workshops: 
SOCLIFE winter workshop, Cologne in 02/2012; Doctoral research colloquium at the chair for 
empirical social and economic research, University of Cologne, in 01/2013. 
26
 Within this paper, the term ‘reform’ refers only to amendments that led to more flexible EPL. 
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One potential explanation for this contradictory outcome can be 
attributed to a conflict of interests on the political level. While high unemployment 
rates and the economic and social consequences involved would legitimate the 
implementation of reforms from an economic perspective, high and increasing 
unemployment rates, in contrast, are considered to diminish the political support 
that is needed by the decisive voters for the actual implementation of the 
amendment.  
In contrast to the large number of studies that deal with the effects of 
changes in EPL, the empirical literature analyzing the determinants for the 
implementation of employment protection reforms is only sparse (Emmenegger 
2011) and concentrates mainly on political determinants like the number of veto-
points or the dominance of left or right wing parties (e.g. Botero et al. 2004; 
Bonoli 2003; Hoe et al. 2008; Ochel et al. 2008; Rueada 2005). The present 
study tries to fill the gap in the empirical literature by highlighting the role of 
labour market conditions, particularly the meaning of unemployment, and the 
relation between labour market insiders and outsiders. 
The paper is structured as follows: First, the theoretical considerations 
concerning the relation between unemployment and EPL are introduced. 
Afterwards, the data and the methodological approach are presented. The study 
concentrates on EU-15 countries between 1995 and 2005. In order to identify 
potential necessary conditions for the implementation of amendments, crisp-set 
qualitative comparative analysis (crisp-set QCA) has been applied. Within the 
result section, the paper provides an overview on the reforms that have taken 
place between 1995 and 2005. The results of the truth tables are discussed and 
differentiated according to the type of employment affected and the strength of 
reforms. The study ends with a conclusion and discussion of the findings. 
5.2 Theoretical considerations 
First insights into the interdependency of unemployment and the realizability of 
employment protection reforms are provided by the work of Saint-Paul (1993, 
1996). He highlights the relation between unemployment and the political support 
for dismissal reforms by different groups of voters. The unemployed are generally 
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interested in eliminating employment barriers in the form of hiring disincentives 
and to improve their own job chances. However, the employees represent due to 
their numerical predominance the decisive voters, whose support is needed by 
the political actors for not being punished by deselection in the next legislative 
period. The employees have primarily an interest to maintain their own job 
security (cf. Ochel et al. 2008). Employees in regular employment, the so-called 
labour market insiders (Lindbeck/Snower 1989), are generally against reforms 
that reduce their own employment protection and, therewith, their own 
advantages. The effort to protect their own job security is higher the larger 
unemployment is. This also means that a reform that aims to make EPL more 
flexible is less likely to get the necessary support when unemployment is high 
and in particular, when unemployment is increasing (Ochel et al. 2008; Saint-Paul 
1993). Policies that contribute to the persistence of unemployment get the 
greatest consent by voters. An employment protection reform that leads to a 
relaxation of dismissal rules is, thus, only possible when unemployment is low or 
decreasing, i.e. when the incentive of the insiders to protect the status quo is 
rather low.  
Saint-Paul (1993) claims for this reason that the high (long-term) 
unemployment rates as they could be observed in many European countries, did 
not have a huge influence on the relaxation of EPL. Since the unemployed still 
form a minority despite high unemployment rates, their interests are not taken 
into account or they step back behind the interests of the employees.  
These assumptions are associated with certain restrictions (Saint-Paul 
1996). The unemployed would not declare themselves in favour of a complete 
abolishment of dismissal rules if the individual costs arising from continual job 
changes would be higher than the gains from employment, although it might 
facilitate easier access to employment as such.  
Furthermore, specific aspects can influence the support of the 
employees. Workers would not prefer infinitely high separation costs if this would 
lead companies into bankruptcy or if it would thwart the necessary progress to 
remain competitive.  
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The ‘tax-effect’ can also be influential. Unemployment increases the tax 
burden for employees. Therefore, workers have an incentive to support measures 
that reduce unemployment in order to diminish their individual tax load. 
The decisive voters are also more likely to contribute to reforms that 
reduce unemployment and facilitate labour market entry when they anticipate 
acute job insecurity themselves. According to Saint-Paul (1996), the political 
support of the decisive voters increases when unemployment is distributed over 
broad population groups and when employment rates are decreasing. In the case 
that unemployment is distributed only among specific groups, i.e. low skilled and 
young people or specific regions or sectors, the political pressure by insiders to 
reduce unemployment is rather low. 
Generally, the realizability of amendments that are detrimental for 
regular employees is expected to be rather difficult. However, there might be 
some differences for deregulation measures that affect temporary employment 
only. Persons with a regular employment contract are not harmed by these 
changes. In contrast: ‘Two-tier systems give incumbent employees the best of 
both worlds: their current terms are unaffected, but if they lose their job, they will 
benefit from higher job creation’ (Saint-Paul 1996: 280). Reforms that facilitate 
the use of temporary employment and fixed-term contracts influence the outside 
options of workers positively. According to Saint-Paul (1996) this also promotes 
the bargaining power against employers that, in turn, has a positive effect on the 
level of job security. 
Therefore, it is easier for politicians to implement reforms that regulate 
temporary employment or fixed-term contracts, without being punished by the 
insiders. The support for such amendments is bigger the higher the share of 
outsiders (i.e. the unemployed, or persons that work on a temporary basis) 
because they would directly benefit from the increased hiring incentives by the 
employer. Saint-Paul (1993) explains thereby the introduction of the two-tier 
employment protection system that differentiates between regular and temporary 
employment and that has led to a dual labour market with flexible and rigid 
employees (Saint-Paul 1993). Moreover, a negative labour market situation with 
high and increasing unemployment is related to an increase in the number of 
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outsiders and a rise in political power.27 It can be assumed that reforms are more 
likely the bigger the share of outsiders on the labour market is. 
Some authors (Eichhorst/Marx 2011; Ochel et al. 2008), however, expect 
that insiders nevertheless anticipate negative effects through the expansion of 
the temporary employment sector at least in the long term. Due to the 
'dualization' of the labour markets, the competition increases for insiders. 
Employers may have incentives to hire less expensive outsiders via fixed-term 
contracts. This diminishes the bargaining position of the insiders, with the result 
of low wages and lower employment security. The authors, therefore, claim that 
decisive voters generally have no interest to support employment protection 
reforms, even if they only affect temporary employment and fixed-term contracts. 
Moreover, one may assume that an easier use of temporary employment or 
fixed-term contracts is only of limited value for the perceived outside-options. In 
the long run, the unemployment risks increase in the case of job loss if this is 
connected with a change into temporary employment relationships in the future. 
Emmenegger (2009) further argues that outsiders might also have 
motives not to support deregulations on temporary employment at all. The 
experience of job loss can lead to a stronger appreciation of job security in future 
employment relationships. Moreover, further deregulation makes it more difficult 
to switch into regular employment later. Emmenegger (2009) provides some 
evidence that the differences between insiders and outsiders concerning their 
preferences for EPL might be overestimated. He argues in this context that voters 
do not decide on amendments on employment protection only but on policy 
packages with different contests that are offered by parties in election campaigns. 
 
 
 
                                                             
 
27 Saint-Paul (1996) assumes that increasing unemployment has a positive influence on the 
bargaining power of insiders, because the number of regular employed is lower and the rents only 
have to be distributed among fewer workers. However, the author neglects in this context that the 
increasing number of outsiders leads to a growing wage undercutting competition. 
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5.3 Results of the empirical research literature 
There are only a few studies that deal with the relation between labour market 
conditions and the implementation employment protection reforms. Furthermore, 
they differ concerning the operationalization of EPL, the methods used, the 
sample included and the reference period. Direct comparisons of results are, 
therefore, only possible to a limited extent. 
In his empirical analysis, Saint-Paul (1996) focuses on European 
countries between 1960 and 1995. In order to examine the role of labour market 
conditions on the implementation of reforms, he takes the following determinants 
into account: Unemployment, the change in unemployment and the output 
growth.28 Reforms are determined on the basis of OECD country reports from 
various years and articles dealing with EPL reforms. For his study, he uses 
descriptive analyses. Saint-Paul (1996) identifies different empirical regularities. 
One result is that two-tier reductions29 in EPL only occur when unemployment is 
rising and output growth is below the country-specific trend. Two-tier reforms 
have taken place in bad economic conditions, but not in extremely difficult times. 
In many cases unemployment has been above the country specific average. 
Saint-Paul concludes that ‘Two tier reforms are, therefore, driven by opportunity 
more than ideology’ (Saint-Paul 1996: 284). For reforms that lead to changes in 
the regulation of regular employment, the picture is less clear. In half of the 
cases, unemployment has decreased prior to the reform. Concerning the level of 
unemployment and the development of output growth, no explicit relations can be 
observed. 
Ochel (2009) concentrated on two-tier reforms that have taken place in 
Europe between 1985 and 2003. He analyses the prevalent conditions in 
countries with implemented reforms and countries that have failed to implement a 
reform by having a closer look at the deregulation processes of some selected 
                                                             
 
28
 Saint-Paul also examines the role of some political determinants. These are the party in power 
and the electoral cycle.  
29
 Two-tier reductions are reforms that lead to the creation of a two-tier system with regular 
employement on the one side and a market for temporary emmployent on the other side, or, if the 
two-tier system already exists, to a further increase in the flexibility of the temporary employment 
sector. 
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countries. EPL is measured by the EPL-index provided by the OECD (OECD 
2004). He observed a strong resistance of incumbent workers to reforms and that 
governments preferred to avoid conflicts with unions. According to Ochel (2009), 
increases in unemployment did not support EPL reforms on regular but on 
temporary employment. 
The European Commission provided current empirical investigations in 
2012. The Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs examined the 
role of potential labour market determinants for amendments of EPL in the EU-
member states between 2000 and 2010. In this context, it concentrates on 
employment-friendly reforms, i.e. reforms relaxing EPL, but without distinguishing 
between regular and temporary employment. Information concerning EPL is 
based on the Labour Market Reforms Database (LABREF) (European 
Commission 2013b). As a methodological approach, a Poisson regression 
analysis has been applied. The results show that low job finding rates, a high 
share of temporary employment and low GDP growth increase the likelihood of 
employment-friendly reforms. Tax wedges on labour, the employment rate, the 
net replacement rate and the duration of unemployment benefits, the share of 
long-term unemployment, unemployment, real per-capita GDP and wage shares 
are not significant. 
5.4 Hypotheses 
On the basis of the presented theoretical considerations, employment protection 
reforms are expected to be rather rare events. Under the assumption that the 
implementation of a reform depends on the support of the decisive voter, different 
necessary conditions can be derived. 
Generally, it is assumed that a positive labour market situation with regard 
to the development and distribution of unemployment is necessary for the 
implementation of a reform. Politicians need the support of the decisive voters or 
the labour market insiders. This group particularly tries to protect the status quo, 
when unemployment is high or increasing. Conversely, this means that reforms 
are only supported in the case of low and/or decreasing unemployment. 
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H1: A positive labour market situation, i.e. unemployment rates below 
average or decreasing unemployment rates, are necessary for the 
implementation of employment protection reforms that lead to a relaxation of 
dismissal rules. 
On the basis of the presented theoretical considerations, reforms are also 
expected to occur under certain exceptions although unemployment is high or 
increasing. In addition to hypothesis H1, some alternating hypotheses can be 
derived. However, it is expected that the decisive voter has to feel threatened by 
the current labour market situation in order to support reforms relaxing EPL. 
These threats can result from an actual anticipation of job loss, high social 
expenditures or tax burdens as a consequence of high unemployment rates. 
Reforms that lead to a relaxation of employment protection are also expected to 
be implemented by politicians, when the competition by labour market outsiders 
is particularly high or increasing 
H2a: A negative labour market situation, i.e. unemployment rates above 
average and increasing unemployment, in connection with an increasing degree 
of job insecurity are necessary for the implementation of employment protection 
reforms that lead to a relaxation of dismissal rules. 
H2b: A negative labour market situation, i.e. unemployment rates above 
average and increasing unemployment, in connection with high social 
expenditures for unemployment benefits are necessary for the implementation of 
employment protection reforms that lead to a relaxation of dismissal rules. 
H2c:  A negative labour market situation, i.e. unemployment rates above 
average and increasing unemployment, in connection with a high share of 
workers that are employed on a temporary basis are necessary for the 
implementation of employment protection reforms that lead to a relaxation of 
dismissal rules. 
Moreover, it is expected that amendments concerning the use of temporary 
employment or fix-term contracts are more likely to occur than the deregulation of 
dismissal rules for regular employment.  
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5.5 Data 
Within this analysis, deregulation processes are taken into account that have 
taken place in the EU-15 countries and during 1995 and 2005. Due to missing 
data on the level of employment protection, Luxembourg had to be excluded.  
The operationalization of employment protection is provided by the EPL-
index of the OECD (see OECD 2004, 2010). The index differentiates between 
rules for regular and temporary employment (including fixed-term contracts) and 
is based on the average of the two. The sub-index for regular employment 
captures the following aspects: procedural inconveniences of individual dismissal 
of employees on regular contracts, notice and severance pay for no-fault 
individual dismissal and the difficulty to enforce a dismissal. The sub-index for 
temporary employment captures the existence of objective reasons that prohibits 
the use of temporary employment and fixed-term employment, the maximum 
allowed duration of such contracts and the possibilities of renewals for both 
employment types. Both sub-indices are measured on a scale from 0 to 6. The 
higher the value is, the more rigid regulation is. In this context, all relevant 
legislation and provisions of collective agreements are taken into account (for a 
detailed description of the indices see OECD 2004).  
The implementation of an employment protection reform represents the 
outcome Y. The study concentrates on deregulation processes only. This implies 
that Y is coded 1, whenever EPL has been relaxed. In all other cases (no 
change, reregulation) the outcome is coded 0. In a second step, it is furthermore 
differentiated between reforms on regular employment and temporary 
employment as well between weak and strong reforms. Changes in the EPL-
index above 0.5 units are considered to represent a strong reform. 
In order to study the role of unemployment for the implementation of 
employment protection deregulation, unemployment rates and their development 
prior to the reform are taken into account. In this context, two different aspects 
are included: (1) the unemployment rate lies below the EU-15 average of the 
corresponding year or not, and (2) unemployment is decreasing. Unemployment 
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trends display the development within the country that has taken place within the 
last three years.30 It is assumed that the medium-term development of 
unemployment is most important, since the implementation of a reform is mostly 
time consuming. The variable is coded 1 whenever unemployment is below the 
average or when the unemployment rate has decreased within the last three 
years before the implementation of the reform (eurostat 2013a).  
Increasing job insecurity for labour market insiders is operationalized by 
employment rates. It is coded 1, when employment rates decreased within the 
last three years before the reform took place and 0 otherwise (eurostat 2013b). 
High social expenditures for unemployment are derived from the average 
unemployment benefits of a single earner with two dependent children. 
Unemployment benefits are coded 1, when unemployment benefits are above the 
EU-15 average of the corresponding year (van Vliet/Caminada 2012). Social 
expenditures are considered to be high or increasing, when unemployment is 
high or increasing. 
The influence of labour market outsiders is captured by the degree of 
temporary employment within a country. It is coded 1, when the share lies above 
the EU-15 average of the corresponding year (eurostat 2013c). 
5.6 Methods 
The empirical analysis starts with a descriptive overview on the deregulation of 
EPL that has taken place between 1995 and 2005 within the EU-15 countries. 
In order to analyse the role of unemployment for the implementation of an 
employment protection reform, crisp-set qualitative comparative analysis is 
applied. An advantage of crisp-set QCA is that it can be used to identify causal 
relations, although the number of cases is low. However, the results from the 
selected sample are not generalizable. Crisp-set QCA requires that all relevant 
variables are dichotomized.  
                                                             
 
30
 Unemployment rate t-1 – Unemployment rate t-3, with t = the year of reform. 
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The study is limited to the analysis of necessary conditions.31 A condition 
is said to be necessary for an outcome Y, if the falsity of the condition guarantees 
the nonexistence of Y. In other words, whenever the outcome Y occurs, X will be 
there as well (X  Y). This also implies that the analysis can be restricted to 
those cases in which the outcome is available, i.e. in which employment 
protection has been relaxed (Schneider/Wagemann 2007). The results are 
illustrated by truth tables. 
In contrast to multivariate regression techniques, QCA allows for the 
combination of different conditions in order to explain the underlying causal 
mechanisms. In this context, it is important to note that QCA uses Boolean 
algebra and not linear algebra. The link between different necessary conditions is 
indicated by the logical OR which is expressed by the symbol ‘+’ and the logical 
AND expressed by ‘*’. According to the hypotheses formulated in section 4, it is 
tested whether the following equation is true: 
 
A + a * (B + C + D)  Y 
With: 
A = low or decreasing unemployment  
B = high proportion of temporary workers 
C = high unemployment benefits  
D = increasing job insecurity for insiders 
a = high and increasing unemployment 
Y = relaxation of EPL 
 
Theoretically, four conditions would lead to 16 different combinations of variables. 
However, in practice, we are confronted with bounded empirical diversity: not all 
of the possible combinations are usually recorded by the sample. They might 
exist in reality, but are not captured due to the small number of cases. For this 
analysis, the conservative approach has been chosen in order to deal with the 
bounded empirical diversity, i.e. only those combinations of variables are taken 
                                                             
 
31
 The analysis of sufficient conditions is in light of the theoretical considerations outlined in section 
5.2 not adequate. One reason for this is that reforms are path dependent, i.e. the implementation of 
a reform in one year influences the likelihood of potential following reforms. For the sake of 
completeness, without theoretical foundation, it has been tested whether the conditions A and aBC 
are sufficient for Y, that means whether Y can always be observed when the conditions A and aBC 
are present. This is not the case. In addition, no other combination of configurations has turned out 
to be sufficient for Y.  
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into account for which we have empirically observable cases (for more 
information on different approaches to deal with bounded empirical diversity, see 
Schneider/Wagemann 2007). 
The quality of the results derived by a crisp-set QCA, are illustrated by a 
consistency measure. This measure describes how many single cases can be 
explained by a condition in relation to the total number of cases and is calculated 
as:  
number of cases with X=1 and Y=1 
number of cases with X=1 
Another measure that is generally reported in the context of crisp-set QCA is the 
coverage score. It represents the share of cases with X=1 for which the outcome 
can be observed and is calculated as: 
number of cases with X=1 and Y=1 
number of cases with X=1 
The coverage score is an indicator for the triviality of a condition. It controls for 
the total number of cases in which the condition is present. If the condition also 
occurs in numerous cases in which the outcome Y is not existent, one may 
assume that the condition is irrelevant for Y. 
 For the present analysis, however, the coverage score has only limited 
meaning and will, therefore, not be taken into account. The reason for this is that 
the cases in the sample used are not independent.32 It includes country 
information from different point in times. The implementation of a reform in one 
year has, however, an effect on the implementation on the next reform. If EPL 
has been relaxed at one point in time, it is unlikely that a new reform will take 
place in the following year independent of the economic or political conditions. 
Moreover, changes in economic and political conditions are expected to be rather 
slow. In the case of this specific sample, the coverage score does, therefore, not 
lead to meaningful conclusions. 
 
                                                             
 
32
 Usually, QCA is not applied to examine countries at different point in times but at one specific 
year. 
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5.7 Empirical results 
According to the OECD database (2010), 23 employment protection reforms 
have taken place between 1995 and 2005 in the EU-15 countries that have led to 
a relaxation of dismissal rules if reforms on regular and temporary employment 
are treated separately (see Table 5.1). Nearly two-thirds of the reforms affected 
the use of temporary employment. 
Only three countries did not relax their levels of EPL within the 
investigation period. These are France, Ireland and the United Kingdom. The 
latter two already had very flexible employment protection rules from the 
beginning. Finland and Spain relaxed rules only for regular employment; 
Germany, Belgium, Greece, Italy and Sweden only for temporary employment. 
Denmark, the Netherlands and Portugal implemented a dual strategy.  
By looking at the strength of the reforms, one can observe big differences, 
in particular between the two employment types. For regular employment, EPL is 
reduced on average by 0.17 units, with a minimum of 0.03 units and a maximum 
of 0.55 units. For temporary employment, the changes in EPL are considerably 
larger. On average, legislation for temporary employment has been reduced by 
0.89 units. The smallest reform captures a change in the EPL-index of 0.25 units. 
The biggest changes imply a difference of 2.00 units on the EPL-scale. However, 
in most of the cases, reforms were only marginal. While some countries have 
implemented only one reform, others took several deregulation steps.  
One special case is Italy. It has implemented five different EPL reforms 
between 1997 and 2003. These changes go back to the ‘Treu Law’ which 
introduced temporary contracts and extended the applicability of fixed-term 
contracts by means of reform packages that are planned to be implemented in 
several consecutive years (Ochel 2009; Sciulli 2006). The implementation of 
these reforms was independent from labour market influences. Therefore, Italy 
will be excluded from the QCA. 
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Table 5.1: Employment protection deregulation 1995-2005 (EU-15) 
State Year Type of 
reform 
Content of the reform Change EPL 
before 
DK 1995 Regular Notice period 0.05 1.68 
DK 1995 Temporary Conditions for temporary work agency 
employment, number of contracts, duration 
of contracts 
1.75 3.13 
FI 1996 Regular Notice period 0.14 2.45 
PT 1996 Temporary Conditions for temporary work agency 
employment 
0.38 3.38 
ES 1997 Regular Compensation payment after unfair 
dismissal 
0.16 2.77 
BE 1997 Temporary Duration of temporary work agency 
contracts + number of contracts, duration 
and conditions for fixed-term contracts 
2.00 4.63 
DE 1997 Temporary Conditions for temporary work agency 
employment + number of contracts, 
duration and conditions for fixed-term 
contracts 
1.5 3.50 
IT 1997 Temporary Number of contracts, duration and 
conditions for fixed-term contracts 
0.63 5.38 
SE 1997 Temporary Number of contracts, duration and 
conditions for fixed-term contracts 
0.45 2.08 
IT 1998 Temporary Introduction of temporary work agency 
employment 
1.12 4.75 
NL 1999 Regular Notification procedure, notice period
1)
 0.03 3.08 
NL 1999 temporary Conditions for fixed-term contracts + 
conditions for temporary work agency 
employment 
1.19 2.38 
IT 2000 temporary Conditions for temporary work agency 
employment 
0.38 3.63 
FI 2001 Regular Notice period 0.14 2.31 
IT 2001 temporary Duration and conditions for fixed-term 
contracts 
1.00 3.25 
DE 2002 temporary Conditions for temporary work agency 
employment 
0.5 2.00 
AT 2003 Regular Severance Payment 0.55 2.92 
ES 2003 Regular Definition of a fair dismissal, compensation 
payments after an unfair dismissal 
0.15 2.61 
IT 2003 temporary Conditions for temporary work agency 
employment 
0.37 2.25 
GR 2003 temporary Introduction of temporary work agency 
employment +  number of fixed term 
contracts 
1.62 4.75 
PT 2004 Regular Trial period 0.16 4.33 
DE 2004 temporary Duration of temporary work agency 
employment  
0.25 1.50 
PT 2004 temporary Duration of fixed-term contracts  0.25 3.00 
1) At the same time, severance payment has become obligatory for short-term and 
medium-term employment.2) At the same time severance payments have increased 
somewhat for all types of employment duration.4) The maximum allowed duration of 
fixed-term contracts has, in contrast, been reduced. 
The EPL-index works for most of the items with ranges in order to make legislation 
comparable between countries. For some items, the OECD-index distinguishes between 
the duration of the employment relationship by using different employment durations: 
short-term = 9 months, medium-term = 4 years, long-term = 20 years. 
Source: OECD 2010. 
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Table 5.2 shows the truth table according to the crisp-set QCA. Since we are only 
interested in necessary conditions, it contains only configurations where the 
outcome is present (Y=1) independent of the type of employment that has been 
affected.33 
Table 5.2: Truth table – Deregulation of EPL 
Conditions A B C D Y= EPL N 
 1 1 1 1 1 2 
1 1 1 0 1 4 
1 0 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 1 3 
0 1 1 1 1 2 
0 1 1 0 1 2 
Consistency 0.73 0.67 0.8 0.2   
 A = low or decreasing unemployment  
 B = high proportion of temporary workers 
 C = high unemployment benefits  
 D = increasing job insecurity for insiders  
 Y = relaxation of EPL 
 
Source: Own research. 
The table consists of seven different configurations. That implies that nine 
configurations are empirically non-existent. None of the four conditions are 
necessary if seen in isolation.  
With a consistency measure of 0.8, condition C (high unemployment 
benefits) shows the highest value. 80 % of all cases in which a reform has taken 
place provide unemployment benefits that are above the EU-15 average. In the 
literature, a consistency of 80 % is generally considered as too low for a 
necessary condition (Schneider/Wagemann 2007). 
However, in the case of employment protection reforms leading to the 
relaxation of dismissal rules, there can be alternate necessary conditions.34 It is 
assumed that either a positive labour market situation, expressed by low and 
decreasing unemployment rates, is necessary for a reform or a negative labour 
market situation that is linked with conditions that might have adverse effects on 
the labour market insiders, like high social expenditures, increasing job insecurity 
or strong competition through temporary workers. 
                                                             
 
33
 If a country has implemented changes on both types of employment, this is now regarded as one 
reform. 
34
 Note: in order to use alternate conditions to identify necessary conditions, strong theoretical 
arguments are necessary (Schneider/Wagemann 2007). 
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As the analysis of the truth table in Table 5.2 shows, not all of the 
alternate conditions are important. For the sake of simplification, aD drops out as 
a necessary condition for the implementation of the reform. However, in the 
absence of a positive labour market situation and the presence of an employment 
protection reform, both conditions, high unemployment benefits and a high share 
of temporary workers, are met. This leads us to the following equation A + aB + 
aC  Y, which can be further summarized to A + aBC  Y. 
For our sample, thus, two necessary conditions can be identified. The first 
is a positive labour market situation expressed by low or decreasing 
unemployment; the second is a negative labour market situation in combination 
with high unemployment benefits that represents high social expenditures for the 
insiders and a high share of temporary workers who are competitors and might 
also be influential for the political support of the reform. The two conditions A and 
aBC together show a consistency rate of 100 %, i.e. they capture all cases of the 
sample with Y=1. 
In five of the eleven cases where a positive labour market situation is 
present (A=1) this is due to decreasing unemployment rates; in three cases 
unemployment was below the average of the EU-15 countries in the 
corresponding year and in the remaining three cases unemployment was both 
decreasing and below the average. 
In many cases, A goes along with B (high proportion of temporary works), 
C (high unemployment benefits) and D (increasing job insecurity). However, the 
absence or the presence of these conditions is not sufficient for A.  
Reforms on Temporary and Regular Employment 
Due to the theoretical considerations, results might change according to the type 
of employment that is affected by the reform. Therefore, truth tables are also 
presented separately for the deregulation of regular (EPR) and temporary 
employment (EPT). 
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Table 5.4: Truth table – Deregulation of EPR and EPT 
 A B C D Y= EPR N 
 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 1 1 1 0 1 3 
 1 0 1 1 1 1 
 1 0 1 0 1 1 
 1 0 0 0 1 1 
 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Consistency  0.88 0.63 0.88 0.25   
 A B C D Y=EPT N 
 1 1 1 1 1 2 
 1 1 1 0 1 1 
 1 0 1 1 1 1 
 1 0 1 0 1 1 
 1 0 0 0 1 2 
 0 1 1 1 1 2 
 0 1 1 0 1 1 
Consistency 0.70 0.50 0.80 0.50   
 A = low or decreasing unemployment  
 B = high proportion of temporary workers 
 C = high unemployment benefits  
 D = increasing job insecurity for insiders 
 Y= relaxation of regulations on regular employment (EPR) and temporary employment 
(EPT) 
 
Source: Own research. 
The equation A + aBC  Y is also confirmed for deregulations on regular and 
temporary employment. The consistency scores of A and B are somewhat higher 
in the case of reforms for regular in contrast to temporary employment. In seven 
out of eight cases where a reform on regular employment has taken place, 
unemployment has either been below average or has decreased within the years 
before.35 Except for one case (Finland 1996), a positive labour market situation is 
a necessary condition for the deregulation of dismissal rules for regular 
employment. In addition, in seven out of eight cases, unemployment benefits 
have been above average while the reform has been implemented. However, as 
discussed before, the meaning of condition C is considered to be dependent from 
the existence or absence of A. For reforms on temporary employment, the 
consistency of A is lower compared to C. A occurs in seven out of ten cases,36 C 
in eight out of ten.  
 
                                                             
 
35
 In three out of the eight cases, unemployment has decreased and in two cases it was below the 
average. In the remaining three cases, both conditions were present. 
36
 In two cases unemployment was either below average or decreasing; in three cases, both 
conditions were present. 
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Weak and Strong Reforms 
A large number of deregulation processes concerning the relaxation of EPL are 
only marginal. The actual changes in EPL are, therefore, mostly low. The 
following examines whether there is a difference between weak and strong 
reforms. Since the perception and the experienced threat is likely to depend on 
the size of reform (Ochel et al. 2008; Pierson 1996), the role of unemployment 
and other labour market conditions might vary from each other. The empirical 
configurations for weak and strong reforms (changes in the EPL-scale ≤ 0.5 and 
above 0.5) are represented in Table 5.5. 
Table 5.5: Truth table – Weak and strong reforms 
 
A B C D 
Y=EPL > 
0.5 N 
 1 0 1 0 1 1 
 1 0 1 1 1 1 
 1 0 0 0 1 3 
 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Consistency  83.3 0.17 0.50 0.33   
 
A B C D 
Y=EPL ≤ 
0.5 N 
 1 1 1 1 1 2 
 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 0 1 1 1 1 1 
 0 1 1 0 1 2 
Consistency 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.33   
 A = low or decreasing unemployment  
 B = high proportion of temporary workers 
 C = high unemployment benefits  
 D = increasing job insecurity for insiders 
 Y= relaxation of regulations on regular employment (EPR) and temporary employment 
(EPT) 
 
Source: own research. 
For strong reforms, the equation A + aBC  Y can be confirmed. The 
employment protection reform in Germany in the year 1997 is the only major 
reform, where unemployment was neither below the average nor decreasing.37 
Conversely, all the other conditions were present, i.e. strong competition by 
temporary workers, high social expenditures for unemployment and increasing 
job insecurity for labour market insiders. 
                                                             
 
37
  In one case unemployment has decreased prior to the reform, in another one it was below the 
average. In the remaining three cases both conditions were present. 
 134 
 
In the case of weak reforms, the picture is different. We can now observe 
two other necessary conditions: these are B (high share of temporary workers) 
and C (unemployment benefits above the average). Both conditions are totally 
consistent, i.e. they both are present in all cases were a weak reform has been 
implemented. For weak reforms the following equation can be derived: BC  A.38  
5.8 Conclusion 
The motivation of the paper was to shed some light onto the rationales that lie 
behind the implementation of a reform. The main assumption in this context was 
that there is a conflict of interests on the political level. While the relaxation of 
EPL might have positive economic effects, politicians might be punished with 
deselection by not satisfying the interests of the labour market insiders who are 
the decisive voters. In this context, it is assumed that politicians only get the 
necessary support when unemployment is low or decreasing, or when the 
incumbent employees are threatened by detrimental conditions, like high social 
expenditures for unemployment, increases in acute job insecurity and strong 
competition by outsiders. 
The results for the EU-15 countries between 1995 and 2005 show that 
there have been several reforms. Nearly two-thirds affected temporary 
employment or the use of fixed-term contracts. Moreover, changes in EPL for 
temporary employment were mostly more pronounced. In this respect, the results 
already suggest that the implementation of essential reforms on regular 
employment seem to be accompanied by certain difficulties that might prevent 
the actual realization. 
The configurations of the QCA illustrate that there is no single but 
alternate necessary conditions in order to explain the presence of a reform within 
the sample. All cases can be explained by a positive labour market situation, i.e. 
unemployment rates that are below average or decreasing, or, on the other hand, 
by a negative labour market situation in combination with a high share of 
                                                             
 
38
 However, the equation A + a*(BC) is not wrong, but it can be further simplified. The reduction of 
complexity is one of the main aims of QCA.  
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temporary workers who compete with the incumbent employees and high levels 
of unemployment benefits that can be interpreted as high social expenditures for 
the insider. So, at least two threatening conditions have been present in the 
absence of a positive labour market situation to implement a reform. However, 
increasing job insecurity has played only a minor role. Moreover, decreasing 
employment rates might not be sufficient for measuring acute job insecurity. The 
fear of job loss is mainly determined by operational factors (Mohr 1997).  
By distinguishing between reforms on regular and temporary employment, 
it was expected that the existence of positive labour market conditions are more 
meaningful for amendments on regular dismissal rules. This can be, at least to a 
certain degree, confirmed by the results. In all but one case, labour market 
conditions have been positive prior to a reform for dismissal rules for regular 
employment. In the context of deregulations on temporary employment, in three 
out of ten cases a negative labour market situation with high and increasing 
unemployment rates can be observed prior to the reform. 
According to the literature, it was expected that the role of temporary 
employees is more influential in the case of reforms affecting regulation of the 
use of temporary work and fixed-term contracts. However, the consistency rates 
confirm the opposite. This indicates that outsiders have been generally interested 
in more flexible employment protection and that they were influential for both 
types of reforms. 
The analysis also shows that there are differences between weak and 
strong reforms. For weak reforms, i.e. changes in the EPL-index lower than 0.5 
units, the existence of a high share of temporary employment together with high 
unemployment benefits can be identified as necessary conditions. The role of 
labour market conditions has been in the case of weak reforms only of minor 
importance. In contrast, in the case of strong reforms, the presence of a positive 
labour market situation explains nearly all cases, while high unemployment 
benefits or high shares of temporary employment were mostly absent. These 
results confirm the assumption that there are different underlying mechanisms for 
the implementation of weak and strong reforms. This might be explained by 
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differences in the perception of reforms and the corresponding resistance 
towards them. 
The results clearly demonstrate that in most cases the relaxation of 
employment protection has not been used as a labour market instrument to fight 
back high and increasing unemployment. Although the relaxation of EPL might in 
the long run lead to a reduction of unemployment. Politicians seem to apply 
strategic approaches in order to avoid punishment by the decisive voters.  
The findings deviate in comparison to the previous research results. Saint-
Paul (1996) and Ochel (2009) both state that reforms facilitating the use of 
temporary employment are initiated by an increase in unemployment. Within the 
present analysis, however, unemployment has been either low or decreasing 
before the reform. Differences might be a result of variations in the sample and 
the reference period. This indicates that the underlying mechanisms strongly 
depend on present conditions. There seems to be no general and time consistent 
pattern that explains the role of unemployment for the implementation of 
employment protection reforms. 
The results also demonstrate that, independent of the level and trends in 
unemployment, reforms that have taken place between 1995 and 2005 within the 
EU-15 countries were in line with the flexicurity strategy of the European 
Commission (2013b). The main assumption of this strategy is that more and 
better jobs can be achieved by combining flexible EPL with high level of income 
security provided by generous unemployment benefits. Except for strong reforms, 
consistency rates for the condition ‘high unemployment benefits’ always count at 
least 80 %. Thus, the provision of adequate income security levels was probably 
an important condition for getting the support of the decisive voters independent 
of other labour market influences. 
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Annex: Employment protection reforms and labour market conditions between 1995 and 2005 
  
Development 
of 
unemployment 
rates 
Unemployment 
rates 
Positive 
labour 
market 
situation 
Share of 
temporary 
employment 
Unemployment 
benefits 
Employment 
insecurity EPL reforms 
Strong 
reforms 
Reforms on 
regular 
employment 
Reforms on 
temporary 
employment 
AT_2003 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 
BE_1997 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
DE_1997 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
DE_2002 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
DE_2004 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
DK_1995 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
ES_1997 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
ES_2003 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
FI_1996 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
FI_2001 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
GR_2003 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 
NL_1999 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
PT_1996 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 
PT_2004 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
SE_1997 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
Source: own research on the basis of Eurostat 2013a, 2013b, 2013c and OECD 2010. 
Development of unemployment rates: 1 = unemployment decreased within the three years prior to the reform, i.e. between t -3 and t-1; 0 = otherwise 
Unemployment rates: 1 = unemployment rates are below the average of the EU-15 countries in the corresponding year; 0 = otherwise 
Positive labour market situation: 1 = unemployment either decreased within the last three years and/or is below the average; 0 = otherwise 
Share of temporary employment: 1 = share is above the average of the EU-15 countries in the corresponding year; 0 = otherwise 
Unemployment benefits: 1 = benefits are above the average of the EU-15 countries in the corresponding year; 0 = otherwise 
Employment insecurity: 1 = employment decreased within the three years prior to the reform, i.e. between t-3 and t-1; 0 = otherwise 
EPL reforms: 1 = EPL has been relaxed; 0 = otherwise 
Strong reforms: 1= the change on the EPL-index is bigger than 0.5 units; 0 = otherwise 
Reforms on regular employment: 1 = the reform affected legislation for regular employment; 0 = otherwise 
Reforms on temporary employment: 1 = the reform affected legislation for temporary employment; 0 = otherwise
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6. Conclusion 
Over the last few decades, EPL has been relaxed in many European countries. In 
particular, the use of temporary employment has been simplified. However, the 
empirical literature shows ambiguous results concerning the general relation 
between EPL and unemployment. In many studies, the effects are insignificant; a 
change in EPL does not alter the level of unemployment (Skedinger 2010). 
Besides methodological aspects (Addison/Teixeira 2001), one reason for this 
outcome might be that EPL works differently for the labour force depending on 
the position of the workers in the labour market. Although the net effect on 
unemployment might be zero, benefits of one group resulting from more rigid or 
flexible EPL may be balanced by the disadvantages of others. This would imply 
that changes in EPL influence existing imbalances on the labour market. 
By examining the relation between EPL and its labour market outcomes 
for different labour force groups, this assumption is in the focus of the thesis. The 
thesis provides evidence to what extent social inequalities among different labour 
force groups are related to the level of or changes in EPL in particular concerning 
the distribution of unemployment risks. It also investigates the role of social 
inequality for the implementation of EPL reforms leading to more flexible labour 
markets. For this purpose, different European countries have been compared. 
Moreover, the thesis makes a contribution concerning the applicability of the 
insider-outsider theory of Lindbeck and Snower (1987, 1988, 2001, 2002), which 
provides the theoretical basis for the studies. 
6.1 The relation between EPL and social inequality 
The thesis investigates whether EPL is related to changes in social inequality. In 
this regard, it mainly concentrates on the question of how EPL regulates access 
to employment and unemployment respectively. Employment is considered to be 
central for different manifestations of social inequality, e.g. the level of income, 
access to goods, the extent of social participation. Each of the studies has 
addressed specific aspects in this context.  
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The first study deals with deregulation processes and their influence on 
the differences in unemployment and employment rates between individuals with 
different skill levels. The analysis focuses on changes in European countries 
between 1997 and 2007. The effects of EPL are examined separately for 
regulation of regular and temporary employment and under the control of further 
labour market policies and economic developments.  
The regression results show that the relaxation of dismissal rules for 
regular employment actually decreases the imbalances in the distribution of 
unemployment between medium and highly skilled individuals. By distinguishing 
unemployment rates according to gender, the effect turns out to be significant 
only for women. This indicates that the effects of EPL on unemployment are not 
only moderated by skills but also by gender. One central difference to the male 
labour workforce is that women take career breaks more often because of 
parenting. Therefore, opportunities to re-enter the labour market seem to be 
differently affected by EPL for women with medium and high qualifications. Less 
rigid EPL seems to reduce employment barriers in particular for medium skilled 
women. 
However, the study also demonstrates that more flexible dismissal rules 
for regular employment decrease inequalities in employment rates between low 
and highly skilled individuals of both genders. For women, a decrease in 
inequalities in employment rates can also be observed among medium and highly 
skilled workers.  
Reforms facilitating the use of temporary employment have no effect at all 
on the distribution of unemployment risks. In contrast to what was expected, a 
relaxation of EPL does not improve the labour market position of low skilled 
workers compared to individuals with higher qualifications, at least in the short-
term. However, it must be taken into consideration that EPL reforms might have 
long-term effects that are not controlled for. The present analysis only 
concentrates on potential changes in the distribution of unemployment risks one 
year after the reform has taken place. 
Changes in EPL, thus, influence the access to employment for various 
skill groups in different ways. An approximation of unemployment risks by 
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relaxing EPL for regular employment can only be observed between medium and 
highly qualified women. At first sight, thus, the effect of EPL on social inequality 
seems to be rather low. However, the consideration of employment rates 
conveys a different picture: The more flexible regulation on EPL for regular 
employment becomes, the smaller the differences between the low and highly 
skilled workers (for women also between the medium and highly skilled) are. This 
implies that more rigid EPL for regular employment leads to exclusionary effects 
influencing the access to employment in a very negative way. Thus, stricter EPL 
rather forces disadvantaged labour force groups completely out of the labour 
market instead of increasing their unemployment risks. A relaxation of dismissal 
rules, therefore, could lead to a reduction of social inequality. With regard to 
regulation of temporary employment, effects are only significant concerning the 
differences in employment rates for women. Thus, a more simplified use of 
temporary employment could be an instrument in order to increase labour market 
participation of low and medium skilled women in comparison to the highly 
skilled.  
The second study is a cross-sectional analysis and focuses on the level of 
EPL and its relation to individual unemployment risks; in contrast to the first 
study, where the effects of EPL reforms on unemployment have been 
investigated. The underlying assumption is that the level of EPL remains 
relatively stable over time and the study, therefore, reveal more general 
correlations between EPL and unemployment. Since it is assumed that the 
disadvantages of the low skilled have been mainly induced by skill-biased 
technological change, the study also focuses on interactions between EPL and 
levels of technological progress. The level of EPL is measured by the overall 
index provided by the OECD capturing regulation of regular and temporary 
employment. Technological progress is operationalized by the share of 
employment in (medium-) high-tech manufacturing and knowledge intensive 
services. The results of the multilevel regression analyses demonstrate that EPL 
is positively related with the likelihood to be unemployed for all skill groups. Strict 
EPL is disadvantageously for all workers whatever the skill level acquired, 
although the differences due to the level of EPL are rather low. In relative terms, 
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the relation between EPL and unemployment is strongest for the highly skilled.  
Therefore, strict EPL is generally related to higher unemployment rates, but to 
fewer differences in individual unemployment risks between skill-groups. In this 
regard, higher levels of EPL should lead to less social inequality. In contrast, the 
relaxation of EPL is then related to greater imbalances between skill groups. 
However, the relationship between EPL and the individual unemployment 
risks of the medium and highly skilled is moderated by the level of technological 
progress. In countries with considerable technological advancements, the relation 
between EPL and unemployment can even become negative. The results 
indicate that flexibility demands for the low skilled do not depend on or change 
with technological developments. For the medium and highly skilled, the need for 
numerical flexibility seems to become less with technological advancements, 
probably due to the higher demand for functional flexibility. Thus, in countries with 
high levels of technological progress, high levels of EPL are related to greater 
imbalances in unemployment risks between individuals with low qualifications 
and individuals with medium or high skill levels compared to countries with more 
flexible dismissal rules.  
With regard to social inequality, the results show that the relation between 
EPL and unemployment risks for different skill groups varies with contextual 
factors. In countries with less technological development, unemployment risks 
are more equally distributed among different skill groups when EPL is strict, while 
imbalances are strong between the low skilled and the medium and highly skilled 
in countries with considerable technological advancements.  
The study, furthermore, examines the link between EPL and long-term 
unemployment risks. However, no robust relation was identified between them. In 
contrast to what is claimed in the literature, strict EPL does not necessarily create 
employment barriers for outsiders by decreasing hiring incentives. It may also 
result in more frequent transitions between employment and unemployment. In 
the case of strict EPL, employers might prefer to use a legitimate exit option, for 
example, by not prolonging existing employment relationships after the end of 
trial periods or fixed-term contracts in contrast to countries with more flexible 
dismissal rules. What the paper does not look for, is the relation between EPL 
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and inactivity. As the first study has demonstrated, changes in EPL primarily lead 
to the displacement from the labour market. Therefore, it may be possible, that 
there is a relation between the level of EPL and individual and country specific 
inactivity risks. 
The third study concentrates on older men and examines the relation 
between EPL, previous employment biographies and current labour market 
positions. Here it is distinguished between employment, unemployment and early 
retirement. It is also a cross-sectional analysis in which micro and macro 
variables are simultaneously taken into account. The study examines whether 
EPL is related to differences in the labour market position for older individuals 
with stable or unstable work histories. The stability of work histories is defined by 
job tenure and the share of regular employment (i.e. full-time employment). 
Individuals with unstable work histories are more likely to be unemployed in old 
age. In contrast to what might been expected, the relation between 
unemployment risks and previous employment biographies is not moderated by 
dismissal rules.  
However, the regression results of the third study demonstrate that 
inequalities in the likelihood of taking early retirement resulting from previous 
labour experiences are affected by the level of EPL. Older workers with a high 
share of regular employment are more likely to retire compared to people who 
spend fewer years in full-time employment. According to the results, rigid 
dismissal rules reduce the probability of early retirement for individuals with 
consistent careers in regular employment, but only when the expected pension 
benefits are small. If benefits are generous, the reverse effect can be observed, 
i.e. the probability of early retirement increases. Strict EPL, thus, protects older 
workers with stable careers against dismissal, but only if alternative options of 
displacement by means of early retirement are not available. For people with 
inconsistent careers, in contrast, the observed differences in early retirement 
risks due to the implemented level of EPL are only marginal.  
Again, as in the second study, we can observe diverging relations 
between EPL and social inequality. In general, early retirement is seen as a 
socially accepted alternative to unemployment. In countries, with generous early 
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retirement pensions, strict EPL leads to great differences in the probability of 
early retirement between older labour market insiders and outsiders. These 
differences become smaller, and might even reverse direction, the less generous 
early retirement pensions are. EPL is not related to individual unemployment 
risks. Thus, social inequalities due to existing differences in the distribution of 
unemployment between older workers with stable and instable careers cannot be 
altered by strengthening or relaxing dismissal rules. 
The fourth study of the thesis takes a totally different perspective. It 
examines the role of unemployment in the implementation of reforms relaxing 
EPL and, thereby, focuses on the meaning of already existing inequalities in the 
labour market. As methodological approach, the study applies QCA. It addresses 
a conflict of interests on the political level. While more flexible EPL is, from an 
economical perspective, expected to decrease unemployment, high and 
increasing unemployment rates might reduce the political support by insiders for 
such reforms. Due to their numerical dominance, insiders are considered to be 
the decisive voters. Generally, insiders are expected to increase the existing 
inequalities with outsiders by supporting policies that improve their own labour 
market position and worsen employment chances of outsiders, in particular, when 
they feel threatened by unemployment. 
The results of the QCA, capturing the EU-15 countries between 1995 and 
2005 demonstrate that there is no single condition but several alternate 
necessary conditions for the presence of a reform. However, in most cases, the 
labour market situation has been positive: i.e. with low or decreasing 
unemployment rates. Thus, countries with low or decreasing social inequality in 
their labour force, expressed in the level of unemployment rates, seem to be 
more likely to implement reforms which facilitate labour market entry for 
outsiders. That means that there might be self-reinforcing effects which influence 
imbalances in unemployment risks between insiders and outsiders. However, 
threatening conditions like high social expenditures and a high share of 
temporary employment together with high and increasing unemployment rates 
can also explain the presence of a reform leading to more flexible EPL.  
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 Moreover, the study detects some differences between the 
implementation of weak and strong reforms. In the case of weak reforms, the role 
of labour market conditions is only of minor importance in contrast to the 
implementation of strong reforms. Between changes in EPL for regular and 
temporary employment differences are less pronounced.  
As the discussion of the findings has demonstrated, the relation between 
EPL and social inequality is ambiguous. A relaxation of EPL can work in both 
ways. Mechanisms of social closure, thus, can only partly be observed. 
Furthermore, it strongly depends on external effects, e.g. the level of 
technological progress or, with respect to early retirement, the generosity of early 
retirement pensions. Moreover, the results indicate that EPL is rather related to 
the complete displacement from the labour market, e.g. in terms of inactivity or 
early retirement, instead of unemployment. 
6.2 Theoretical contribution 
The insider-outsider theory of Lindbeck and Snower (1987, 1988, 2001, 2002) 
has been originally established in order to explain differences in unemployment 
risks. Within the present studies, the relation between EPL and the observed 
inequalities in unemployment risks is less strong than expected by following the 
theoretical assumptions of the theory. According to the insider-outsider theory, a 
reduction of labour turn-over costs should improve the employment chances of 
outsiders and reduce their unemployment risks. In this regard, the relaxation of 
EPL is expected to decrease labour turnover costs for the company. Deregulation 
processes should, furthermore, decrease the bargaining power of insiders and, 
by reducing separation costs, improve the labour market position of outsiders. 
For individuals with different skill levels, the thesis provides some 
supporting evidence. The relaxation of dismissal rules for regular employment 
decreases imbalances between medium and highly skilled women. However, 
workers with medium skills are not considered as labour market outsiders. Due to 
their greater unemployment risks in general, as a consequence of technological 
progress, this characteristic should rather apply to the low skilled. 
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In countries with a very high degree of technological progress, which are 
only few, we can observe contrasting relations between the low skilled in 
comparison to the medium and highly skilled. Very flexible EPL is related to lower 
unemployment risks for the low skilled in comparison to countries with more rigid 
EPL, but to higher unemployment risks for the medium and highly skilled. This 
might imply that a relaxation of EPL can reduce existing inequalities in the 
distribution of unemployment between skill groups. However, this finding does not 
apply to countries which are less technologically developed. In contrast, there, 
more flexible EPL is related to greater imbalances between skill groups. These 
results indicate that countries differ according to their flexibility demands. 
Moreover, the level of EPL does not moderate unemployment risks for old 
men with stable or instable careers nor is it related to individual long-term 
unemployment risks. 
There are different explanations why the expected results concerning the 
distribution of unemployment risks according to the insider-outsider theory cannot 
be observed39: 
 Positive (e.g. increase in productivity) and negative (e.g. increase in labour 
costs) outcomes may compensate each other. This might also explain why 
the general effects of EPL on unemployment are mostly insignificant 
(Skedinger 2010). 
 Companies are not able or willing to adapt their hiring and firing decisions or 
the composition of their work force (in the short term) respectively, e.g. 
because changes in EPL are too small to cause any significant effect.  
Changes in labour turnover costs might also be transferred to their 
customers. 
 The classification of insiders and outsiders is not applicable to the described 
groups. In some countries, for instance, the variation in unemployment risks 
between low, medium and highly skilled are rather low. These countries also 
show less technological progress, which could explain the differences in the 
relation between EPL and unemployment. 
                                                             
 
39
 The list does not make a claim on completeness. 
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 EPL interacts with other contextual factors, e.g. economic determinants or 
labour market policies that might compensate or dominate the relation 
between EPL and unemployment. 
 Changes in EPL may cause long-term effects. Changes in EPL, therefore, are 
rather related to differences in employment rates or inactivity rates 
respectively. This assumption is confirmed by the first study, which has 
demonstrated that a relaxation of EPL is related to fewer imbalances in 
employment rates between low and highly skilled workers.  
Following the assumptions of the insider-outsider theory with regard to the 
implementation of a reform, it has been expected that insiders, who are 
considered to be the decisive voters, do not support any legislative amendments 
that interfere with their own labour market position. Therefore, reforms relaxing 
EPL should only be implemented in times of low or decreasing unemployment. 
For most cases, this assumption could be confirmed within the fourth study. 
However, in some, unemployment was high and increasing prior to the reform, 
but insiders were also confronted with threatening conditions that are expressed 
in high social welfare contributions and competition by temporary workers. These 
conditions probably had a positive effect on the insiders’ incentives to support 
such EPL reforms. 
The insider-outsider theory has already been criticized several times for 
its explanation of labour market regulations (Emmenegger 2009). In this context, 
it has been argued that EPL reforms are only one part of a policy package. The 
decision to support a specific party might also result from other political targets 
that are pursued by politicians. Moreover, outsiders might also be interested in 
higher levels of job-security:  
‘If one does not have a job, one may believe that job security regulations 
decrease one’s chance of becoming employed. But being unemployed may also make 
one realize that once in a new job, regulations will be beneficial for him or her too. Thus, 
while the benefit of job security regulations is rather obvious for labour market insiders, 
there are also good reasons for labour market outsiders to value job security regulations 
highly’ (Emmenegger 2009: 134).  
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6.3 Limitations 
Studies need to deal with certain limitations that are mainly caused by 
methodological restrictions. In order to ensure comparability between countries, it 
is necessary to refer to more general indicators that are available for as many 
cases as possible. For this reason, not all aspects that are captured by national 
EPL can be taken into account. 
Moreover, the methods that have been used, do not apply an unrestricted 
number of country level variables. This is in particular true for the studies that 
estimate micro and macro level coefficients simultaneously. Due to the small 
number of cases that could be included at the macro level, only a few selected 
country level variables can be taken into account. For this reason, it was not 
possible to differentiate the various dimensions that are captured by the EPL 
index provided by the OECD. Differences in one aspect, for instance the amount 
of severance payment, might be more influential for the hiring or firing decisions 
of employers, than others, such as the obligation to re-employ an employee after 
a dismissal. 
Since the results of the second and third study are cross-sectional, they 
also do not allow causal explanations. However, they illustrate the general 
relation between EPL and individual labour market outcomes, from which at least 
presumptions concerning the effects of EPL reforms can be derived. 
This thesis has demonstrated that the relation between EPL and 
unemployment, at least for the medium and highly skilled, is moderated by the 
level of technological progress that has taken place in a country. The relation 
between EPL and early retirement for older individuals is moderated by the 
generosity of early retirement pensions. In addition, there are also several 
theoretical arguments that the relation between EPL and unemployment can also 
be moderated by other labour market policies that could not be included in the 
empirical analyses because of methodological restrictions (Esping-Anderson 
2000, de Beer/Schils 2005). In this regard, wage systems are expected to be 
particularly meaningful. Wage systems set the framework for wage competitions 
between insiders and outsiders. Theoretically, outsiders could improve their 
bargaining position by only demanding low wages. However, such wage 
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underbidding processes are usually restricted in practice, for instance, by the 
establishment of minimum wages or very low standard wages (Lindbeck/Snower 
1988). Very flexible wage systems, in contrast, may compensate the negative 
employment effects of EPL by allowing outsiders to negotiate low wages. On the 
other hand, the relation between EPL and unemployment might be strengthened 
the more rigid the wage systems are.  
In addition, several studies have demonstrated that the growth and 
distribution of unemployment depends on numerous influences (Blanchard 2005, 
Nickell et al. 2005). 
Each of the studies concentrates on very specific details concerning the 
relationship between EPL and unemployment, i.e. on selected labour force 
groups and specific labour market conditions. This means, of course, that there 
are still a bunch of open questions that can be raised with regard to the relation 
between EPL and social inequality. It remains still unclear, for instance, how EPL 
is related to social inequality for other outsider groups like migrants, individuals 
with disabilities and so on. Furthermore, the results do not refer to the quality of 
employment that might be related to labour market segmentation. Several studies 
demonstrate that there is a relation between EPL and atypical employment. The 
level of EPL is, for example, related to low wages and the share of temporary 
employment (Bertola 1990; Gebel/Giesecke 2011; Koeniger et al. 2007; van 
Lancker 2012). Reductions in inequality due to the improvement of employment 
opportunities for outsiders could be compensated, e.g. by low incomes or higher 
levels of job insecurity. Moreover, differences do not only exist between, but also 
within countries. EPL might also have varying effects for different branches or 
sectors. Because of the absence of firm specific determinants in cross-national 
data sets, these interrelations could not be addressed within the thesis. 
6.4 Policy Implications 
One striking result of the thesis is that no general policy implications can be 
drawn from the studies. The deregulation of EPL is no panacea to solve labour 
market problems in particular with respect to the existence of social inequality. 
Therefore, the demand of the European Commission for more flexible dismissal 
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rules within the member states of the European Union has to be regarded 
critically (European Commission 2013). 
The relation between EPL and labour market outcomes varies for different 
labour force groups. Therefore, political targets that are pursued by a reform have 
to be tested carefully and, where necessary, balanced against each other. 
Moreover, politicians who are willing to change EPL, have to consider the 
circumstances determining the possibilities to implement a reform and to develop 
an appropriate strategy to receive the support by the decisive voters. The results 
of the fourth study have shown that reforms have mostly been implemented, 
when labour market conditions have been positive, i.e. with low or decreasing 
unemployment rates or when insiders have been confronted with strong 
competition by outsiders or high social expenditures as a result of high and 
increasing unemployment. 
EPL can be used as labour market instrument in order to address current 
social developments. Social inequalities between low and highly skilled workers 
that have been caused by technological progress can be reduced by more 
flexible EPL. This can be seen in the relation between the level of EPL and the 
individual unemployment risks of the different skill groups in the second study, 
but also by the short-term effects of EPL reforms on the employment rates that 
are demonstrated in the first study. 
An increase of labour market participation of older workers – as a 
response to demographic change – can only be achieved by the relaxation of 
dismissal rules if early pension benefits are low. In countries with generous 
benefits, the reverse is the case. 
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